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ABSTRACT 
 
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps’ long history in China before World War II 
was a prelude to a little known struggle. In the aftermath of Japan’s surrender in August 
1945, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps embarked on a complex series of operations to 
rescue Allied prisoners of war, stabilize North China, and repatriate millions of Japanese 
soldiers and civilians.  The more than 50,000 Marines and over a hundred vessels of the 
U.S. Seventh Fleet committed to China repatriated over three million Japanese and 
transported 200,000 Chinese Nationalist soldiers to North China.  While doing so, they 
became enmeshed in the complex military and political landscape that was the Chinese 
Civil War.  Over the next four years, U.S. Navy leaders, intent on reestablishing the 
longstanding presence and strategic role of the Navy in China, opposed efforts by the 
U.S. Army and State Department to withdraw all U.S. forces from the vast country.  
From 1944 to 1949, a core group of civilian and naval leaders worked steadily to shore 
up Nationalist China in the face of a growing and intractable Chinese Communist Party.  
Unwavering in their view that China was a strategic priority and that Asia stood at the 
forefront of the nascent Cold War, these leaders repeatedly clashed with General George 
C. Marshall and President Harry Truman.  Exacerbated by an atmosphere of distrust and 
intra-service rivalry, this conflict over China revealed stark divisions between the U.S. 
Navy and its sister services, and illuminated inherent differences as the United States 
struggled to come to terms with both the new Cold War and the reality of nuclear 
warfare. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On September 10th 1945, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek sent a message to 
President Harry S. Truman asking that the United States establish a “military advisory 
board” to assist China in “reorganiz[ing] her defensive military machine.”  Truman 
replied that he would take matter under consideration and referred the request to 
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for study.1  Just over a month later, on October 18th, 
Chief of Naval Operations Ernest J. King sent a memorandum to Army Chief of Staff 
George C. Marshall outlining a structure for such an and organization.  Marshall 
responded by saying:	  
“Two principles that appear to me to be essential in the establishment of the U.S. 
Advisory Group in China are: 
a. That there be no possibility of differing viewpoints on similar matters being
placed before the Generalissimo for resolution. 
b. That there be some method to insure that duplication and overlapping of
functions be avoided between the various groups in China.” 
Marshall explained his concerns about potential disunity, saying, “Differences in view 
between the Army and Navy as to what matters are of joint interest have probably 
occurred recently more often in China than any other areas of the world.”2  The Army 
Chief of Staff hoped to avoid in the future the difficulties he had observed during the 
previous four years of war.  From 1941 to 1945 Army and Navy leaders both in 
1	  Chiang to Truman, September 10, 1945; Truman to Chiang, September 13, 1945. Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1945  (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 19xx):, 7: 554, 557.	  2	  Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens, eds., The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 5: The 
Finest Soldier – January 1st, 1945 – January 7th, 1947 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003): 
333. 
	   2 
Washington and the Pacific debated how best to defeat Japan and competed for the 
allocation of resources to their theaters of operations. 
 With Japan’s surrender in August 1945, State Department officials, Army and 
Navy leaders began to debate how best to stabilize China and what role each service 
should play in that undertaking.  The concurrent rise of the Cold War in Europe and the 
Mediterranean and conflict over defense unification overshadowed the development of 
U.S. policy concerning China both at that time and among diplomatic historians since. 
Indeed, the entire postwar American military intervention in China has been neglected 
by military and naval historians. Very few histories of World War II, the Cold War, or 
the Korean War even mention the presence of an entire U.S. Navy fleet or two 
reinforced Marine Corps divisions in China. Those few scholars who have studied the 
American intervention in China tend to focus on either the Navy or Marine Corps’ 
separate roles. Although a few studies of the end of World War II shed light on the first 
phase of the Navy and Marine Corps intervention, no single study has attempted to place 
the 1944-1949 intra-service rivalry over China within the context of the burgeoning Cold 
War in Asia. The conflict over China had many components and causes, and involved 
much more than simple intra-service rivalry.  For the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, these 
disputes overlapped with a little remembered intervention into mainland China that saw 
the ending of one war and the beginning of another.  
The intervention can be divided into three main phases. The first, October 1944 
through December 1945, was perhaps the most contentious. This period coincided with 
the beginning of U.S. Army Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer’s tour as 
3 
Commander of the China Theater, and ended with the arrival of General George C. 
Marshall as a special envoy to attempt reconciliation between the Nationalists and 
Communists. The second phase, from January 1946 to January 1947, began with signs of 
progress in negotiations aimed at establishing a framework for peace between the armies 
and governments led by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, as well as cooperation 
between leaders of the U.S. Army and Navy. But within weeks optimism gave way to 
confusion and disillusionment as the cease fire brokered by Marshall in January broke 
down and disagreements over the future role of the American military in East Asia 
intensified.  During the third and final phase of U.S. operations in China, the Cold War 
engulfed East Asia and contributed to increasingly sharp and often public debates about 
the remaining U.S. Navy and Marine Corps personnel in China, and what to do with 
them. In this last phase the State Department led the opposition to the Navy’s efforts to 
remain in China. 
Determined to protect key strategic interests, guard against communist 
expansion, and maintain their longstanding proprietary and historical relationship, a core 
group of senior U.S. Navy leaders demanded that there be no withdrawal from China.  
For Army leaders such as George Marshall and Douglas MacArthur, China was a 
peripheral concern. Their disappointing experience with Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-
shek during the war with Japan led them to distance themselves from what they 
considered a corrupt and unreliable ally.  Navy leaders felt differently. Secretary of the 
Navy James V. Forrestal, Chief of Naval Operations Ernest King, and Seventh Fleet 
commanders Thomas C. Kinkaid, Daniel E. Barbey, and Charles M. Cooke believed 
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China lay at the heart of America’s longstanding relationship with East Asia. For 
cultural and historic reasons, the U.S. Navy and Marines believed China to be a strategic 
priority. Facing the headwinds of the new Cold War and a new and unfamiliar postwar 
world, the Navy’s leaders were slow to realize that the China of past years was gone 
forever. Overwhelming yet misplaced concerns over the Cold War in Asia and the 
Navy’s proprietary relationship with China fueled its leaders’ desire to stay in a county 
torn asunder and beyond any other nation’s control. 
The American post-WWII intervention in China is dimly remembered today. 
Having occurred in the years between the end of World War II and the beginning of the 
Korean conflict, even modern members of the U.S. Navy or Marine Corps have little 
knowledge of the size and scope of the American effort in China. Yet even by the 
colossal standards of World War II it was a major military operation. At its height more 
than 50,000 U.S. Marines were utilized in various roles in the aftermath of Japan’s 
surrender, as were over a hundred U.S. Navy warships and their crews. Millions of 
Asians were repatriated or transported by U.S. Navy vessels to new homes or to new 
battlefields. Some of the U.S. Navy’s operations were useful to Chinese and Japanese 
alike. Others were not. Despite its best intentions the military presence of the United 
States in China deepened the mistrust between the administration of Harry Truman and 
the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong. This would have profound 
consequences for the future. 
This study places the conflict between the U.S. Army and Navy in the context of 
the Navy and Marine Corps’ role in the Cold War world. Reduced to a fraction of its 
5 
wartime strength by 1946 and beset by ideological and strategic challenges on all sides, 
both the Navy and Marine Corps were forced to fight a defensive struggle against new 
technologies and false predictions for future warfare. One of its greatest defenders, Navy 
and later Defense Secretary James Forrestal, would play a prominent role in the Navy’s 
China policy, much more than has been previously understood. Other luminaries in this 
rivalry include George Marshall, who so dominated U.S. foreign and diplomatic policy 
in the late 1940s, especially with regards to China. These and other American leaders 
would argue, bitterly at times, over the proper place for the Navy and Marines in China.  
Their personalities, backgrounds, and service loyalty would all play an important part in 
the struggle that follows. 
6 
Figure 1: Map of North China and Manchuria 
Source: Newspaper PM, inc. 1945, Map Reading Room, Library of Congress. 
Note on Geographical Names: For this study the Pinyin system of Chinese place names has been 
utilized, with the following exceptions. Due to their familiarity to Western readers, the cities of 
Port Arthur and Mukden are referred to by the traditional and historical spelling.  
7 
Table 1: Prominent Geographical Names by Transliteration System 
Pinyin  Traditional System Wade-Giles 
Beijing  Peking  Pei-ching 
Chongqing Chungking Ch’ung-ch’ing 
Dalian  Dairen  Ta-lien 
Fuzhou  Foochow Fu-chou 
Guangdong Kwantung Kuang-tung 
Guangzhou Canton  Kuang-chou 
Guling  Kuling  Kuling 
Haerbin Harbin  Ha-erh-pin 
Jiulong  Kowloon Chiu-lung 
Lushun  Port Arthur Lu-shun 
Liaoning Liaoning Liao-ning 
Beidaihe Peitaiho Pei Tai Ho 
Qingdao Tsingtao Ch’ing-tao 
Shanghai Shanghai Shangh-hai 
Shenyang Mukden Shen-yang 
Tianjin  Tientsin T’ien-chin 
Wuzhou Wuchow Wu-chou 
Xiamen  Amoy  Hsia-men 
Yanan  Yenan  Yen-an 
Yantai  Chefoo  Yan-t’ai 
Source: Bruce Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, Modern China:  Continuity and Change 1644 to the 
Present (New York: Prentince Hall, 2010): A1 
8 
CHAPTER I 
THE U.S. NAVY, ARMY, AND MARINE CORPS IN CHINA, 1900-1945 
On June 22nd 1945 the island of Okinawa was declared secure, eighty-two days 
after savage battle had soaked the rocky ground with blood. The casualties were horrific. 
The United States suffered nearly 13,000 killed in action and more than 80,000 
wounded. Conservative estimates placed the number of Japanese dead, both military and 
civilian, at more than 100,000. And then there were the kamikazes. Hundreds of barely 
trained Japanese pilots had hurled themselves in a form of ritual suicide at anything 
afloat flying an American flag, sinking and damaging dozens of warships and killing 
nearly 5,000 sailors.  Americans had faced the unique Japanese desire to fight to the 
death since Guadalcanal in 1942 but the scale of Okinawa stunned nonetheless.  In his 
history of the closing months of the war historian Max Hastings concluded that, “At 
every level, from high command to fighting soldiers, sailors, and Marines, Americans 
emerged from the battle shocked by the ferocity of the resistance they encountered, the 
determination of the Japanese combatants to die rather than accept defeat.”1 
By August the First Marine Division on Okinawa circulated with rumors.  Many 
weary leathernecks along with the exhausted and bloodied sailors offshore looked north 
towards the Japanese home islands, envisioning another Okinawa on an even more 
horrifying scale.  Very few expected to be sent home. With the thunderclap 
announcement of the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the all but 
1	  Max Hastings, Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45 (2007): 403.	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disbelieved surrender of Japan most believed that they would be sent to Tokyo as part of 
the occupation force.  It was met with some astonishment when word reached the sailors 
and Marines that many of them would be sent to North China. Instead of northward to 
Honshu they turned their gaze westward toward a land that both the Navy and Marine 
Corps knew well. 
 One of the First Division Marines, a thoughtful yet hardened Alabama native, 
recorded that his tent mate responded to the surprise announcement with a shout, 
exclaiming, “Hey you guys, we’ll be China Marines!”2  For many of the American 
sailors and Marines duty in China harkened back to another era, when the Navy and 
Marine Corps were permanent guests in the fabled land. Many of the youngest of them 
had heard stories from older chiefs and sergeants about service in China. Soon they 
would see the country for themselves. The First Division Marines would be among 
nearly 100,000 personnel who would be sent to strategic points in North China in the 
closing months of 1945.  Eugene B. Sledge, the quiet Alabaman Marine whose memoirs 
have earned the status of a modern classic, summarized the setting, “In the fall of 1945, 
there existed in China a power vacuum that many opposing factions stood ready to fill. 
Into this seething cauldron of political and ideological unrest we arrived – the survivors 
of the battle for Okinawa – more like schoolboys on holiday than mighty conquerors.”3 
But it would not be just the Marines in China. The U.S. Navy would go as well, and 
would set up its new Western Pacific headquarters in the North China port city of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 E. B. Sledge, China Marine: An Infantryman’s Life after World War II (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002): 9. 
3 Ibid., 1	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Qingdao. For the next four years China would be home for the recently created Seventh 
Fleet.4 
The Old China Marines, 1900-1941 
Long before Tokyo’s surrender the Navy Department considered China an area 
of special interest and responsibility.  Armed with legal standing to work and trade in 
China and ostensibly positioned to protect American Christian missionaries and 
economic interests, the U.S. Navy maintained a small but highly regarded force of 
sailors and Marines at strategic points in the vast country. Over time this small force 
developed a culture and existence all its own.  
The story of American sailors and Marines in China during the first decades of 
the 20th century carries an almost mythical quality to it. Many of the young American 
servicemen who found themselves in China during the Twenties and Thirties brought 
back fantastic tales of a technologically primitive yet cultured land fondly remembered.  
Nothing in the farms of the Midwest or even the streets of Manhattan could prepare them 
for the ancient civilization they encountered.  But beyond the cultural impressions of 
China these men also built up a well of experience and familiarity with the vast country. 
Before thousands of American bluejackets and leathernecks returned to Chinese waters 
in October of 1945 the older veterans among them had regaled them of tales of “Old 
China.”  They had been here before.   
4	  Note: The entity known as the U.S. Seventh Fleet would go through several name changes during this 
period. From late 1943 to January 1st, 1947 it would be known simply as 7th Fleet; then Naval Forces 
Western Pacific, 1947-19 August 1949; and finally United States Seventh Task Fleet, 19 August 1949-11 
February 1950. Afterwards it became known as United States Seventh Fleet, a title that it has kept to this 
day. For simplicity purposes of this study it will be referred to as Seventh Fleet for the remainder of this 
study.	  
11 
American merchant sailors had carried the Stars and Stripes into China even 
before the adoption of the U.S. Constitution. In 1784 the small American merchant ship 
Empress of China sailed into the teeming port of Canton, inaugurating a small but 
important portion of America’s international trade.5  A century later, as a result of 
relentless Western imperialism and its own internal weakness China had come to 
resemble an enormous roast that had been carved to pieces by outsiders.  The Qing 
Dynasty that had ruled China since 1644 saw its power to direct events slipping away in 
the world’s most populous nation.  Following its defeat at the hands of the British in the 
Opium War (1839-1842) and a series of other humiliations the Qing were forced to cede 
sovereignty to Western powers in more than a dozen treaty ports, most notably British-
dominated Shanghai and Hong Kong, Russian Port Arthur and Dalian, German Qingdao, 
and the French in the southern port of Guangzhouwan (see Table 1 for Chinese 
geographical names). Extraterritoriality, the legal premise that Western laws and 
customs were sovereign in these treaty ports, became one of the most glaring examples 
of Chinese humiliation and fed an attitude of disdain for the West. 
Rarely in history has so large a nation been under the thumb of outsiders.  By the 
summer of 1900, anger at Western domination, coupled with a series of droughts and 
bad harvests, exploded into an uprising that terrified and astonished European and 
American capitals.  The “Brotherhood of Harmonious Fists,” known to history as the 
Boxers, began a deadly campaign to purge China of all foreigners, any Chinese convert 
5	  Eric Jay Dolin’s When the United States First Met China: An Exotic History of Tea, Drugs, and Sail 
(New York: Liveright Publishing, 2012), pp. 22-23. 	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to Christianity, and all those who sheltered Westerners. In Shanxi more than forty 
foreign missionaries were beheaded, and tens of thousands of Chinese Christians were 
executed by the most gruesome methods.  The Boxer rising culminated in the 
encirclement of the foreign legations in Beijing and a subsequent fifty-five day siege. 
Inside citizens of more than a dozen Western nations along with thousands of desperate 
Chinese Christians clung to life, most with almost nothing to eat and all waiting for 
rescue.  
The Boxers seemed to possess a legendary status even before proclaiming 
themselves immune to modern weapons. Yet, as Chinese historian Jonathan Fenby has 
pointed out, the Boxers, who saw themselves as “a divine army marching to eradicate 
the demons threatening their country” were not rebels in the traditional sense, but instead 
were a violent and motivated minority seeking to destroy all foreign influence.6 In spite 
of a firm belief in their own invincibility as well as the support of the Qing Empress 
Dowager Cixi, the Boxers proved unable to cope with the military power of the West. A 
relief force totaling nearly twenty thousand men from eight nations, including several 
hundred U.S. sailors and Marines, ended the siege of Beijing in August 1900, and soon 
exacted a heavy price on the Qing Dynasty. Signed in September of 1901, the Boxer 
Protocol forced China to pay a large indemnity and make territorial concessions to the 
victors. Furthermore each of the signatories retained the right to station military 
personnel in Beijing for the defense of their foreign legations.7    
6	  Jonathan Fenby, Modern China:  The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 to the Present (New York: 
Harper Collins, 2008): 83.	  7	  Evan F. Carlson, “Marines as an Aid to Diplomacy in China,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 1936: 48.	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 In her study of the Boxer rebellion, Diana Preston argues that the uprising “saw 
the first steps in America’s gradual assumption from Britain of the role of an often 
misunderstood, sometimes misguided, and occasionally hypocritical world policeman.”8  
This assumption of global leadership actually began a few years earlier, with America’s 
swift victory in the Spanish-American War. The subsequent annexation of the 
Philippines placed China much closer to America’s economic grasp. In 1899, in 
response to Germany obtaining a “sphere of influence” in China’s Shandong Peninsula, 
Secretary of State John Hay issued the first Open Door Note, which declared that “all 
nations in China should enjoy perfect equality of treatment for their commerce and 
navigation within such ‘spheres’.”9 
 Thus began a new era in Asia for the United States.  After using admittedly 
brutal methods to pacify and occupy the Philippines, the entry into China revealed a new 
willingness among Americans to embrace certain aspects of imperialism, even though 
most chose not to view it that way.  American diplomats and businessman saw in China 
a land open to their interests, a new frontier of investment and trade tempered by their 
desires to avoid outright imperialism.  American missionaries saw in China millions of 
souls eager to receive Christianity.  The prevailing view among Americans was that their 
country was not a true imperialist power. Diplomatic historian Michael Schaller argues 
that when they did think of China most Americans assumed they would be welcomed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Diana Preston, The Boxer Rebellion:  The Dramatic Story of China’s War on Foreigners that Shook the 
World in the Summer of 1900. (New York: Berkley Books, 2001): x.	  9	  John Hay to Andrew D. White, “First Open Door Note,” Department of State, September 6, 1899. 
http://www.vlib.us/amdocs/texts/opendoor.html. Retrieved on November 4, 2014.	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because they were not Europeans, and thus untainted by with the stigma of imperialism. 
Schaller concludes that in this view Americans clung to a dangerous hypocrisy, writing, 
“The fact that the United States demanded and acquired all the imperialist privileges 
which others wrung from the Chinese government seemed a mere technicality.”10 
These privileges were based on a series of treaties American diplomats and 
military leaders used to legitimize their rights in China. The first and most important of 
these was signed in 1844. Backed by a three-ship squadron, Caleb Cushing, a former 
congressman, concluded an agreement with the Qing Dynasty. Signed in Macao, the 
Treaty of Wanghia granted the United States most favored-nation tariff status, 
authorization to trade at Canton and four other treaty ports, and the exemption of 
Americans in China from local laws.11  The subsequent Burlingame Treaty of 1868 also 
granted religious freedom to Americans in China, which gave legal authorization for the 
subsequent missionary crusade in Asia. As bluntly stated by naval historian William 
Braisted, “Until such time as the Chinese were deemed fit to exercise the full rights of 
sovereign independence, it was the responsibility of the U.S. Navy to extend to 
Americans within its reach protection under the unequal treaties.”  Every American 
president from Theodore to Franklin Roosevelt stretched these treaties to maximum 
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advantage, and had no qualms about establishing a semi-permanent military presence in 
China.12   
 During the decades following the American Civil War the U.S. Navy gradually 
increased its permanent presence in Asian waters. Previously titled the East India 
Squadron (1835-1861), the Asiatic Squadron (1865-1901), and the 1st Squadron of the 
Pacific Fleet (1901-1907), the U.S. Asiatic Fleet was formally established in the 
Philippines in 1907. The smallest of the U.S. Navy’s three fleets, by 1920 it numbered 
only twenty-six vessels, six of which were obsolete gunboats assigned to the Yangtze 
Patrol.13  The fleet followed a seasonal deployment, wintering at its homeport in Manila 
and in the spring and summer months sailing a long arc in the Western Pacific and South 
China Sea.  The annual cruise was as much about diplomacy as a show of force. While 
the fleet’s handful of cruisers and destroyers were regular visitors to the ports of China, 
French Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies, its river gunboats, permanently on the 
Yangtze River, were its most visible assets in China.14     
 Formally established in 1922, the Yangtze Patrol was unique. One of the most 
peculiar organizations ever created by the U.S. Navy one Yangtze boat captain captured 
the singular nature this way, writing, “Naval officers are often assigned to strange types 
of duty, but for duty afloat I believe there is none more unusual than duty on a river 
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gunboat.”15  Though an American river patrol had existed since the 1850’s not until 1903 
did a permanent naval presence emerge, when the river gunboats Elcano, Villabos, and 
Pompey arrived in Shanghai. The patrol’s mission officially was to protect American 
economic interests and citizens along the river highway that was the Yangtze.  Based out 
of Hankow, approximately 600 miles from Shanghai, the patrol’s most publicized 
function was to provide protection and support to thousands of American Christian 
missionaries.16  
 In 1925 Congress authorized funding for construction of six river gunboats to 
replace the collection of craft left over from the Spanish-American War.17 These vessels 
formed the nucleus of Yangtze Patrol during the late 1920s and 1930s.  Service on these 
small, shallow draft craft that resembled large houseboats was a tour of duty found 
nowhere else. The crew of around fifty officers and men included Chinese mess servants 
and barbers.  A special armed guard of six enlisted men carried Thompson submachine 
guns and Browning rifles at all times, unusual duty for a sailor. Navigation on the 
Yangtze was complex and dangerous, requiring great skill. Despite the availability of 
native pilots, the shallow waters and poor navigation aids led to numerous groundings.  
Even navigating through fresh water the engineers below had to struggle to keep the 
muddy, contaminated waters of the river from clogging the evaporators that fed clean 
water to the engine boilers.18 
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 Though preceded by the Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps also established itself in 
China after the Boxer rising. For most years following the First World War the Marine 
garrison in China numbered no more than a thousand men in Beijing and Shanghai. 
However this small but prominent contingent became a fixture of American foreign 
policy in Asia.  Deployment to China was highly coveted by most Marines, and several 
who served in Beijing would become legends in the Corps. Future Medal of Honor 
recipients Lewis “Chesty” Puller, Alexander Vandegrift, and Merrit B. Edson were 
perhaps the most famous of the Marines whose service in China preceded their 
remarkable exploits on Guadalcanal and elsewhere in World War II.  All recalled their 
China service with pride.  
 Augmenting the Navy and Marine Corps dominance in China was the U.S. 
Army’s 15th Infantry Regiment.  Through a complex series of circumstances from 1912 
to 1938 the 15th Regiment, minus one battalion deployed in the Philippines, was 
stationed at Tianjin in the former German legation. A unit whose placement in China 
was as complex as its exotic mixture of traditions, “a dismounted American version of 
the Bengal Lancers” in the view of Asian historian Robert O’Conner, the “Can-Do” 15th 
also included a remarkable showcase of future military leaders.19  George C. Marshall, 
Joseph Stilwell, and Matthew Ridgway all passed through Tianjin on their way to higher 
commands.  For then Lieutenant Colonel Marshall, who served as executive officer of 
the regiment from 1924 to 1927, the three years in China were most enjoyable.  Marshall 
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biographer Edward Cray notes that, “Unlike the 15th’s newly arrived Major Joseph 
Stilwell, Marshall, despite his sympathy for the Chinese people made no special effort to 
immerse himself in their history or culture.”20  He did, however, make a strong effort to 
learn the challenging Chinese language, and was able to achieve considerable 
proficiency in less than six months. Yet as Marshall’s official biographer Forrest Pogue 
concludes, Marshall considered his China tour as merely one among many in his long 
road to General of the Army.21   
  Unlike Marshall, who was joined by his wife Lily in Tianjin, most American 
servicemen were unmarried or unaccompanied by their wives in China.  The presence of 
so many unattached men in iniquitous locales like Shanghai led to endless opportunities 
to get drunk, and worse. Chinese and Russian prostitutes were plentiful, as were   
opportunities for a drunken brawl. One notorious section of Shanghai known as Blood 
Alley was the scene for many such confrontations.  O’Conner has described it as, “the 
arena in which the American Marines and Seaforth Highlanders staged some of their 
most memorable brawls.  When those contingents met in a bar, the furniture and 
glassware of the establishment was immediately written off as a total loss.”22   
 Violent brawls notwithstanding most American sailors and Marines would 
describe their time in East Asia as a peaceful and enjoyable tour of duty.  Life was good 
in China. Wares were cheap, duty was light and opportunities for leisure activities such 
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as hunting and fishing were plentiful. Liquor, an illegal commodity during Prohibition, 
was easy to obtain.23   Even for a private earning $21 a month, a fifth of whiskey and a 
quart of beer could be purchased for little more than a dollar.24 Both services enjoyed the 
cheap labor of Chinese cooks and servants, with even the most junior sailor or private 
able to afford his own personal “boy.”  One Marine officer speaking years later summed 
up the experience with simple nostalgia, saying, “The Old China days, the Shanghai and 
Peking days were wonderful.”25  
 A few Marines even enjoyed the rare opportunity to join the Navy on the 
Yangtze. Periodically Marine officers would be invited to embark on a gunboat traveling 
upriver to Chongqing.  One Marine officer, 2nd Lieutenant Ian Bethel, took such an 
opportunity and joined the newly commissioned USS Panay on her month-long 1,500- 
mile voyage in 1928. Recalling the event as “one of the greatest experiences that I ever 
had” in China, he also recalled the segregated nature of Chinese society. With some 
bewilderment he noted that because they were from a different province, but perhaps 
also because they worked for the Americans, “the Chinese that were aboard this boat as 
mess boys, pilots, assistant pilots and so forth, wouldn’t get off and go ashore in 
Chonqqing. They were just as unwelcome in Chongqing – or probably more so – than 
we were.”26     
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 This fractured nature of China would soon be exploited by its smaller but more 
powerful island neighbor. While China stumbled through the first decades of the 20th 
century Japan had remade itself into a great power, beating the Russian colossus in the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.  Simultaneously the collapse of much of the world 
economy in 1929 ushered in a new and terrible reality.  In a phrase borrowed from 
Winston Churchill, historian Piers Brendon describes the decade of the 1930s as a dark 
valley, “inhabited by the giants of unemployment, hardship, strife, and fear.”27  The 
Western powers, most notably the United States, France, and Great Britain, saw their 
will and power sapped by the Great Depression but maintained their democratic 
institutions. In Japan the march towards militarism was more gradual than in Germany, 
but inexorable. In 1931 Japan seized Manchuria in an operation that was universally 
condemned but drew little else in response.  This aggressive move marked the first step 
in Japan’s war with not only China but toward war with the United States as well.  
 Americans who served in China during the 1930s cast a wary eye towards Japan, 
but were more concerned with their own host country. Although the duties and missions 
of the Navy and Marines in China were quite different, they shared many of the same 
fears and concerns.  They were visitors in a land of over three hundred million people, 
replete with bandits and independent warlord armies. Around them China was going 
through wrenching and momentous changes.  After the fall of the Manchu Dynasty in 
1911 China endured nearly two decades of internal chaos and strife. Only in the late 
1920s, when Chiang Kai-Shek’s Guomindang (also known as the Nationalist) party had 
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defeated most of its warlord rivals did a manner of stability return. Louis Morton, in a 
study of the American military experience in China, summarized the U.S. presence in 
the ancient empire, concluding that, “The maintenance of a garrison in China created 
numerous problems. Not only did the Army and Navy have to maintain this force in the 
territory of a foreign sovereign nation – in itself a perplexing and complicated task – but 
they also had to develop and keep up to date elaborate plans to reinforce the garrison in 
the event of attack, or, if necessary, to withdraw it altogether.”28 
Public Opinion and the American Military in China 
Far from the barracks of Beijing most Americans gave little thought to their 
servicemen in China. A few powerful politicians, however, not only noticed but felt that 
their presence was a thirty-year mistake.  Among the most critical was Republican 
Senator William Edgar Borah of Idaho.  A determined isolationist who took pride in 
having never traveled outside the United States, by the late 1930s he was in his seventies 
and in poor health. But even infirm he remained a brilliant orator, and would become 
one of the most vocal critics of American policy in East Asia.  A powerful cabal of 
senators, largely from the West and Midwest, often joined Borah in demanding that 
American sailors and Marines depart China as quickly as possible. 
During the 1930s many Americans shared Borah’s views. The average American 
was overcome with a single concern: surviving the Great Depression. The economic 
28 Louis Morton, “Army and Marines on China Station:  A Study in Military and Political Rivalry,” Pacific 
Historical Review, 29:1 (February 1960): 51.	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cataclysm was at its peak in the years of 1931-32, and most Americans had no desire to 
become involved in the desolate lands of Manchuria.  In her study of the often ugly 
battle between American isolationists and interventionists in the years before Pearl 
Harbor, historian Lynne Olsen notes that, “The misty idealism of the pre-World War I 
period had given way to a hard-eyed, determined isolationism, which precluded 
accepting any of the inherent responsibilities that came with America’s position as the 
world’s leading economic power.”29  A poll conducted in September 1937 found that 
just over half of Americans favored a complete military withdrawal from China.30 
 Most American diplomats and military leaders in China viewed the situation 
quite differently.  Among them was Nelson T. Johnson, a career diplomat who became 
American ambassador to China in 1935. At the time an energetic forty-eight years old, 
he was fluent in Mandarin Chinese and had lived more than a decade in Asia.31 Johnson 
saw Japan’s intentions in China presciently.  In a December 1935 letter to the veteran 
diplomat and Asian expert Stanley Hornbeck, a discouraged Johnson wrote that, “I am 
convinced that the Japanese military leadership has definitely embarked on a well-
considered plan which is intended to place China under the control and supervision of 
Japan, and this plan will be persistently and consistently pursued by the Japanese until it 
has been accomplished.” He warned that American missionaries would soon be at risk, 
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and that the lack of Chinese unity in the face of a determined and aggressive Japan 
would likely spell disaster in the near future.32   
In the spring of 1937 a leader who shared Johnson’s views took command of the 
Asiatic Fleet. Admiral Harry T. Yarnell, an 1899 graduate of the United States Naval 
Academy, was one of its most accomplished yet little known graduates. A visionary in 
aviation and submarine warfare, he predicted the dominance of fleet submarines and 
carrier aviation in the next war. Like Johnson he also foresaw Japan’s aggressive plans 
for Southeast Asia. In a 1937 letter to the High Commissioner of the Philippines Yarnell 
wrote that the he had no doubt that the Japanese Navy would encroach upon the 
archipelago in the next few years, and would probably seize the Philippine archipelago if 
they could. With fierce words he argued that whatever mistakes the United States had 
made in governing the Philippines it could not abandon them to the Japanese, and that a 
stronger China made Japanese aggression less likely to succeed.  He also derided 
American isolationists for living in the past. Referring to the idea that the United States 
could protect itself by withdrawing from the world, he wrote, “The time has passed 
when a great nation can increase her safety by such a method. The world has shrunk too 
much.”33 
The Sino-Japanese War 
Events soon overtook Johnson and Yarnell’s most pessimistic predictions.  
Anticipating a quick victory against the Chinese on July 7th, 1937 the Japanese initiated 
32	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the “China Incident,” better known as the Sino-Japanese War. In a disputed set of 
circumstances, the Japanese guard at the ancient Marco Polo Bridge southwest of 
Beijing opened fire on Chinese soldiers, sparking an apocalyptic war whose price in 
blood no one expected.  In the words of one of the most respected historians of Chinese 
military history, “neither the Chinese nor the Japanese high command anticipated the 
outbreak of a total war that would ultimately spread throughout China and beyond, and 
would last eight long years.”34  Millions would eventually die due to Japan’s 
miscalculations.  In an August 1st letter Marine Corps Captain John Letcher recorded 
that he had been able to visit the village of Nan Yuan, a short drive from Beijing. Dozens 
of Chinese soldiers lay unburied on a road, most cut down by Japanese machine gun fire 
while transiting the area.  It would be a small foretaste of what was to come.35      
Total war would soon consume China. In fits and starts Japan advanced ever 
deeper into the country’s enormous interior, and in horror and disappointment the 
Chinese Nationalists watched as their armies disintegrated in the face of the Japanese 
onslaught. Facing a modern and exceptionally destructive modern military the GMD 
government withdrew inland, eventually setting up its government in the central city of 
Chongqing. One specialist on the Sino-Japanese War described Chiang’s strategy against 
the Japanese as a time honored defensive one, writing, “Nationalist China opted for 
defensive warfare, for trading space for time, and for drawing out the Japanese forces so 
34	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as to wear them down and prevent them from translating their battlefield success into a 
durable victory.”36  
 Yet such a strategy could not stem Japanese brutality, and to the world’s horror 
the fury of Japanese militarism exploded upon the Nationalist capital of Nanjing in 
December 1937.  Japanese soldiers inflicted cruel and inhuman suffering upon Chinese 
women and children in Nanjing, something even acknowledged by Japanese military 
leaders at the time. In vivid and searing language historian Piers Brendon concludes that 
the Japanese, “embarked on a saturnalia of destruction such as had not been seen since 
the sack of Magdeburg during the Thirty Years War.” In this orgy of rape, pillage, and 
murder tens of thousands of civilians were slaughtered; the exact number will never be 
known. Conservative estimates range from 50,000 to 100,000 men, women, and 
children.37 
 Even Americans impressed by Japan’s achievements over the past century began 
to take a dim view of Nippon in the wake of the Nanjing massacre. Despite the 
destruction most remained committed to not getting involved. On December 12th the 
desires of many isolationists to remain neutral in Asia was put to its first major test.  
While underway on the Yangtze and flying its largest American flags the USS Panay 
was bombed and sunk by Japanese aircraft. Three Americans and one Italian journalist 
were killed, and forty-six Americans and three Chinese were wounded.38   
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 Isolationists in the United States were quick to downplay the event.  While 
lamenting the loss of life some Americans felt the United States had brought the deaths 
upon itself by the continued presence of military personnel in China. Most isolationists 
embraced Japan’s prompt admission of guilt and promise of substantial monetary 
compensation.39 Senator Borah termed the event a “regrettable thing,” while Senator 
Elbert Thomas of Utah, another staunch isolationist, took special note of Japan’s 
contrition and declared, “You can’t go to war with a nation which admits it was wrong.” 
One Texas congressman even declared that it was “about time for us to mind our own 
business.” Many in Congress demanded the swift withdrawal of all American military 
personnel from China. With Japan’s prompt apology and subsequent compensation to 
victim’s families the Panay Incident soon faded from memory.40 
 After the Panay sinking the United States and Japan all but became locked on a 
collision course to war. American public opinion turned against Japan but isolationists 
continued to push to keep the country out of war. Thanks to the remarkable diplomatic 
efforts of Admiral Yarnell, who walked a tightrope during his tenure as head of the 
Asiatic Fleet, a series of confrontations between U.S. Navy and Japanese military 
personnel did not lead to bloodshed.41  Likewise the Marines in Shanghai and Beijing 
repeatedly had to endure insults and indignities from the Japanese Army, who members, 
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on numerous occasions, tried to provoke the Marines on guard duty into opening fire. 
But despite these close calls none of the incidents led to a clash of arms.42  
 For the next four years Japan became ever more trapped in a China quagmire of 
its own creation. From 1937 to 1941 Japan suffered more than 600,000 casualties in a 
war that it could not conclude on its own terms. Despite the loss of millions of lives and 
their capital at Nanjing, Chinese leaders did not surrender, to the surprise and dismay of 
the Japanese. One Chinese historian has concluded that, “for four years, China, 
expending oceans of blood and undertaking huge material sacrifices… carried on the 
struggle against Japan virtually alone, with a heroism and stoicism far too little 
appreciated in the West.”43  The West, particularly the United States, responded by 
increasing pressure on Japan’s most vulnerable point, its dependence on foreign oil. By 
early 1941 the United States had steadily tightened the noose of economic sanctions 
around Japan’s vulnerable neck, and in the summer declared an embargo on oil exports 
to the resource hungry empire.44  Furthermore during the previous two decades 
American naval planners had crafted a comprehensive war plan to defeat the Japanese 
Navy. The Japanese leadership knew that despite outward appearances of isolationism 
the American fleet, on paper, would be prepared. Faced with a choice in their minds of 
economic and political ruin or war, Japan’s leaders chose war.45  
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Before the Japanese struck most American military and civilian personnel were 
evacuated from China. Most American military leaders in the region recognized that 
they were more a liability than an asset in the event of a war with Japan. The Army’s 
15th Regiment in Tianjin had packed up and left China in 1938, and as relations 
continued to deteriorate by August 1941 Yarnell’s successor, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, 
recommended that the Marines in China be sent home. The 1200 man Fourth Marine 
detachment in Shanghai shipped out first in November, to be followed by the remaining 
legation personnel in Beijing and Tianjin.46 At the same time most of the remaining 
American gunboats on the Yangtze and their crews were withdrawn. Those seaworthy 
enough to do so made the voyage to Philippines. The few unfortunate enough to be left 
behind were scuttled. On December 5th the Navy officially dissolved the Yangtze Patrol. 
One of the U.S. Navy’s most unusual and distinctive missions had come to an end.47 
Keeping China in the War: 1941-43 
On the morning of December 8th, 1941 the two hundred Marines still in Beijing 
and the nearby port of Qingwandao awoke to find their country at war with Japan. 
Rather than fight a hopeless battle they chose to surrender.  One of the Marine officers 
who would soon endure the brutality of a Japanese prisoner of war camp declared to a 
fellow officer that, “Do you know that this is the first time that a United States Marine 
46	  Biggs, The United States Marines in North China, 205-6.	  47	  Tolley, Yangtze Patrol, 282.	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command has surrendered without a fight?” 48 As the United States gradually recovered 
from its shock, the nation that was now at war with Japan saw China as a centerpiece of 
American strategy for the Pacific. For the first two years of the war American strategic 
planning in Asia centered around two points: keeping China in the war and using it as a 
base to launch a counteroffensive. Yet as the war progressed American and Chinese 
leaders grew frustrated with one another.  Chiang, having led his country through four 
years of brutal war, demanded more support than the United States and Great Britain 
were willing to provide. The Anglo-Saxon powers, for their part, wanted to keep China 
in the war but balked at providing the level of material support Chiang demanded. The 
“Germany First” policy that guided Anglo-American cooperation and strategy kept 
China a secondary theater throughout the war.49  
 To the frustration of Navy and Marine Corps leaders the U.S. Army took over 
leadership of American operations in China after Pearl Harbor.  In light of the severe 
losses sustained by the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines this made 
strategic sense but frustrated the Navy Department, as Army thinking and control came 
to dominate the newly established China-India-Burma Theater.  Appointed the senior 
American commander in the CBI in January of 1942, Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell 
proceeded to undercut numerous attempts by the Navy to assert its currently limited 
influence in China.  
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 Long a land torn apart by rival warlords China would be no different when the 
Americans returned to the country in early 1942. The best known of these contests 
emerged between Chiang and General Stilwell himself.  As the head of the China-
Burma-India (CBI) Theater as well as Chiang’s Chief of Staff Joseph Stilwell was a 
hard-edged soldier who had considerable experience in China, having developed a 
respectable fluency in Mandarin Chinese. Yet historians are sharply divided over his 
leadership during the war. An irreverent and abrasive personality who in private referred 
to Roosevelt’s close aide Harry Hopkins as a “strange gnomelike creature”50 and used 
the pejorative “Peanut” to describe Chiang, Stilwell respected only raw strength.51  He 
also owed some of his stature in the Army to his friendship with George Marshall.  
Stilwell’s courage and leadership under atrocious conditions during the 1942 Burma 
campaign earned him undying praise, yet in matters of personality, temperament, and 
diplomacy he has rightly come under enormous criticism. One historian concludes that 
despite his gifts Stilwell was ultimately a poor choice for the China post, concluding, 
“Leadership of the CBI required a person of remarkable stamina, determination, and tact. 
Stilwell was the personification of the first two but failed miserably with the third.”52 
 In fairness to Stilwell the obstacles he confronted in China were all but 
insurmountable. After his arrival in March 1942 an initial period of goodwill between 
himself and Generalissimo and Madame Chiang soon evaporated.  For his part Chiang 
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came to resent the American’s arrogant cockiness and overconfidence.53  Stilwell came 
to see the GMD as corrupt and Chiang himself as a dictatorial misfit who was only 
interested in getting American assistance against the Japanese so he could crush Mao 
Zedong’s Communists after the war. But Stilwell’s problems went beyond Chiang and 
the GMD. “Vinegar Joe” wore several hats with conflicting responsibilities in the CBI. 
As Mark Stoler points out, for example, “As head of the U.S. military mission to China, 
[Stilwell] controlled Lend-Lease supplies, but as chief of staff to Chiang, he was 
subordinate to a government leader who wanted to control those supplies himself.”  The 
CBI’s innate complexities coupled with its dizzying and overlapping command 
requirements would have taxed the strongest of leaders. For the undiplomatic Stilwell 
they were simply too much.54     
 A second great rivalry in China was also between Stilwell and a man he despised, 
though in this case it was a fellow American. U.S. Army Air Corps General Claire 
Chennault, head of the Flying Tigers and later the 14th Air Force in China and a fierce 
proponent of airpower, as well as an ally of Chiang, developed into a bitter enemy of 
Stilwell. This triangle of hate and mistrust is best summarized by historian S.C.M. Paine, 
who concludes, “Stilwell despised the Chiangs, both Generalissimo and Madame, while 
Chennault was devoted to them.  Stilwell and Chennault also despised each other and 
had friends in high places, Marshall and Roosevelt, respectively, who kept them in their 
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positions long after their personal vitriol damaged rather than furthered U.S. foreign 
policy.”55  
For the United States the strategic utility of China steadily declined throughout 
the war. The bloody but successful American advance across the Central Pacific made 
China’s value as a springboard to assault Japan less and less necessary.  Chiang’s 
strained relationship with Stilwell coupled with the poor performance of the Nationalist 
war effort as well as Roosevelt’s eroding patience further diminished China’s usefulness. 
Douglas MacArthur’s insistence that the Philippines be retaken also reduced the 
likelihood that American troops would land anywhere near Shanghai or Formosa.  Thus 
by the close of 1943 the strategic situation had changed. China was no longer viewed as 
the decisive factor in defeating Japan that it had once been, despite Roosevelt’s 
continued desires to make China in a great power.56  In his classic study on the often 
torturous relationship between the GMD and Washington during the war Herbert Feis 
acknowledges that by November 1943, “the need or value of China in the winning of the 
war was on the wane; while in contrast the need for taking measures to secure its future 
unity position was growing graver.”57 Less than a year later Stilwell would be gone and 
new American leadership would be confronted with the question of China’s place in the 
postwar world.   
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  Unlike in Japan, historians have been far more critical of American policies and 
actions in China during the postwar era.  Unencumbered by the absolute need to station 
tens of thousands of troops in such a vast country, the United States could have chosen 
to withdraw completely from China in the fall of 1945. Instead, American leaders 
deployed two reinforced divisions of Marines, supported by the U.S. Navy’s Seventh 
Fleet in north China, a decision that would have a significant impact on the future Cold 
War and the American future in Asia.  
On August 8th 1945 U.S. Army Intelligence released a report on postwar East 
Asia. The report highlighted the progress made by the Chinese Nationalist Government 
in organizing its military forces and gaining some key victories against the Japanese over 
the past two years. The document also provided a stark warning about the postwar 
world, “The war against Japan will not be over when the shooting stops.  There will still 
remain many military tasks to be accomplished, for example: the disarming and return of 
all Japanese troops, the restoration of civil law and order in China, the occupation of 
Japan, and the administration of trusteed areas.” This statement succinctly laid out the 
primary tasks that would be undertaken by the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps in China. 
Much would need to be done to assure the peace, yet a new war was building long 
before the Japanese surrender finally came.58   
The precarious state of China’s position went far beyond local concerns.  Three 
larger strategic realities drove the perceived necessity to intervene. The first was that the 
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war had broken China. Asian historian Rana Mitter, in his outstanding study of China as 
the “forgotten ally” during the war with Japan, concludes that “the battered, punch drunk 
state that was Nationalist China in 1945 had been fundamentally destroyed by the war 
with Japan.”59 And the fighting was unlikely to end with Japan’s surrender. As the war 
approached its end the chances of a civil war between the exhausted Nationalists and the 
strengthened Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seemed greater than ever. Based in the 
northern Chinese city of Yanan, Mao’s forces controlled large swathes of territory and 
had grown considerably stronger during the long war with Japan.  Many American 
leaders in the CBI feared the Communists would take advantage of the chaos 
surrounding the Japanese surrender to strengthen their position for what they felt was the 
coming civil war.   
 The Japanese Empire was being steadily compressed by unyielding naval power. 
Yet in China the Japanese who would go on one last offensive.  In April of 1944 the 
Japanese Kwantung Army launched its largest land operation of the war.  The offensive 
threatened the Nationalist government in Chongqing and coincided with the low point in 
Sino-American wartime relations.60 By the fall of 1944 the bitter feud between Chiang 
Kai-shek and Joseph Stilwell had reached a boiling point. Both men were exasperated 
with each other, and their conflict spilled over from personal animosity to threatening 
the entire course of the war. Rana Mitter blames both men, writing, “Chiang and Stilwell 
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both acted irresponsibly. Their pique and personal prejudices led to decisions that caused 
the deaths of thousands of the Chinese soldiers both claimed to hold in such high 
regard.”61 
 Events came to a head in October of 1944. After months of recriminations and 
demands from his Chinese ally Roosevelt felt he had no choice and ordered Stilwell’s 
recall.  As Roosevelt historian Robert Dallek concludes the president’s decision was 
based primarily on his long term goal to transform China into a great and independent 
power, writing, “Roosevelt’s decision to accommodate Chiang rested more on political 
than military considerations.  He believed a direct confrontation over Stilwell’s 
appointment might precipitate Chiang’s collapse.  To have a part in overturning China’s 
government would destroy all he had done to advance her emergence as an independent, 
sovereign state.”62      
 Roosevelt and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to divide the CBI into two 
separate commands, an act long overdue. The enormous size and complexity of the 
theatre necessitated separate areas of responsibility.  The CBI was dissolved and new 
Burma-India and China Theatres were established.63 But who would replace Stilwell? 
On October 24th a little known American general serving in Ceylon received an urgent 
message from Washington. Serving as Lord Louis Mountbatten’s deputy in the British 
Southeast Asia Theater, Major General Albert Wedemeyer opened the message and 
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entered a new world. He was ordered to “proceed without delay” to Chongqing and 
report to Chiang as the commander of U.S. Army forces in China.64  A talented officer 
and reserved intellectual who was in many ways the polar opposite of “Vinegar” Joe, 
Wedemeyer would inadvertently return the U.S. Navy and Marines to China in 1945 and 
wield enormous influence in shaping postwar policy between the United States and 
China. 
 A native of Kansas and 1919 graduate of West Point, Albert Coady Wedemeyer 
enjoyed a distinguished but little noticed career. He first achieved notoriety in 1941 as a 
member of the War Plans Division in Washington, D.C.  Not for the last time he found 
himself in a remarkably ironic situation.  A lifelong anti-communist he had long admired 
Germany, a nation he respected for its martial spirit and industrial power.  He privately 
opposed American entry into any European war, but was chosen to craft a 
comprehensive plan to defeat Nazi Germany.  Historian Lynne Olsen points out that, “In 
a supreme irony, the man chosen to direct this extraordinarily complex study, dubbed the 
Victory Program, was none other than Major Albert Wedemeyer, one of the most 
isolationist officers in the Army.” Like Charles Lindbergh he sought a strong America 
that could remain aloof from European wars. Unlike the aviator Wedemeyer chose to put 
his personal views aside and prepare for battle.65  
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Despite his role in the Victory Program, a planning effort that would lay the 
foundations for everything from the Eighth Air Force to the Normandy landings, 
Wedemeyer remained in the background for much of the war. His lack of notoriety was 
a product of two main factors.  As his sole biographer John McLaughlin notes, “It was 
Wedemeyer’s fate to have his role in the Asian theatre diminished by Stilwell admirers, 
especially Barbara Tuchman, and later, his contributions as a major strategist of the war 
overshadowed by such luminaries as Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, and others.”66  
Wedemeyer was a strategist and planner, not a combat commander. He excelled at grand 
strategy, and considered one of America’s most fundamental weaknesses to be its lack of 
long term strategic planning.  As a result of all this combined with his lack of battlefield 
command experience Wedemeyer’s has not fared well in the popular American history 
of the war.67 
Secondly, the general disagreed with American global strategy both during and 
after the war.  He was a bundle of contradictions, professing a profound love for the U.S. 
Army but consistently criticized both its leaders and grand strategy. He advocated strong 
interaction with the nations of the world but labeled himself a non-interventionist and 
opposed nearly all forms of military action except self-defense.  A strident anti-
communist, Wedemeyer viewed the Soviet Union as a grave threat to the freedom of 
mankind but considered containment an inappropriate strategy. His pessimistic memoirs, 
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compiled at a time when Americans were searching for reaffirmation of their struggles in 
World War II, cast a long shadow on his considerable wartime accomplishments.68    
Those memoirs reveal a conflicted man of strategic vision who professed grave 
misgivings about America’s role in the world. He refused to call the conclusion of World 
War II a “victory,” and argues that the war in Europe could have been decisively 
shortened had a 1943 invasion of France been implemented over British objections. He 
also argues that some form of assistance to the German resistance movement against 
Adolf Hitler could have accelerated Nazi capitulation.  By the mid 1950’s the evils of 
the Nazi regime were well documented, yet he virtually ignores the Holocaust. He 
consistently argued that Nazi Germany was destroyed only for the world to watch the 
Soviets establish dominance in Eastern Europe.69   
Yet this was all in Wedemeyer’s future. As he arrived in Chongqing the general 
was under no illusions about the enormity of his task.  His new headquarters was in 
disarray and the Japanese were on the offensive. Since 1941 most of the fighting in the 
Chinese theater had been confined to Burma. This changed in April 1944, when Japan 
Japan launched the Ichigo offensive (Offensive Number One). Using more than 80 
percent of the Japanese China Expeditionary Army’s 620,000 troops, the primary 
objective of the offensive was to capture and destroy the new XXth Bomber Command’s 
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airfields in central China.70  As John McLaughlin describes it, “Militarily, it was China’s 
darkest hour.  The capital at Chongqing was in serious danger of being lost.  The mauled 
and malnourished Chinese Army seemed to have little fight left. With the exception of 
the campaign in Burma, they had not defeated the Japanese in any battle.”71 
Adding to the difficulty for Wedemeyer was the discovery that Stilwell had left 
his command in an appalling state. No orders or instructions were left behind and 
Wedemeyer found most of his new staff incompetent. Stilwell had micromanaged his 
subordinates so completely that a proper briefing on the situation was impossible. 
Wedemeyer concluded that his predecessor did not have the requisite ability to be a 
regimental commander, and in a letter home wrote that in the future “he will be the most 
deflated hero in the history of our fine army.”72     
Writing to Marshall six weeks after his arrival, Wedemeyer described his 
difficulties in detail.  Arguing that the Chinese had “no conception of organization, 
logistics, or modern warfare,” he concluded that for a single leader to direct strategy 
from Chongqing would require “a Churchill, Disraeli, and Machiavelli all in one.”73 His 
colorful descriptions highlighted the myriad problems Stilwell encountered: a highly 
decentralized, provincial state, poor command and control, and a single leader who was 
only nominally in control of his military. Yet Wedemeyer also developed considerable 
respect for China and its people, acknowledging that, “As the weeks passed I began to 	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understand that the Nationalist Government of China, far from being reluctant to fight as 
pictured by Stilwell and some of his friends among the American correspondents, had 
shown amazing tenacity and endurance in resisting Japan. France had gone down to 
defeat six weeks after Germany launched her offensive.  In 1944 China was still 
resisting, seven years after Japan had launched her initial attack.”74 
The China Theater: The Nationalists, Communists, and SACO 
Wedemeyer proved an able organizer and strategist in China, and unlike his 
predecessor was able to work with Chiang.  Instead of trying to win the war by fighting 
in Burma and courting the American press he was determined to build a Nationalist 
Chinese Army capable of consistently beating the Japanese.  Given more time 
Wedemeyer might have succeeded.  As it was he achieved much in a short amount of 
time.  Since 1937 the Chinese armies had been on the defensive, mounting an effective 
insurgency against the Japanese but never able to organize and train as a national force. 
Stilwell’s fixation on the Burma theater and his worsening relationship with Chiang did 
little to change this. Often Chinese armies found themselves beaten by numerically 
smaller Japanese units.  Only on rare occasions could Chinese armies hold a defensive 
line against the better equipped, motivated, and led Japanese army.        
Why was building a capable Chinese Nationalist Army such a nearly hopeless 
task?  Many Western observers pointed towards the corruption endemic in the 
Nationalist government, the low morale and education of the average Chinese conscript, 
74 Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, 279.	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and a general unwillingness to fight. A classified 1943 British report on the Chinese 
Army assessed the main problem to be a product of Chinese culture which scorned the 
profession of arms.75  Chinese historian Guangqiu Xu has argued that the root of 
problem lay in China’s provincial nature, writing, “From the military point of view, 
American generals and leaders were right in identifying such problems as 
ineffectiveness, corruption, and low morale in the Chinese Army, but they were unaware 
that many of the Chinese military forces were still provincial in nature. The Chinese 
army under Chiang’s control was a loose coalition of semi-independent military forces 
bound together by personal loyalties and material rewards.”76 
An even more searing description of the Chinese Nationalist Army comes from 
one of Chiang’s own generals. In a series of interviews after the Chinese Civil War, 
General Li-Zongren offered a frank and brutal description of his former army and its 
soldiers: “The Chinese Army also had several good points which deserve to be 
described.  First, we fought with a bereaved army that met a strong invading foe in order 
to protect their homes and safeguard their country.  At the beginning of the war, the 
strong morale [of] our men was without historic precedent.  The saying goes, ‘When one 
man is prepared to give up his life, ten thousand men may not overtake him.’ And our 
whole country was prepared to fight the enemy to the end. Apart from these few strong 
points, however, we too had many defects.  Our officers and men lacked rigid training; 
their discipline was lax and their combat power was weak.  The conscription authorities 
75	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of the central government simply grabbed men from all over the country for military 
service.  The new recruits were ill-trained and sent to the front lines hurriedly.  This was 
just like driving sheep to feed the tigers.  Pay was low and food was bad.  The men were 
malnourished and underweight.  Doctors and medicines were scarce and the wounded or 
sick men faced conditions which defied description.”77 
Most Americans in China were appalled by the methods of conscription used by 
the Nationalists. Press gangs would appear in the spring and would forcibly abduct 
farmers from their lands for service in the army, leaving their families destitute and 
starving.  After their conscription the “new soldiers” would be marched with their hands 
tied behind their backs, with little food and no medical care. Beaten and malnourished, 
many did not survive the long journey to a training center. The press gang leaders more 
resembled slave traders than any 20th century form of conscription. Most were well-
compensated for their efforts, and those who delivered their exhausted and diseased 
ridden recruits to the training centers quickly moved on to new towns and villages for 
the next wave.78 
 Even after they had joined the army the conscripts were underfed and 
malnourished, many near death. Thousands chose to desert rather than face death from 
starvation. Even healthy men who began training often arrived at their assigned units in 
deplorable condition. Also troubling for the long term was that few could read or write.79 
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Despite this nearly hopeless situation Wedemeyer was determined to succeed, and unlike 
Stilwell was willing to try new and innovative methods. He soon implemented reforms, 
especially in feeding, supplying, and training the Chinese armies.   Most notably, he 
organized the new Chinese Nationalist Army around 36 American-style divisions and 20 
Commando groups, enlarged and improved the Chinese Training Command, and 
established an air force. He also established a Central Procurement Agency for the 
Nationalist Army that partially solved the food supply problem by curbing the graft and 
corruption that accounted for so much suffering in the ranks. Perhaps most importantly 
he made great strides in having American advisers train their Chinese counterparts 
directly, rather than through intermediaries.80  Despite the improvements the Ichigo 
offensive revealed China’s continued military weakness. 
Adding to Wedemeyer’s woes were the strained relations between the U.S. Army 
and Navy in China. Ever since the creation of the CBI in January 1942 many Navy 
leaders chafed at the Army’s domination in a region they had previously considered their 
own.  The brilliant and ferocious Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, 
was among those determined to attack Japan by way of either the Chinese mainland or 
Formosa. King took a special interest in returning the Navy to China, both as a way of 
reasserting influence in the country and perhaps as a way to challenge Army control. As 
summarized by historian Michael Schaller, “The U.S. Navy, with its China tradition 
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going back to the Yangtze patrol gunboats and Asiatic Fleet, bitterly resented the leading 
position which the army assumed in China after 1941.”81 
To this end a relatively junior American naval officer was sent to China soon 
after Pearl Harbor. Newly promoted Commander Milton “Mary” Miles was summoned 
to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and secretly ordered to go to China and 
prepare the coast for future American amphibious landings. He was also, in Admiral 
King’s words, to “heckle the Japanese.” Miles, an officer with considerable experience 
on the Yangtze Patrol, became one of King’s must trusted officers in Asia. Promoted 
rapidly (he ended the war as a Rear Admiral) Miles oversaw the establishment of a 
remarkable covert, hybrid group of saboteurs, spies, and guerillas that went far beyond 
King’s original vision.82     
Soon after his arrival in April 1942 Miles met Dai Li, one of Chiang’s most 
trusted deputies. The head of Chiang’s secret police, Dai Li was known for his ruthless 
acumen and history as an assassin. Most Americans who knew anything about China 
regarded him as deeply corrupt and an unreliable partner, even when fighting the 
Japanese. Yet Miles and Dai Li forged an unlikely partnership which led to the creation 
of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization, better known as SACO.  A curious 
creation, SACO was a Navy command with few maritime assets assigned a covert 
mission deep inside a foreign country nominally under the command of a foreign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 133.	  
82 Milton E. Miles, A Different Kind of War: The Little-Known Story of the Combined Guerilla Forces 
Created in China by the U.S. Navy and the Chinese During World War II (New York: Doubleday, 1967): 
18. 
	   45 
intelligence officer.  On paper Dai Li was the head of SACO but in reality Miles ran the 
daily operations as his deputy. As Miles summarizes in his memoirs, “One of the most 
surprising things about SACO – the Sino-American Cooperative Organization - was that 
we two individuals without a common language, who represented countries of such 
different cultures, military customs, and political development, could work out a 
program of combined secret services that could be accepted almost without revision by 
both countries.”   Because of this understanding the two men were free to design 
resourceful and effective covert operations against the Japanese.83 
For nearly three years SACO employed several thousand Navy personnel in a 
variety of roles, including rescuing downed Allied airmen, meteorology, sabotage, and 
intelligence gathering. Miles’ most remarkable and controversial activity, however, was 
his efforts to train and equip Chinese guerillas.  Eight SACO naval units were 
established in cities such as Hwei Chow and Sian to train a secret insurgent army.84 By 
October of 1944 Miles reported to Nimitz that he had more than 16,000 trained guerillas 
armed and ready, with several more thousand spread in various throughout east and 
central China. As a measure of his resourcefulness SACO also trained several thousand 
pirates, arming their Chinese junks with American machine guns and rockets. Even 
pirates, historically the most hated enemy of professional mariners, had their place in 
Miles’ organization.85   
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 George Marshall and many senior Army leaders viewed SACO with disdain.  
The leaders of SACO’s primary Army rival in China, the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS), made repeated efforts to sideline and minimize the U.S. Navy and SACO in 
China. The complex war of words between the OSS and SACO is beyond the boundaries 
of this study, but a brief discussion is warranted. Between 1942 and 1945 the conflict 
reached the highest levels of the War and Navy Departments, as both Marshall and King 
became involved in protecting their respective services’ interests in Asia. The battle 
between the U.S. Army and Navy over covert operations in China became a live 
grenade, and the bitter fight over SACO embodied that weapon.      
In his history of the OSS in China, Maochun Yu makes clear that both Stilwell 
and Marshall viewed SACO as an obstacle. The adoption of the document that created 
SACO in 1942 soon aroused Army countermeasures. As Yu notes, “The signing of the 
SACO agreement sent an immediate shock wave through Stilwell’s staff circle.  
Although the general had approved the plan, many of his low-ranking officers were 
particularly jealous of the navy’s success in controlling virtually all non-combat related 
intelligence gathering.  Almost immediately, sabotage efforts were initiated at the 
general’s headquarters.”86   Stilwell’s successor was no less hostile.  Wedemeyer 
mentions Miles and SACO only once in his memoirs, describing them as an 
“embarrassing problem.”87  As previously noted, one of the reasons for the Army’s 
disdain for SACO was simple: Miles and his team got results.  Frustration with Chiang 
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and his regime were endemic among U.S. Army personnel in China. Perhaps Miles 
simply understood the Chinese mind better, but more likely he was able to set aside his 
moral qualms about Dai Li and focus on pragmatic cooperation with the Nationalists.  In 
one of the earliest and best studies done on SACO, Michael Schaller concludes that, 
“More than cloak and dagger heroics, the real importance of the SACO experience lies 
in what it tells us about American policy and American-Chinese Nationalist cooperation. 
While Stilwell was prevented from commanding well-trained and adequately supplied 
Chinese troops, and Chennault wallowed in the battles of publicity, Miles succeeded in 
working out a close military and political relationship with the Nationalists.”88 
 SACO made many enemies in China but the group received unwavering support 
from Admiral King, who convinced the president to promote Miles to the rank of 
commodore in April 1944.89  For Wedemeyer, however, SACO was an intractable 
problem that he was determined to eliminate. Relations between the CBI head and Miles 
were always strained, and at one point they exploded into a tense confrontation. In 
January 1945 Miles reported to the general in Chongqing, and after waiting a few days 
the two men finally sat down in a meeting that lasted nearly two hours. An initially civil 
discussion over logistics degenerated into a shouting match, mostly directed by 
Wedemeyer against his Navy subordinate. The general told Miles that he did not like 
having any organization in his theatre that operated independently from his command, 
that he considered the SACO agreement to be an abomination, and that Admiral Nimitz 
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would never allow an Army command to operate independently from him in the Pacific. 
Miles retorted that China was very different due to the presence of Nationalists and the 
complexities of the Sino-American alliance.  Wedemeyer disagreed and raised the stakes 
by declaring that on his next trip to Washington he would demand that SACO be placed 
under his direct control.90  
 The discussion cooled down afterwards but the relations between the two men 
were always tense. For his part, Miles could never understand why SACO, with less than 
1,300 U.S Navy personnel and consuming a tiny fraction of the allocated supplies for the 
China theater, would be such a problem for the OSS and the U.S. Army.91  SACO would 
be eventually be placed under CBI command, but Miles continued to enjoy the 
unyielding support of Admiral King.  Beyond fighting the Japanese, Miles and his 
organization had, in the eyes of King and many other senior naval personnel, already 
served their purpose: to provide the U.S. Navy a door back into China. Given 
Wedemeyer’s reputation as a cerebral intellectual, it is remarkable that Miles and SACO 
caused him such grief, but they reflected not only disagreements over command but also 
the longstanding Navy view that the Army was intruding on its traditional area of 
operations.          
 While dealing with SACO and countless other problems Wedemeyer’s efforts to 
assist Chiang were bearing fruit. In part because of constant harassment by both the 14th 
Air Force and XXth Bomber Command but also due to better performance from the 
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average Chinese soldier. By the spring of 1945 the Ichigo offensive had been spent. The 
Nationalists lost more than 130,000 killed as a result of the operation, six to eight times 
as many as did the Japanese. Ten major American air bases, thirty-six airports, and the 
cities of Henan, Hunan, and Guangxi also fell.  The Ichigo Offensive meant little in a 
strategic sense, however. With the capture of the Mariana Islands of Saipan and Tinian 
the United States no longer needed the central China airbases for its B-29 bombers.  
Historian Sally Paine summarizes the situation and concludes that, “Ichigo had a greater 
impact on the civil war than on the global war by making the Nationalists look militarily 
incompetent, wiping out formations vital to defeat the Communists, and leaving Central 
China wide open to Communist infiltration.”92 
 As the danger from the offensive waned Wedemeyer worried less about the 
Japanese and more about the Chinese Communists.  Throughout the war Mao’s forces in 
and around north China had fought the Japanese but had also bided their time, making 
preparations for the postwar struggle for the country. By the start of 1945 it was 
estimated that Mao’s forces, both regular, and irregular numbered nearly 500,000 men, 
and enjoyed remarkable support from the local population in many areas of north 
China.93 An American intelligence report on Mao and his deputy, Zhou Enlai, reported 
that both men were confident of their final victory, believing that that Nationalists’ days 
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were numbered.94  Wedemeyer feared that should the war end suddenly, the Communists 
would use the confusion to seize weapons surrendered by the Japanese and position 
themselves favorably for the civil war. Only by stationing a large number of American 
personnel in postwar China, he believed, could this gloomy prospect be prevented.95 
The Yalta Conference, China, and the Soviet Union 
Few meetings of political or military leaders have garnered greater historical 
interest than that held at Yalta in February 1945. Aside from the overreaching objective 
of ending the war in Europe, Roosevelt went to Yalta determined to bring the Soviet 
Union into the war against Japan. And, he was willing to go to great lengths to get it.  
Buried within formal plenary sessions and countless informal meetings were a series of 
agreements made by Roosevelt and Stalin, agreements that would have an enormous 
influence on postwar China.  
The U.S. Joint Chiefs had desired Soviet participation against Japan since Pearl 
Harbor, but Stalin refused to make any commitment until the Tehran Conference in 
December 1943 and January 1944.  There the Soviet leader   announced that the Soviet 
Union would attack Japan once Nazi Germany had been defeated.96  Negotiations 
concerning the details of that entry continued throughout 1944, and as Roosevelt 
prepared to embark for Crimea in January 1945 he was determined to bring the Soviets 
94	  “Current Relations between Chiang Kai-Shek and the Communists,” December 23rd, Box 17, Record 
Group 493; Records of U.S. Army Forces in the China-Burma-India Theater of Operations, 1942-47, 
NARA.	  
95 Wedemeyer to Marshall, August 1st, 1945, Box 83, Wedemeyer Papers, CHIS. 
96 Sextant Conference, Minutes of the Third Plenary Meeting, December 4, 1943, Record of Intra-Allied 
Conferences, CD-ROM, OSDA. 
	   51 
into the war as soon as possible.  The reasons were simple: Soviet participation could tie 
down the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria and ease pressure on the probable 
invasion of Kyushu or Honshu thereby helping to end the war more swiftly. At the time 
of Yalta the atomic bomb was an unknown quantity, and uncertainty persisted as to 
whether it would actually work. 
 Stalin also went to Yalta with specific objectives. In return for declaring war on 
Japan and seizing control of Manchuria the Soviet dictator insisted upon the return of the 
territory lost during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), most notably the northern 
portion of Sakhalin Island, the Kurile Islands, and Port Arthur, plus access to the port 
Dalian.  Stalin also demanded that Soviet forces be allowed to remain in Manchuria for 
three months after Japan’s surrender and that the Soviets share control of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway.  A huge region of 503,000 square miles, roughly twice the size of 
Texas, Manchuria possessed tremendous untapped natural resources.97  The population 
in 1945 - estimated at 45 million people - was mostly Manchu Chinese but also included 
a small minority of Mongolians, Russians, and Koreans.98  
 Beyond the natural resources of Manchuria, however, was the prize of a viable, 
deep water ice free port, for centuries a Russian obsession.  Port Arthur was too shallow 
for this purpose and Stalin wanted the city more for sentimental than military purposes. 
Thus, Stalin cast his eyes on the south Manchurian port of Dalian, and insisted on joint 
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control of the port with Chiang’s government.99  A year-round warm water port that 
offered the finest harbor and facilities on the northern Yellow Sea, Dalian was largely 
untouched by the war and featured a large anchorage and berths to accommodate more 
than fifty ships.  The daily capacity of the port was estimated at 30,000 long tons. With 
access to Dalian and the Far East railways the Soviet Union would at long last have 
year-round access to the Pacific.100 
When he arrived in the Crimea Joseph Stalin was in the strongest position of the 
war, and when he left his hand was stronger still, especially on China.  Sakhalin, the 
Kuriles, and nominal control over Manchuria were his for the taking.  During a series of 
secret meetings with Stalin at Yalta the Roosevelt largely acceded to his demands on 
China and Manchuria, without consulting Chiang Kai-shek. This was a remarkable act 
for a president who had long trumpeted the Wilsonian dictum of self-determination for 
the free nations of the world.  As aptly summarized by historian S. M. Plokhy in his 
recent study of the conference, “Roosevelt had obtained Stalin’s all-important 
commitment to enter the war against Japan, but that commitment had come at a high 
price.  The president had agreed to hand over territories even before the war was over – 
the very policies he had condemned both publicly and privately on numerous occasions, 
notably in the Atlantic Charter.”101  
 When informed of the Yalta agreement in late March, U.S. Ambassador to China 
Patrick J. Hurley was shocked at the official concessions to the Soviet Union. Hurley 
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was instructed to meet with Chiang by June 15th and “make every effort to obtain his 
approval.”102 When Chiang was finally informed of the Yalta agreements he lost much 
of his remaining belief in American good faith. As his biographer Jay Taylor writes, 
“The concessions on Manchuria themselves were not what distressed him; in less than a 
year he would be willing to offer Stalin even more in that region.  More galling to 
Chiang was the insult to himself and China in the way the Anglo-Saxons had assumed 
the right to give away China’s sovereign rights.”103 
A month after the Yalta conference General Wedemeyer visited Roosevelt in the 
White House. Anticipating the intellectual vigor he had come to expect from the 
president the general was aghast, writing, “I had not seen the President for several 
months and was shocked at his physical appearance. His color was ashen, his face 
drawn, and his jaw drooping. I had difficulty conveying information to him because he 
seemed in a daze.”104  A few weeks later, on April 12th, Franklin Roosevelt died while 
resting at Warm Springs, Georgia.  The president’s longtime chief of staff and friend, 
Admiral William Leahy lamented in his diary that, “The Captain of the Team is gone, 
and we are all at loose ends and confused as to who may be capable of giving sage 
advice and counsel to the new leader in his handling of the staggering burdens of war 
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and peace that he must carry.” Leahy also privately wondered if Harry Truman would be 
up to the herculean task.105  
 Roosevelt was a capable wartime leader who overcame enormous obstacles but 
made several critical mistakes. One of these was with his successor. Clearly aware of his 
failing health the president chose to conceal his condition from his new vice-president. 
In key areas of foreign policy Roosevelt also neglected Truman mightily, and when 
summoned to the White House on April 12, 1945, the Missourian had not even been 
briefed on the development of the atomic bomb.  Upon taking the oath of office, the new 
president faced an overwhelming array of mammoth tasks, as well as a horrifying 
technology that would change the world forever. He had little time or energy to devote 
to the problems of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist Chinese. With the unfortunate 
agreement made at Yalta tying his hands Truman felt obliged to continue his 
predecessor’s course.  
 By May 1945, some leaders in Washington began to wonder if Soviet 
intervention against Japan was still necessary. On May 12th Acting Secretary of State 
Secretary of State Joseph Grew queried the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson if the Soviet demands agreed to at Yalta could be reconsidered.  Stimson replied 
that at this point the Soviets could take what they wanted in Manchuria regardless of the 
Yalta accords, and the United States was in no position to stop them.  Stimson painted a 
disturbing picture, noting that, “If the present schism in China continues, and, at the 
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same time Russian forces advance to areas giving them close contact with the Chinese 
Communists, our present problems in China will become more complicated.”106 
 In July, Ambassador Hurley Chiang reported to Truman that with some 
negotiations he could accede to the Soviet demands. However, he insisted that Dalian be 
made a free port run by the Chinese government, though he was more than willing to 
employ Soviet technical advisers.107 Stalin had no intention of sharing Dalian with the 
Guomindang. At a private meeting at Yalta with Foreign Minister Molotov and George 
Kennan, Stalin expressed the demand that the port be run by the NKVD, the Soviet 
secret police.108 Hurley confided to Truman that to push Chiang any further on this issue 
could be disastrous, declaring, “We have gone as far as the public opinion of China will 
stand, we may have even gone beyond the limit that the Chinese people will support.”109   
 The Yalta agreements on China gave the Soviets considerable leverage for their 
designs on East Asia.  Though they never came to fruition, several historians have 
shown that Stalin’s designs on East Asia went far beyond Manchuria. David Glantz’s 
classic study on the Soviet invasion of Manchuria provides compelling evidence that 
complex plans were drawn up on Stalin’s orders for the invasion of Japan’s 
northernmost island of Hokkaido. In part due to concerns raised from two of his top 
advisers, Marshal Zhukov and Foreign Minister Molotov, Stalin chose to cancel the 
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operation.110  More recently Tsuyoshi Hasegawa has detailed how Stalin only pulled 
back when U.S. intelligence became aware of his Hokkaido plans and when he judged 
the diplomatic costs for the operation to be too high.111    
Japan’s Surrender and Wedemeyer’s Plea 
By October of 1944 advantage in the war had shifted decisively in favor of the 
Allies. Nazi Germany was being squeezed into oblivion between the inexorable 
onslaught of the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. The battles of the Philippine Sea 
and Leyte Gulf had virtually destroyed the Imperial Japanese Navy. The majority of 
Japan’s elite naval aviators had been killed in action, and the U.S. Navy’s relentless 
submarine offensive was strangling Japan’s maritime commerce. Yet the Japanese 
fought on.  Millions of soldiers remained in China and the home islands.  Faced with the 
likelihood of increasingly violent resistance, American planners began to create 
blueprints for landing on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The dreaded invasion of Japan’s home 
islands and the enormous bloodletting that would likely occur weighed heavily on every 
American in uniform.    
As late as February of 1945 most American planners did not foresee a Japanese 
surrender occurring that same year. After the Yalta Conference, Admiral King notified 
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that the earliest likely date for the defeat of 
Germany was July 1st, 1945. The defeat of Japan was forecast for eighteen months after 
110 Glantz, The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945: ‘August Storm’, 305-306
111 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy:  Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press, 2005): 273-274.	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Germany’s fall.112  Given the anticipated ferocity of Japanese resistance, American 
planners expected a long campaign. However, by July of 1945, with the surrender of 
Germany, the success of the atomic bomb tests in New Mexico, and the destruction by 
strategic bombing of Japan’s major cities, the war’s end seemed much closer. The day 
after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima the Soviet ambassador formally notified the 
Japanese government of his government’s decision to abrogate the five-year neutrality 
agreement with Japan.113 The next morning, after months of moving divisions of 
infantry, armor and artillery from Europe the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria. Thanks 
to a superbly executed combination of deception and espionage the Japanese were taken 
by complete surprise. With the loss of the initiative the exhausted Kwantung Army could 
do little to even slow  the Soviet juggernaut, and within a week the Japanese government 
announced it would surrender.114 
Did the atomic bombs compel the Japanese surrender, did the Soviet invasion, or 
was it a complex combination of these decisive acts?  Historians will continue to argue 
this topic as long as the history of our world is debated.115 Of more concern to historians 	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of postwar China, however, is not why Japan surrendered but when it did.  Most of those 
without direct or indirect knowledge of the atomic bombs expected the war to last much 
longer. Enormous problems, long assumed to be in the still distant future, appeared fully 
formed in the present.  How would the United States and China deal with the surrender 
of thousands of Japanese soldiers and civilians? Would the Russians leave Manchuria in 
a timely manner? How would the United States. respond to an outbreak of civil war 
between the Nationalists and Communists? 
Wedemeyer feared the worst. Through a series of messages to General Marshall 
during the first half of August he laid out an urgent case for American intervention. The 
mounting alarm evident in each succeeding message is startling. On August 1st he 
outlined the inherent weaknesses of the Chinese government, its inability to oversee the 
potential surrender of the Japanese, and the continuing reorganization of the Nationalist 
armies.  He also emphasized the imminent threat represented by the increasingly 
belligerent Communists, and urged that a sizeable American force be assigned to China 
as soon as possible following the surrender of hostilities.116 Having received no adequate 
reply he dispatched another message on August 12th, with this blunt language: “Deeply 
concerned am I relative lack of appreciation in Washington of explosive and portentous 
possibilities when Japan surrenders.”   Noting that China seemed to be on the bottom of 
the Asian list of priorities (behind Japan and Korea) he urgently recommended that five 
American divisions be assigned to China to assist with the myriad postwar problems.117 
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His last message to Marshall before the surrender reiterated his concerns, and was 
almost Churchillian in its imagery, writing, “I view Asia as an enormous pot, seething 
and boiling, the fumes of which may readily snuff out the advantages gained by Allied 
sacrifices the past several years.”118    
Wedemeyer was not alone in his views. The U.S. ambassador to the Soviet 
Union, Averell Harriman, also recommended to Truman that American troops be landed 
in China after the surrender.  He also feared Soviet influence in both North China and 
Manchuria.119  As for Wedemeyer, the general again found himself at the center of a 
profound irony. While attempting to both stabilize China and safeguard it against the 
Soviets and Chinese Communists the general opened the door to the intervention of 
American sailors and Marines.  The Navy and Marines, not the Army, would be at the 
centerpiece of America’s postwar intervention in China.    
For China’s long suffering people the end of the eight-year war was but a brief 
blessing. Their ancient land was in shambles, their economy wrecked, and countless 
towns and villages destroyed. No reliable figures exist for how many Chinese soldiers 
perished during the war but the best estimate comes to around 10 million, with more 
than double that number of civilians.120   Chiang himself expressed astonishment at the 
surrender news but quickly released a series of broadcasts to the people of China and the 
United States, thanking both for their determination in the face of tyranny. Tempering 
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his mood, however, was this prediction: “Peace, when fighting has entirely ceased, will 
confront us with stupendous and difficult tasks, demanding greater strength and sacrifice 
than the years of war. At times we may feel that the problems of peace that descend 
upon us are more trying than those we met during the war.”  This prophecy would turn 
out to be remarkably accurate. Within a few months, much of China would be in chaos 
as the long anticipated civil war erupted. Caught in the middle would be a weary group 
of Americans trying to cope with a world of neither war nor peace.121
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CHAPTER II 
“AN ENORMOUS POT, SEETHING AND BOILING” 
The abrupt end of the war caught nearly everyone in Asia by surprise. Most had 
expected a struggle of many more months, or even a year. Dropping of atomic bombs on 
Japan and Soviet entry into the war brought a swift conclusion to the long and brutal 
war. But Japan’s surrender also resulted in a strong feeling among many Japanese 
citizens that they had been beaten by the United States, not the Chinese. For the average 
Japanese soldier it was widely believed that American technology coupled with 
overwhelming naval and air power had been the cause of their defeat. The weeks and 
months that followed announcement of the Japanese surrender on August 15th, 1945 
revealed that the Japanese had lost none of their contempt for either the Chinese and the 
Russians. This would have serious implications for the United States’ postwar China 
strategy.   
The previous chapter described the experience of U.S. Navy and Marines in 
China during the early twentieth century as well as their expulsion from East Asia at the 
start of the war.  Many of the younger American sailors and Marines had heard nostalgic 
stories of China from gunnery sergeants and petty officers who had served on the 
Yangtze River and in North China prior to the war. Though perhaps entertained by the 
tales of China in the 1920s and 1930s, most of those hearing them desired only to be sent 
home.  If this was not possible and they were given the choice between being stationed 
in Japan or deployed to China most would prefer the latter.  Whatever their thoughts the 
50,000 men of the III Marine Expeditionary Force were ordered to reenter North China 
62 
during September and October 1945 and occupy the cities of Tianjin, Qingdao, and 
Beijing.   
Albert Wedemeyer, Mao Zedong, and Chiang Kai-shek 
For General Albert Wedemeyer the unexpected surrender of Japan brought little 
time for celebration. Instead it ushered in a host of potentially crushing challenges. As 
head of the China Theater the general was tasked with overseeing the Japanese surrender 
in East Asia, coordinating with Chiang Kai-shek the movement of his armies so that he, 
not Mao Zedong, could accept the surrender of Japanese forces and ensuring the safe and 
rapid return of American prisoners of war. Thousands of Allied POW’s awaited rescue 
in camps scattered throughout North China and Manchuria, and their safe return was an 
obvious priority of all Americans.  Wedemeyer needed American troops to oversee all of 
these vital tasks.   
In early August Wedemeyer had conveyed to General George Marshall his 
concerns about the importance of China after Japan’s surrender.  During the first week of 
August Chiang had personally requested to Wedemeyer that a minimum of six American 
ground divisions be stationed in China after the war: two in the Tianjin/Beijing area, two 
in Shanghai, and one to Canton and Nanjing respectively.1  He cabled Marshall that in 
his view China, not Korea or even Japan, should be the top priority for America’s 
postwar resources in Asia.2  The Army Chief of Staff wrote back that, “Your proposal 
1	  Memorandum, Wedemeyer to Marshall, August 11th, 1945, William Leahy Papers, RG 218, Records of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Box 3, NARA.	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that we give China first priority over Japan and Korea will not repeat not be acceptable.”  
He dismissed the proposal of sending six U.S. Army divisions to China in the near 
future, indicating that all available divisions were being earmarked for the occupation of 
Japan and Korea. The best Marshall could offer would be two divisions, though of what 
kind or service remained unclear.3 
 Several important decisions on China would soon be made. At a hastily convened 
conference held in Manila senior representatives from most of the major U.S. military 
commands in Asia and the Pacific gathered to discuss U.S. postwar role in China. After 
three days of meetings they agreed on a four-part strategy: First, two Marine Corps 
divisions would be assigned to duty in China, and would be estimated to arrive around 
September 30th. Second, priority would be given to North China, specifically Qingdao 
and Tianjin, though American naval forces would also establish a strong presence in 
Shanghai. Third, the U.S. Seventh Fleet would be tasked with providing naval support 
for China in the form of mine clearance and port security.  Finally, to avoid hostilities 
and remove them from China as rapidly as possible, the repatriation of Japanese military 
personnel to the home islands would take priority.4           
 Back in Chongqing, Wedemeyer faced several overwhelming tasks with only 
limited resources to work with.  With ten divisions assigned to Japan and two more to 
Korea, only the 50,000 Marines from the two battle tested divisions of the III Marine 
Expeditionary Force on Okinawa and Guam would be available for China. If he was 
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disappointed by the assignment of Marines rather than Army troops one can never know, 
but in his memoirs the Marines are barely discussed. Only a short mention of “these 
inadequate but extremely valuable reinforcements” reveals his thoughts on the matter.5 It 
seems likely that he would have preferred to have Army divisions in China. It is with no 
small irony that an Army general, who had long stymied U.S. Navy efforts in China, 
would find himself inadvertently bringing the Navy and Marines back to help close out 
the war. 
 On August 20th Wedemeyer’s headquarters in Chongqing issued a directive 
entitled China Theater Directive #25, which detailed the three major objectives central to 
American plans for North China. The Marines of the III MEF would: 1) assist the 
Nationalist Government by occupying key areas, 2) accept the surrender of Japanese 
forces around Tianjin and Beijing, and 3) locate and liberate American and Allied 
prisoners of war.6 At the time the III MEF Marines on Okinawa were training for 
Operation Coronet, the planned invasion of the Kanto plain on Honshu scheduled for 
March 1946, which would follow the November 1st American invasion of Kyushu.7 An 
August 26th Warning Order detailed  preparatory steps to be taken prior to deployment in 
China, including bringing all equipment up to good working condition, administering a 
series of comprehensive immunizations to all personnel, and ensuring that all Marines 
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were issued new identification tags.  The order specified that preparations should be 
complete by September 15th for a pending occupation in Asia.8    
While the Marines prepared for service in North China, Wedemeyer confronted a 
host of challenges.  Chief among them was determining how to deal with Mao and his 
Communists. In early August U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley called upon 
Mao, Chiang, and Wedemeyer to meet. Mao’s unpredictable ally, Joseph Stalin, all but 
ordered his attendance. A reluctant Mao agreed to a meeting in Chongqing as soon as 
possible. Over four weeks Chiang and Mao met nine times privately and many more 
times publicly to discuss the status of the Chinese Communist Party, political prisoners, 
and working towards a new national government. Both Chiang and Mao proclaimed that 
the civil war between them must end.9  
 Before many of these outwardly cordial meetings would take place, however, a 
tense encounter occurred. On August 30th Wedemeyer met with Mao and Zhou Enlai at 
Hurley’s residence. Wedemeyer, though outwardly affecting his usual cerebral calm, 
was seething inside. He had received a report that U.S. Army Captain John Birch, on 
detached service to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), had been murdered by 
Communist guerillas in Suchow on the Shandong Peninsula. Birch’s death, which has 
long been a source of controversy among historians, was quite possibly the result of 
Birch’s deliberate taunting and abuse of Chinese Communists who he viewed as 
contemptuous enemies of the United States. Regardless of the exact causes of the 
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incident, Birch’s body was discovered on August 27th. He had been shot, mutilated, and 
buried in a shallow grave.10     
 At their first meeting, Mao opened the discussions by asking Wedemeyer how 
many American troops were currently in China. Having heard that additional American 
forces would soon land in China, he also inquired where this would take place. 
Wedemeyer gave vague responses to both questions before telling Mao and Zhou Enlai 
about the circumstances of Birch’s death. Both Communist leaders expressed concern 
and said they knew nothing about the incident. After some discussion an angry 
Wedemeyer told Mao directly, “I would like assurance that this will not happen again. I 
cannot have Americans killed by Chinese Communists in this theatre or anywhere else. I 
am directed by the president of the United States to use whatever force I require to 
protect American lives in China.”11 
 That Wedemeyer would speak so bluntly to Mao reflects the American general’s 
perception of Mao’s position in August 1945. With Japan defeated, a present and 
growing American military presence, and the apparently rejuvenated Nationalist 
government, the CCP seemed to be in a perilous state. Even Mao himself realized this.  
As Ronald Spector summarizes, “At Chongqing, Mao recognized that he was 
temporarily in a tight position. He had little doubt about the long-term outcome in a 
contest with the Nationalists. His movement was dynamic, growing and highly 
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motivated, with good leaders and a proven strategy, while Chiang’s was increasingly 
isolated, corrupt, reactionary and incompetent. Yet for the moment, with the Americans 
backing Chiang and Russian attitudes uncertain, he [Mao] was prepared to make 
concessions.”12 
Mao assured Wedemeyer that he would launch a full investigation into Birch’s 
death. The meeting adjourned with conciliatory words of cooperation on both sides.13  
Like much else said at the Chongqing summit, however, most of Mao’s promises were 
just for show.  He was primarily interested in playing for time and considered the 
agreements made with Chiang, such as assurances on a future coalition government, as 
mere words. As Richard Bernstein concludes, “His [Mao’s] visit to Chungking 
(Chongqing) had served its purpose.  He mollified the Americans, whom he was anxious 
to keep on the sidelines.  He conveyed the image of a reasonable man seeking peace.”14 
The End of SACO 
The close of August saw another dispute boil to the surface. The simmering row 
between the Army and Navy over Rear Admiral Milton Miles and the Sino-American 
Cooperative Organization (SACO) was renewed. For some time Wedemeyer had made it 
plain that he hoped both the SACO agreement and Miles’ organization would be 
terminated at the war’s conclusion. In the days after Japan’s surrender announcement 
12	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  14	  Bernstein, China 1945, 292.	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Wedemeyer recommended to General Marshall that SACO cease operations 
immediately after the official surrender. Admiral King quickly heard of this and soon 
communicated to Marshall his displeasure, writing “I agree with Admiral Miles that 
closing the SACO Agreement as of Surrender Day would leave an extremely bad 
impression with the Chinese government. In fact, I believe that it would prejudice the 
favored status with that government which we have been given to understand United 
States policy will strive to maintain.” King, ever the stalwart backer of Miles, pointed 
out that hostilities may continue well past the surrender date, and to shut down SACO 
could irreparably harm U.S. relations with Chiang’s government.15   
From the Navy Department’s perspective the matter came down to differing 
interpretations of the agreement. General Wedemeyer seemed to favor a strict 
interpretation of the language in the agreement, arguing that according to the SACO 
agreement stipulated that the organization’s existence would cease upon the end of 
hostilities. King and Miles argued that any abrupt termination would be viewed 
negatively by Chiang’s government, and that SACO should at least be allowed to 
continue its weather monitoring activities after the war16 Most naval officers close to 
Miles and SACO felt that Wedemeyer had an ulterior motive; he simply wanted to shut 
down the Navy organization in order to renegotiate with Chiang for an intelligence 
sharing agreement that was more amenable to Army methods.17        
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In truth it was likely matters of personality mattered as much as policy to 
Wedemeyer. The Army general had run out of patience with Miles and his organization. 
He felt that guerilla warfare was Army business, not that of the Navy. Wedemeyer was 
also deeply troubled by Miles’ close relationship with Dai Li, a man whose brutal 
methods he could not tolerate. He was also looking to the future. Ever since SACO had 
established its training camps at Happy Valley the Chinese Communists had demonized 
the organization, accusing the American instructors of providing training not only in 
methods of espionage but also of assassination, thus making Dai Li’s dreaded secret 
police even more dangerous. However exaggerated the Communist propaganda might 
be, to improve the chances of a postwar peace between the Nationalists and Communists 
Wedemeyer wanted SACO shut down as soon as possible.18      
The rivalry between Wedemeyer and Miles was affecting diplomatic relations 
with China. Miles was a longtime favorite of Chiang Kai-shek and his wife who were 
not pleased at the prospect of Miles’ departure. T.V. Soong had written to Secretary of 
the Navy James Forrestal explaining Chiang’s urgent desire for Miles and SACO to have 
a prominent place in postwar China.  Knowing that SACO would be disbanded soon, 
Soong requested that the U.S. government form a Naval Mission to assist the postwar 
Chinese government in building and training its own navy. Furthermore he drew special 
attention to the leadership of SACO, especially Milton Miles, and requested that these 
“capable and tried officers be included in the Naval Mission.”19 
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 On September 16th the Chiangs hosted Wedemeyer for a discussion on the 
postwar American advisory group and Miles’ future in China. Both the Generalissimo 
and his wife argued forcefully for retaining Miles, perhaps as the head of the planned 
U.S. Navy advisory mission to China. But Wedemeyer was adamant. He could not and 
would not work with Miles any longer. The admiral’s close connection to Dai Li and the 
inherent personality conflicts between the two men settled the matter as far as 
Wedemeyer was concerned. Disappointed by the general’s decision, Chiang nevertheless 
eventually accepted it.20    
Ambassador Hurley had also tried to ease the tensions between the two men, but 
to no avail.  Hurley later argued that the problems between the two men revolved around 
childish and petty differences. For the most part, however, the flamboyant ambassador 
privately blamed the Army general, whom he believed was jealous of Miles’ closeness 
with Dai Li and resented Chiang’s glowing statements about Miles. Hurley also felt that 
perhaps Wedemeyer was irked by the prevailing view among many Asians that it was 
the U.S. Navy that had largely defeated the Japanese. In early August Hurley delivered a 
speech in Pearl Harbor in which he stated that the war in the Pacific was largely won by 
naval power, not by the Russian invasion of Manchuria or by the atomic bomb. Word 
had filtered down that Hurley’s speech had been poorly received by Wedemeyer, who 
felt the ambassador was failing to acknowledge the U.S. Army’s contribution to victory 
over Japan.21   
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This was not a narrowly held view in China.  To the countless Asians who had 
heard of the U.S. Navy’s exploits in the Pacific, the overwhelming perception was that 
American naval power had defeated Japan.  Dai Li spoke for many Chinese when he 
wrote to Admiral King’s Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Charles M. Cooke, and declared 
that the defeat of Japan was possible through the “fighting strength of the U.S. Navy.”22 
It was not long before American warships arrived in China.  After a short delay in 
clearing both American and Japanese mines the first units of the Seventh Fleet steamed 
into Shanghai less than two weeks after Japan signed surrender documents on the deck 
of the USS Missouri. Admiral Kinkaid moored his flagship to the number one buoy in 
Shanghai harbor, an honor reserved for Royal Navy flagships during the past century.23  
Future Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt, then a young Navy lieutenant, recalled 
the sight of the fleet’s return to Shanghai as a “grim grey dragon of masts and guns and 
superstructures.”24 Upon their arrival Admiral Kinkaid and his fleet were welcomed by 
countless waving and cheering Chinese. Numerous businessmen and local leaders wrote 
letters to Kinkaid thanking him for their liberation, but perhaps the most poignant was 
from a local middle school principal. The letter requested that his young students could 
visit the American warships in person, “as those children have been growing up under 
the confinement of the enemy’s yoke for so long a time of eight years and now having 
been set free by your grand naval influence as well as their own strength.”25 
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The popularity of the Navy was a serious concern for Wedemeyer, not simply 
because of any jealous motivation, but also due to a dramatic increase in tensions 
between Army personnel and those of the Nationalist Chinese Army. Throughout the 
summer of 1945 a series of incidents occurred in which U.S. Army and OSS personnel 
were harassed or abused by Chinese soldiers. The most serious took place in July in the 
town of Tushan, when members of the Chinese 12th Motorized Engineering Regiment 
encountered about a dozen U.S. Army enlisted personnel at the local International Café. 
Upon seeing that the Americans were in the company of young Chinese women, the 
soldiers physically and verbally harassed them, and at one point forced the Americans to 
line up along a wall at the point of their bayonets. One of the Chinese sergeants yelled, 
“We did not ask for American troops! We want equipment only!”26 Although the 
incident was resolved without injury Wedemeyer quickly wrote to Chiang demanding 
that this and other incidents of harassment be investigated and that new procedures be 
put in place to prevent such acts in the future. With some justification Wedemeyer felt 
that American military personnel were gradually losing the goodwill of the average 
Chinese soldier.27 
These problems came at a time when the U.S. warships were not only operating 
in Shanghai but almost everywhere in Chinese coastal waters.  Chiang had made it clear 
to Ambassador Hurley and President Truman that British ships were not welcome in 
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Chinese ports after Japan’s surrender.28  The bitter memories of British colonial 
domination of China had never died. With the exception of Hong Kong, American ships 
thus had a near monopoly in East Asian waters, with American cruisers and destroyers 
soon crowding anchorages from the Yellow Sea to as far south as Indochina. The no-
British policy caused a few headaches for Admiral Kinkaid, who had numerous Royal 
Navy warships under his command that briefly moored in Shanghai, to the considerable 
consternation of Chiang’s government.29 After establishing his fleet’s new headquarters 
in Shanghai, Kinkaid wrote to his wife that the situation in China resembled more of a 
circus than anything else, as he struggled to balance the interests of the Navy, Chiang’s 
government, and the surrendering Japanese.30 
Despite the U.S. Navy’s popularity and presence in Asia, Milton Miles was in no 
condition to counter General Wedemeyer’s efforts to shut down SACO.  Physically 
exhausted from the war and mentally impaired due to high doses of anti-malarial 
medication, Miles later admitted in his memoirs that he was not fully in control of his 
faculties at war’s end.  Reflecting back on what should have been a time to celebrate 
victory, he wrote instead that, “the month that followed the surrender of Japan was the 
worst through which I have ever lived.”31  In her history of SACO Linda Kush 
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concluded that Miles’ perilous mental state proved ruinous, writing that, “He could not 
remember certain events in which he had been most active.  His professional self-editing 
function had evaporated, leading him to make foolish comments to his superiors, some, 
unfortunately, in writing. He wrote to a navy liaison officer that the future of the navy in 
China depended on getting out from under the army, whose red tape only hindered 
operations, and those remarks ended up on the desks of Wedemeyer and the Joint Chiefs 
out of context.”32 
By the time of Wedemeyer’s meeting with Chiang on September 16th these 
reports had been construed as direct insubordination, as Miles had laid out plans to 
continue SACO activities in direct violation of orders. Even the enormous reach of 
Admiral King could not protect him under these circumstances.  After a tense and 
disastrous mid-September meeting with Wedemeyer in Shanghai Miles, was briefly 
placed under house arrest for health reasons, then flown back to the U.S. to rest and 
recuperate.33  As for Dai Li, he continued to be a source of concern for Wedemeyer until 
his death in March 1946. Cloaked in conspiracy theories, the Chinese spymaster’s fiery 
demise in a plane crash near Nanjing was blamed on everything from mechanical failure 
to vengeful Chinese spirits and Communist or even OSS sabotage. Only Chiang, Miles, 
and a few others in the GMD mourned his passing.34  
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With Miles’ departure the longstanding disputes between the Army and Navy 
eased.  Although the SACO agreement continued to be in force on paper most of its 
operations had been shut down by September and with it the greatest source of 
contention between the two services.35  Yet back in Washington another Army-Navy 
controversy over China was simmering.  In early October George Marshall requested 
that a single military mission be created under the command of an army general. 
Predictably, Admiral King was strongly opposed to this proposal, and instead argued for 
separate Army and Navy missions with an independent coordinator. After much 
discussion, the Joint Chiefs adopted King’s proposal 36  George Marshall accepted the 
arrangement but for the next four years he and James Forrestal rarely agreed on anything 
dealing with China. Even after Marshall became Secretary of State in January 1947 and 
Forrestal became the first Secretary of Defense the following September, each would 
aggressively defend his respective services in China. 
Operation Beleager    
In the seas and inland waters of East Asia the U.S. Seventh Fleet was far from 
idle.  Concerned about the status of 1,500 Allied POW’s in Manchuria, Admiral Thomas 
Kinkaid ordered the two destroyers of Destroyer Squadron 64 under Captain Chester 
Wood to Dalian on September 2nd. Already occupied by the Soviet Red Army, the 
35	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strategic port city and the Yellow Sea became the scene of a proto-Cold War standoff.  
Kinkaid, irritated by what he considered rude and inappropriate behavior on the part of 
the Soviets given the urgent matter of the POW’s, ordered several cruisers and 
destroyers to Dalian. More than 1,500 American and Allied POW’s would finally be 
evacuated through the port in early September by U.S. Navy hospital ships and 
destroyers.   Tensions between the two nations would cool afterwards but the Soviet 
domination of Dalian would continue to concern the U.S. Navy in East Asia.37 The 
delicate and complex situation in Manchuria will be discussed in greater detail in the 
next chapter.  
 The Seventh Fleet was also busy elsewhere. After dealing with the aftermath of a 
vicious typhoon that swept northward through the Philippines towards Japan in early 
September 1945, the fleet loaded the Twenty-Fourth Army Corps at Buckner Bay, 
Okinawa, and headed north.38  On September 9th the Seventh Fleet landed the army 
troops at Inchon, South Korea. The same day Admiral Kinkaid and U.S. Army 
Lieutenant General Courtney Hodge accepted the formal surrender of all Japanese forces 
south of the 38th parallel. General Nobuyuki Abe signed as the Japanese Governor 
General of Korea.39 Admiral Daniel Barbey, the commander of Seventh Fleet 
amphibious forces, described the expressionless Abe as being racked by internal turmoil, 
writing “Although he could control the muscles of his face, he could not control the 
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muscles of his stomach, and midway in the signing he pulled out his handkerchief to 
catch its contents.”40 The scene of surrendering Japanese officers, externally proud but 
internally tormented by what would have been unthinkable only months earlier, was one 
that would be repeated often in the coming weeks.            
Back on Okinawa the 50,000 Marines of the III MEF prepared for deployment to 
China. The now code-named Operation Beleaguer would focus on occupying the key 
cities of Tianjin, Qingdao, and Beijing.  Thanks in large part to its extensive wartime 
intelligence activities in China the U.S. had excellent knowledge of north China, 
especially the key Shandong Peninsula and the Gulf of Chihli. Located at the far western 
corner of the gulf, the strategic city of Dagu was one the first objectives. Dagu was 
located on the south bank of the Hai-Ho River, thirty miles downriver from Tianjin. 
According to most available intelligence the main road from Dagu to Tianjin was in very 
poor condition, but the double track railroad was intact and could be used to transport 
the Marines from Dagu to Tianjin.41   
 Once ashore at Dagu the 1st Marine Division was to oversee and accept the 
surrender of the Japanese North China Army, estimated to have at between 45,000 to 
50,000 personnel and then to occupy and assume control of Hopeh Province before 
moving to Tianjin.42  Although the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions would not be facing 
armed opposition from entrenched Japanese, considerable risks remained.  A large 
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sandbar known simply as the Dagu Bar forced deep draft ships to anchor more than 
seven miles from the city of Dagu.  The Marines would have to transfer to smaller 
landing craft to cover those seven miles.  Most Marine Corps amphibious craft, such as 
the ubiquitous Higgins boat, could cross the bar at any time, but the larger LSM’s 
(Landing Ship, Mechanized) could only cross during a two-hour period at high tide.43   
 At dawn on September 30th the Navy transports carrying the 1st Marine Division 
anchored near the mouth of the Hai River. Upon their arrival dozens of sampans manned 
by cheering and jubilant Chinese crews began waving at the Americans. As the Marines 
climbed down the rope ladders to their landing craft, as they had done so many times 
before in the war, they were astonished to see the Chinese move their sampans within a 
few feet of their boats, waving wildly and even attempting to trade cheap souvenirs. It 
was a welcome change from the landings at Okinawa and Iwo Jima.44 
 After coming ashore at Tangku the Marines were loaded onto waiting trains for 
the trip to Tianjin and then on to Beijing. The trip was a pleasant one for most, as riding 
on a train was an experience few had enjoyed during the war years. Everywhere they 
went the Marines encountered throngs of welcoming Chinese, most waving 
enthusiastically at the arriving Americans. The atmosphere of the journey changed 
rapidly, however, when word was passed that the Marines might have to fight their way 
through the Communists to reach Beijing. This proved to be a false rumor, and the 
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Marines reached the city without incident. E. B. Sledge described their arrival in the 
ancient Chinese capital, “Without any opposition or mishap, our train entered the huge 
rail yard at Beijing and pulled into the station.  To our delight the trackside was lined 
with Chinese schoolchildren holding little American flags and waving and smiling at 
us.”45             
One of the most important reasons for the Marines’ deployment to northern 
China was to oversee the surrender of Japanese forces in China. In August President 
Truman and Chiang agreed that only Nationalist troops would accept the Japanese 
surrender.46  The only exception to this would be their official representatives in North 
China, specifically the U.S. Marines.  Further south as Japanese Guangdong Army units 
began surrendering to the Nationalist Chinese the contempt felt by the former for the 
latter was easily apparent. Historian Donald Gillin succinctly described the situation, 
concluding, “Everywhere in China, except in Manchuria where they were overwhelmed 
by the Soviet Union, the Japanese had no sense of having been defeated and were intent 
on making this clear to the Chinese.” In the metropolises of Beijing and Shanghai the 
Japanese commanders displayed the utmost contempt for their Nationalist Chinese 
counterparts when they surrendered. Elsewhere some Nationalists soldiers revealed that 
they still feared the Japanese, even after the surrender announcement. After being landed 
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on the island of Taiwan 12,000 Nationalist soldiers refused to leave their American 
transports. Only when threatened with being thrown overboard did they disembark.47 
 In marked contrast Japanese surrender ceremonies to the Americans in China 
were largely respectful and orderly, though the Japanese could not mask the inner fury at 
their defeat. On October 6th Marine General Kelly E. Rockey accepted the surrender of 
nearly 18,000 Japanese troops in Tianjin.  Forced to walk half a block to the French 
Municipal Building, Lieutenant General Ginosuke Uchida and Major General Shiro 
Onato placed their swords on a table covered in green felt cloth. 48  With six impressions 
of his personal ivory and jade seal, General Uchida closed one of the final chapters of 
Japan’s hold on North China.49 The numerous Chinese civilians in attendance applauded 
the ceremony, and in the days that followed many took the surrender as a signal to exact 
revenge upon their former tormentors. Thousands of Japanese civilians who had 
previously ruled Tianjin found themselves beaten and robbed by Chinese gangs who 
claimed to be acting under American orders. The Marines soon set up motorized patrols 
to quell the riots, and within a week most of Tianjin had returned to a semblance of 
order.50 
 A few weeks later the Sixth Marines oversaw the official surrender of the 
Japanese in Qingdao.  They were thus witness to one of the last major surrender 
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ceremonies of the war. On the afternoon of October 25th General Rockey accepted the 
surrender from General Nagamo Eiji at the Qingdao racetrack, with 12,000 Marines and 
a battalion of Sherman tanks in formation. Speaking for Rockey, General Lemuel 
Shepherd offered no hand of reconciliation, only victory. Commenting on the historic 
nature of the ceremony, he declared, “I am the sure the personal satisfaction each of you 
obtains from witnessing the local Japanese Army Commander lay down his sword in 
complete defeat, will, in a small measure, compensate for the dangers and hardships to 
which you will have been exposed during your service in this war.”51 Although a few 
smaller surrenders occurred one of the most immediate tasks of Operation Beleager had 
been accomplished.     
 For the officers and men of the Seventh Fleet, the first few weeks in Chinese 
waters were spent transporting the Marines, clearing the channels and ports of Japanese 
mines, and just waiting. Many longed for the coming day when they could sail back in to 
San Francisco or San Diego to a hero’s welcome. Admiral Kinkaid addressed these 
concerns and offered his congratulations during a speech broadcasted live on October 
12th. Speaking from his flagship, the USS Catoctin, anchored in Qingdao, Kinkaid 
acknowledged that for much of the Seventh Fleet work was only beginning in China but 
thanked all the men of the Seventh Fleet for their gallant service, declaring that, “Your 
own personal share in the victory is a priceless possession. I hope that you will always 
remember how it was won and why it had to be won. Those of you who return to civil 
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life take with you a knowledge and understanding based upon the actual use of the 
instruments of war.” He urged all of them to utilize the skills they earned during the war 
for a better tomorrow.52 
The Seventh Fleet was also busy with another important and far more 
problematic mission. Less than a week after Kinkaid’s speech, more than 50,000 
Nationalist troops were being ferried by 17th and 24th U.S. Navy Transport Squadrons to 
North China. As part of Chiang’s efforts to reinforce the north in the face of the growing 
Communist threat, he had completed an agreement with Wedemeyer in September 
whereby the Seventh Fleet, along with the 14th Air Force, would move more than 
100,000 of his best troops from South to North China. This direct support for Chiang’s 
forces, in the midst of what would become one of the most controversial aspects of 
American involvement in China will be discussed in detail in later chapters.53  
China Marines Again 
As the Marines moved into Qingdao, Beijing, and Tianjin, many eagerly 
explored their new surroundings. One Marine officer assigned to the former French 
Legation barracks in Tianjin referred to his new home as “a curious city.”  He marveled 
at the international nature of Tianjin, which seemed to be from a bygone era. “You could 
drive a jeep along the Rue de Marechal Foch in the former French Concession and think 
52	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you were in France” he recalled, and, “You could turn into Victoria Road, flanked by 
stately bank buildings in the former British concession; or you could cross the 
International Bridge to the Via Marchese di San Guiliano in the former Italian 
Concession.”54  
 For the young Marines and sailors China was an alien world, and the Chinese 
themselves both astonishing and incomprehensible. Their ways evoked admiration, 
contempt, and bewilderment.  Many sailors and Marines thought highly of the Chinese 
emphasis on courtesy and manners. Other Americans expressed being surprised by the 
tremendous ingenuity and resourcefulness of merchants and tradesmen.55 One Marine 
would recall that many Chinese craftsmen were capable of precise feats of woodworking 
and leather craftsmanship that most Americans would be unable to accomplish with 
modern power tools.  The Chinese approach to the subject of time also made a positive 
impression. Unencumbered by the need to live according to mechanical constructs most 
Chinese seemed to exist in a timeless state. Eugene Sledge wrote poignantly that in 
China, “People were not rushing through life as victims of a timeframe set by machines, 
but they moved along calmly and enjoyed what pleasures and diversions their rich 
ancient culture afforded them, whether they were merchants or coolies.”56 
 For the average Marine the overwhelming and salient reality of life in China was 
crushing poverty and many commented on it.  After their arrival Marines were 
overwhelmed by not just the sights and sounds but also the smells of people struggling 
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after eight years of brutal war. Young children would raid garbage cans for food, 
Chinese mothers would offer to sell their daughters for little more than twenty U.S. 
dollars, and to make ends meet some laborers would even collect human waste from the 
Marines’ bathrooms and use it as manure in their cabbage fields. Ronald Spector 
concludes that, “While they found these practices appalling, or simply incomprehensible, 
most Marines recognized that the Chinese were engaged in a ‘struggle for survival.’”57  
One aspect of Chinese culture that astounded many Marines was an extraordinary 
insensitivity to those in need. Both officer and enlisted alike were saddened by examples 
of this, such as the common sight of rows of shops in Qingdao, where one family would 
be eating mouthfuls of rice next to another shopkeeper who was visibly starving in the 
street.58  Eugene Sledge describes a coolie pushing a heavy cart of lettuce that became 
stuck on a curb. After a crowd of more than a hundred Chinese stood nearby merely 
discussing the situation, Sledge and a friend grabbed the cart and heaved it onto the 
sidewalk, to the delight and gratitude of the exhausted coolie.59 In a far more lethal 
incident, Private Jeptha Carrell recalled witnessing a Chinese laborer carrying a heavy 
bag of rice. After apparently suffering a heart attack, Carrell recalled that, “He keeled 
over, dropping his load, and lay, unmoving in the roadway. Until I drove up in a Jeep no 
one touched him or even stopped to check his condition.” Carrell, Sledge and other 
Marines would later discover that anyone who helped an injured or dying person was 
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responsible for their care under Chinese law.60  In retrospect this seeming universal 
callousness was the result of both the complexities of Chinese culture and the Japanese 
occupation. In the struggle for survival generosity was a privilege few could afford.   
Even more disheartening to many Marines was the Chinese practice of 
abandoning or selling their young daughters for small amounts of money.  A society that 
prized male children who could carry on the family legacy, the Chinese often considered 
rearing young females to be a burden and sold them if the opportunity arose. Marine 
Private Roy Rostad noted sadly that young girls “were given away, sold into virtual 
slavery, and if they showed prospects of turning out to be a good looker, they brought in 
the biggest buck by being sold in the oldest profession.”61 
In addition to their contacts with Chinese and Japanese civilians, many American 
servicemen had a variety of encounters with the European expatriate communities in 
North China. Two of the most problematic were the Germans and Russians.  German 
communities had been established in Tianjin and Qingdao around 1900 and soon became 
powerful and influential exclaves of business, trade, and politics. During the 1930s the 
Nazi Party was very active in both.  By the conclusion of the war, however the German 
population of Tianjin was less than 600. Most of the remaining Germans, many of which 
had known life in China all their lives, were scheduled to be expatriated to Germany by 
the end of 1945.62  Qingdao, with a similar population of German nationals, saw the 
most direct contact between U.S. Marines and former Nazi party members. The 
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difficulty of identifying and repatriating much of the embedded German population in 
these cities, as well as the expatriate metropolis of Shanghai, would be a continuous 
effort during the American military intervention in China.63 
Divided into Red and White camps, the thousands of Russians in Shanghai, 
Beijing and Qingdao included several hundred prominent members of society, many of 
whom would be thrown into chaos soon after the war’s end when the Nationalist 
government insisted that all Russians in China leave for the Soviet Union or request 
Chinese citizenship.64  Only Red Russians (supporters of the current Communist 
government) could return to Soviet Union after the Russian Civil War (1918-1922). For 
the White Russians, who chose to support and defend the Tsar Nicholas and the Russian 
nobility, returning to their beloved Rodina (homeland) would mean the Soviet gulag, 
torture, or death, and sometimes all three. Many U.S. Marines and naval personnel 
would have memorable encounters with the Russians in China.  Future Chief of Naval 
Operations Elmo Zumwalt, then a young Navy lieutenant, met his future wife, White 
Russian Mouza Coutelias-du-Roche in Shanghai after the surrender.65 Another Marine 
officer who had encounters with both groups described the Whites as, “usually fun to be 
with. The Reds were not.” Curious about the enigmatic Russian Communists he bought a 
ticket to an event commemorating the Russian Revolution.  Held at Tianjin University’s 
main auditorium in November 1945, the event was a magnificently staged piece of 
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Soviet propaganda. After reading a personal letter from Joseph Stalin the organizers 
relentlessly demonstrated through song and sketch that the defeat of Nazi Germany was 
due wholly and incontestably because of the sacrifice of the Soviet Union. The event 
concluded when a Russian white knight ceremonially stabbed the black clad German 
devil.   Little wonder that this secretive but enthusiastic group of Russian exiles in China 
would go on to attract so much attention from the U.S. State Department and U.S. 
intelligence agencies in the years to come.66 
A Cold Fall in China 
By the end of October all the III MEF Marines had been billeted and organized 
ashore. The 1st Marine Division was primarily clustered in Beijing, Tianjin and Dagu, 
while the 6th Marines controlled Qingdao.67  For air support the III MEF relied on the 1st 
Marine Aircraft Wing, which established its headquarters at the old French Arsenal 
airfield east of Tianjin.68 Beyond the initial parades and surrender ceremonies most of 
the work of the Marines was lonely and mundane. Throughout October and November 
their primary duties consisted of guarding rail lines, patrolling the streets of Tianjin and 
Beijing, and keeping a watchful eye on the Japanese prisoners of war prior to their 
repatriation to Japan. Later guarding vital coal mines for the coming winter became an 
important role. It was a dull, monotonous, and increasingly cold watch.  
66	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The greatest danger came not from any vengeful Japanese but from the CCP.  
Throughout October the First Marines encountered various forms of hostility from the 
Communists. The first incident took place soon after the Dagu landings. On October 5th 
a Marine reconnaissance team discovered thirty-six unguarded roadblocks that prevented 
travel along the strategic Tianjin-Beijing highway. The following day an engineering 
team sent to clear the roadblocks was fired up on by then unknown forces, later revealed 
to be Communists. After taking rifle fire and suffering three wounded, the engineering 
team withdrew. On October 7th, supported by a tank platoon and carrier air cover, the 
roadblocks were finally removed. 69 As a gesture of good will Chiang Kai-shek released 
a message on October 12th, thanking the Marines for their valiant service in the Pacific 
and welcoming them to his troubled country. For the remainder of the month sniper 
attacks and sabotage of rail lines and equipment was frequent. No deaths occurred but 
several Marines were injured. Yet these series of incidents were only a taste of what was 
to come.70 
As the weather turned colder in northern China the Marines began to realize that 
a quick departure was increasingly unlikely, especially after the men of the III MEF 
were issued winter service-green uniforms.  The sharp looking thick green wool 
overcoats were especially prized for their warmth, and their arrival from the U.S. was 
greeted with considerable acclaim.71 But beyond the new uniforms and words of thanks 
it was becoming apparent to many that their stay was likely to be much longer than they 	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had anticipated. Confusion and concern over the Navy and Marines’ mission in China 
had been growing, and soon a series of events would compel revision of existing U.S. 
policy. 
Eugene Sledge recalled an incident that reflected the confusing nature of their 
mission. On guard duty near the village of Lang Fang on October 26th, he and his 
platoon nearly got into a firefight when gunfire erupted nearby. Several thousand 
Communist soldiers attacked the Nationalist-controlled village that night. Most of the 
fighting took place a few miles away from the Marines’ position, yet to Sledge the 
situation was both ironic and bitter.  “Here we were, [he wrote] about forty U.S. 
Marines, in the middle of what could explode into a vicious battle between two opposing 
Chinese forces numbering in the thousands. We had survived fierce combat in the 
Pacific and now none of us wanted to stretch his luck any further and get killed in a 
Chinese Civil War. We felt a terribly lonely sensation of being abandoned and 
expendable.”72 
During November a number of violent incidents with the Communists occurred. 
By far the most serious took place on November 14th.  While inspecting the rail line 
from Qingwandao to Beijing Major General Dewitt Peck, the commander of the 1st 
Marine Division, and his staff came under rifle fire from an unidentified group of men 
from a village six miles north of the small town of Kuyeh.  A platoon of Marines 
responded with mortar fire, and like the previous incidents the hostiles dispersed before 
facing the brunt of Marine Corps firepower. After the Kuyeh incident General Rockey 	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requested clarification from General Wedemeyer on the rules of engagement.73  With the 
threat of additional bloodshed growing and their hands tied with restrictive rules, Marine 
Corps leadership in China had become frustrated and angry. No one felt the pressure to 
find a new direction for the U.S. military in China more than Albert Wedemeyer. 
The November Debate 
By November 1945 Wedemeyer had served as the senior American military 
officer in China for over a year. He had developed a strong working relationship with 
Chiang and had met with Mao and Zhou Enlai. He understood the situation in China 
about as well as any Westerner could. And the political, economic, and military 
conditions greatly disturbed him. After a series of consultations with General Rockey 
and Chiang Kai-shek, Wedemeyer submitted a series of detailed reports to the Joint 
Chiefs. He reported facing a perilous situation, far more complex than had been 
anticipated in August when the orders to deploy the Navy and Marines to China had first 
been issued.74  
By early November it had become obvious that the United States had five -  often 
contradictory - goals in China. The first was to oversee the expeditious release of all 
American POW’s, which by November had been accomplished.  The second was the 
repatriation of the Japanese back to their homeland. Although nearly a million Japanese 
soldiers and civilians remained in China this goal seemed achievable in the near future. 
73	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The third, and inextricably tied to the second, was to quietly support Chiang’s 
Nationalists in their effort to gain control over both North China and later Manchuria. 
The fourth goal was to block Soviet expansion in East Asia. This goal, perhaps the most 
nebulous, would soon become a major point of contention between U.S. Navy and Army 
leadership. The final goal, and potentially the most intractable, was to encourage a 
lasting peace and a coalition government between the Nationalists and Communists.  If 
the fifth goal could not be achieved, the United States was to somehow accomplish the 
first three objectives without becoming involved in fratricidal warfare between the two 
Chinese camps. 
After expressing both sympathy and solidarity for Chiang in his report, 
Wedemeyer addressed a memorandum to Marshall explaining the situation.75  The 
Chinese economy was all but collapsing due to high inflation, many Chinese civilians 
were starving, and the Nationalist government, despite its strength in the south, was 
unable to influence policy in the north, despite the presence of the Marines. Chiang 
could not hope to subjugate the Communists, much less take over the increasingly vital 
province of Manchuria without far greater American support than what had been 
currently promised.  The United States thus found itself in an intolerable situation. If it 
withdrew support for Chiang and ended American ground and naval support, the 
corruption and graft endemic to the Nationalist government would probably lead to a 
Communist victory. But if the United States continued to support Chiang, it would find 
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itself embroiled in the same conflict, contrary to its more basic goal which was to avoid 
becoming involved in “fratricidal war.”76 But Wedemeyer also pointed out that more 
than 800,000 Japanese civilian and military personnel remained in China and that 
continued American naval support for the repatriation operation remained an absolute 
necessity.77 
Wedemeyer suggested three alternative policies for China: the United States 
could withdraw from China, commit additional troops to stabilize the country, or to call 
upon the newly created United Nations to make the United States a trustee for China 
similar to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.  The last was fanciful at best as there 
was little or no support in the U.S. government for such a grandiose plan. The second 
option, to side fully with the Nationalists, also seemed unlikely. Yet the first option, to 
withdraw from China and abandon a longtime ally to Communist aggression aided by 
the Soviet Union, was also unpalatable. 
 Wedemeyer’s reports on China were not the only ones submitted to the War and 
Navy Departments.  Admiral Daniel Barbey, Kinkaid’s successor as commander of the 
Seventh Fleet, submitted an assessment of conditions in China at the behest of the Navy 
Department.  In that report he conceded that repatriation of all Japanese from North 
China was both important and necessary, yet to remove of the Japanese followed by a 
withdrawal of the Marines would leave a power vacuum that the Chinese Communists 
would exploit. But for the Marines to remain would expose them to increasingly 
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dangerous conflict with the Communists.  Barbey concluded that should diplomatic 
attempts to bring the Nationalist and Communists into a coalition government fail, the 
United States should withdraw all military personnel from China to prevent them 
becoming involved in an inevitable civil war.  The report ended with a sensible but 
ultimately disregarded warning, “It must be perfectly clear to both the Nationalist leaders 
and the Communist leaders, the disastrous consequences of a civil war to the Chinese 
people, and to their leadership.  I do not think either leader wants civil war. I think that 
both of them have been jockeying for position to obtain the best possible compromise.”78       
Despite its concise conclusions, Barbey’s report was viewed as less important 
than Wedemeyer’s and was read by a smaller number of the senior leaders in 
Washington. Although he had relieved Admiral Kinkaid on November 19th, and was 
highly respected by both services, some U.S. Navy leaders distrusted Barbey due to his 
longtime association with Douglas MacArthur. In their eyes, any naval officer who 
could successfully work with a tremendous source of enmity for so long had to be 
viewed with suspicion.79  For these reasons Barbey’s report played less a role than it 
should have. Yet it is intriguing to speculate what would have happened had the Truman 
Administration adopted Barbey’s all or nothing approach, instead of the compromise 
plan that resulted.   
 The small furor created by these reports culminated in a series of November 
discussions between Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Secretary of War Robert 
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Patterson, and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes.80 At the first meeting, held in 
Washington on November 6th, the participants agreed that either increasing support for 
Chiang or a complete withdrawal from China would have grave consequences. Concerns 
were also raised by Patterson and Byrnes about China’s ability to govern Manchuria 
after the departure of the Soviets. Both were deeply concerned about continued Soviet 
interference or pressure in the region.81   
Two weeks later Byrnes, Forrestal and Patterson reconvened to discuss the China 
situation further and make a final recommendation to President Truman.  Both Forrestal 
and Patterson considered Wedemeyer’s recent reports to be overly pessimistic. In a 
critical opinion that would often repeated in the years ahead, Forrestal argued that 
despite Chiang’s inarguably corrupt government it was the only capable source of 
government acceptable to the U.S. in China, and to abandon American support would 
result in Soviet domination of East Asia. With some variation the other secretaries 
agreed with Forrestal’s assessment and the group concluded that, despite Wedemeyer’s 
apparent pessimism, the United States should continue to support Chiang and the 
Nationalists.82   
Following a few weeks of further discussion and gaining the approval of Douglas 
MacArthur, Admiral Leahy presented a summary of the proposed China policy to 
President Truman.  It called for an increase of support for the Nationalists, additional 
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shipping to accelerate the repatriation of the Japanese, and the furnishing of more vessels 
to be operated by the new Republic of China Navy.  Upwards of 500,000 Japanese 
soldiers and civilians per month were to be repatriated under the new plan. As for the 
status of American forces in China, the report concluded that “The U.S. Marines will 
remain in North China for the time being for the purpose of assisting in the repatriation 
of Japanese nationals, military and civil from that area, the duration of such employment 
to be subject to future directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”83 The day after the 
report was presented to Truman, he approved it with only a few minor comments.84    
The U.S. government thus opted to continue its limited support of Chiang and the 
Nationalists. The accelerated repatriation effort was designed to achieve an important 
goal that remained the most positive component of postwar American effort in China.  
Despite these decisions public pressure was also growing on the Truman Administration 
to provide a clear and rapid exit for the Marines and sailors in China. After a trip to East 
Asia, Montana Congressman Mike Mansfield argued on the House floor that the United 
States was slowly being drawn into a renewed civil war between the Nationalists and 
Communists.85  With the rapid demobilization of the U.S. military worldwide and the 
increasing Communist threat to their safety, several members of Congress voiced grave 
doubts about the announced policy. By December some congressmen began to voice 
their concerns to Truman personally. Representative Hugh de Lacy from Washington 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Truman, December 11th, 1945, Truman Secretary’s 
Files, Box 151, TPL.	  84	  Memorandum from Truman to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of War, Ibid. 85	  Spector, In the Ruins of Empire, 70.	  
	   96 
wrote to the president in late December urging him to end support for Chiang’s 
government and withdraw the Marines.86  De Lacy and Mansfield’s voices were only 
two in a chorus of politicians growing louder around a simple premise: the Marines 
should come home. The plan for equipping and training the Nationalist Navy drew less 
protest, but beyond limited naval support an emerging consensus was that the various 
factions of China be left to work out their problems with American diplomatic and 
economic assistance.      
The appointment of a new American diplomatic emissary to China was one of 
two momentous yet separate events that occurred as 1945 came to an end. These were 
events that would have a profound influence on the future of China mission. On 
November 27th Patrick Hurley, the eccentric and unpredictable American ambassador to 
China, abruptly resigned his post.  For months Hurley had been growing frustrated by 
his inability to bring the Nationalists and Communists together to form a coalition 
government. By November the optimism Hurley had felt at the August summit between 
Mao and Chiang was but a memory, after over two months of complex negotiations had 
accomplished little.87  More personally Hurley had been vexed by certain members of 
the State Department who had long advocated a friendlier stance to Mao and the Chinese 
Communists. Without informing the president beforehand Hurley publicly lambasted the 
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“career men” at the State Department who supported Communism worldwide and 
announced his resignation.88   
For the president Hurley’s announcement was a slap in the face. Wasting no time 
an incensed Truman immediately called George Marshall at his home in Leesburg, 
Virginia, and in a famous but exceptionally brief conversation the president asked 
Marshall, who was only a few days into his retirement, to go to China for him. The 
general responded in the affirmative, and then hung up the phone. No argument, no 
discussion, just America’s perhaps most estimable soldier following orders from his 
commander in chief.  Only later did Marshall realize the extraordinary task that he had 
agreed to undertake on the president’s behalf.89  In a series of meetings with Truman, 
Admiral Leahy, and Secretary of State James Byrnes, Marshall was told in no uncertain 
terms that even if Chiang failed to accept reasonable concessions to Mao’s Communists 
he was still to back the Nationalist government, and yet still produce a way forward for a 
democratic China centered around the Nationalist government.  This was a tall order 
indeed, even for George Marshall.90 
The selection of Marshall was met with near universal acclaim.  Representative 
Mansfield, in a letter to James Byrnes, put the matter eloquently, writing that, “No finer 
choice could have been made for the tremendously difficult job which confronts our 
country in China at this time. He has, I am sure, the tact, diplomacy, and courage 
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necessary to overcome the difficulties which he will face.”91  It was fully expected that 
Marshall would not only succeed where Hurley had failed, but that he would accomplish 
miracles in China. The shattering announcement utterly overshadowed the second key 
event that would affect the U.S. Navy in China, that of the retirement of Admiral Ernest 
J. King as Chief of Naval Operations. This iron-willed defender of sea power, whom 
General Dwight Eisenhower privately wished could be eliminated for the good of the 
American war effort, chose to retire in December. The longtime supporter of Milton 
Miles and zealous advocate for his beloved Navy, King was exhausted by the war and 
saw little place for himself in the Truman administration.  Historian Michael Isenberg 
concluded that this man constructed of “barbed wire and razor blades,” felt that his time 
had come and that, “with the death of his patrons Knox and Roosevelt and the coming of 
peace, he knew he was ill-suited to shepherd the Navy into the postwar years.”92  With 
King’s departure the Navy lost its fiercest and most senior advocate for a greater 
American role in China. From 1946 onwards the fight for the U.S. Navy in China would 
be undertaken by Admiral Charles Cooke, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, and 
a few others.   
 On December 15th the Truman Administration released a detailed statement on 
the U.S. policy toward China. Declaring that a “strong, united, and democratic China is 
of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations organization and for 
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world peace,” the statement described in detail American plans for China. It urged that a 
cease-fire immediately take place between Nationalist Government and the Communists, 
and that a “national conference of representatives” be convened to hammer out the 
shared future of China. As both a reminder of past sacrifices and its current military 
strength, the statement also declared that, “The United States has already been 
compelled to pay a great price to restore the peace which was first broken by the 
Japanese aggression in Manchuria. The maintenance of peace in the Pacific may be 
jeopardized, if not frustrated, unless Japanese influence in China is wholly removed and 
unless China takes her place as a unified, democratic and peaceful nation.  This is the 
purpose of the maintenance for the time being of United States military and naval forces 
in China.”93 
 The selection of George C. Marshall as the new American emissary to China 
marked the end of the U.S. military’s first postwar phase in China. Although it had 
always been understood by those in the highest levels of American government that the 
presence of American warships and Marines in China was as much about supporting 
Chiang Kai-shek and his government as it had been about tying up the loose ends of the  
World War II, the December 15th statement made American intentions far less opaque. 
For Truman to send the nation’s most prestigious (if not its most famous) soldier-
statesman to China brought much greater attention to American involvement in East 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  “Statement by the President – United States Policy Toward China” December 15th, 1945, George C. 
Marshall’s Mission to China, Student Research File, Box 1, TPL.	  
	   100 
Asia.  As for the U.S. Marines and sailors in China, they would remain. For how long 
was yet to be decided. 
 The United States accomplished much in the final months of 1945. The 
American efforts in China have often been overlooked compared to those in postwar 
Germany or Japan, but they were considerable. It is inarguable that without the 
American intervention the teeming masses of North China would have endured a harsh 
winter of starvation and violence. But during these critical months Harry Truman yoked 
his country irrevocably with Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists.  Expectations were 
high that the estimable George Marshall would be able to overcome any and all 
obstacles. 
 One must now turn to the diplomatic arena of the Cold War. As tensions turned 
colder between the United States and the Soviet Union, the latter cast its eye with 
increasing suspicion at the American presence in China. Even Joseph Stalin himself 
developed a more than passing interest in just what the U.S. was planning. As American 
patience with the delayed Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria intensified, negotiations 
took place both on the ground and at the highest levels of government that would shape 
the Cold War in Asia. 
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CHAPTER III 
NEGOTIATING WITH COMMUNISTS 
As World War II approached its conclusion, the Soviet Union, eager to secure 
what it considered the rightful spoils of both war and diplomacy, seized control of 
Manchuria with a near fatal grip. The United States, increasingly determined to hold 
back Soviet influence in Asia, responded with both diplomacy and military pressure.  
The presence of U.S. Marines in North China as well as the Seventh Fleet in Chinese 
waters emerged as perhaps the most important counterweight to Soviet expansion in 
Asia.  During the tense and delicate months after the fighting ended, U.S. Navy 
leadership assigned the China mission a level of importance far out of proportion to its 
numbers. And, although it never rose to the level of importance as Eastern Europe or 
even Greece in 1946, American and Soviet rivalry in China and Manchuria marked the 
start of Cold War in Asia as U.S. sailors and Marines were soon caught up in this new 
struggle for global supremacy.    
The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship 
Just a few hours prior to the Japanese announcement of surrender, the Soviet 
Union and GMD negotiated the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.  Signed 
on August 14th, 1945, the treaty was designed to work out some of the finer points of the 
Yalta accords and their implementation in East Asia. Although the United States and 
Soviet Union separately pushed for the treaty, many American diplomats and senior 
military officers soon viewed its provisions as overwhelmingly favoring the Soviet 
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Union.  This imbalance would play a large role in the operations of both the U.S. Navy 
and Marines in North China.  
 The treaty was negotiated in Moscow during July and early August, primarily by 
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs T.V. Soong and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav 
Molotov. Perhaps Joseph Stalin’s most loyal sycophant, Molotov had served as Foreign 
Minister since 1939 and is best remembered for the astonishing but short-lived 1939-
1941 Nazi-Soviet Pact. Ruthless and cruel, the short, bespectacled former journalist 
managed to outlast many of his contemporaries in Stalin’s inner circle.1  He was also 
intimately involved with Stalin’s Great Terror of the late 1930s. As Soviet scholar 
Geoffrey Roberts has concluded, “Molotov’s personal role in authorizing and sponsoring 
the Terror was second only to Stalin. Indeed, in 1937-1938, when the practice developed 
of Politburo members authorizing arrests, executions, and imprisonments by the list, 
Molotov signed more lists than Stalin – 373 compared to 362.”2  An unrepentant 
Stalinist to his last breath, other than his deadly boss Molotov became the most vocal 
critic of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps mission in North China.3 
After difficult negotiations in Moscow the treaty that emerged gave the Soviet 
Union nearly all of what had been spelled out in the February 1945 Yalta accords, and 
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even more.  Beyond mutual respect for the respective sovereignty of both nations, the 
Soviet Union agreed to recognize the Nationalist government as the sole authority in 
China and Manchuria. For the United States the most crucial articles of the treaty 
concerned the status of Port Arthur and Dalian, as well as ownership of the Chinese 
Manchurian railways. The treaty stipulated that Port Arthur would be considered a naval 
base administered by the Chinese but with a joint Sino-Soviet commission to manage 
military matters, such as the movement of Soviet troops in wartime. Dalian would 
become a free port “open to the trade of all nations,” administered by a Russian harbor-
master.  The major railways in Manchuria would be jointly operated by both countries, 
but only in time of war against Japan could they be used to transport Soviet troops.  The 
treaty would expire at the end of thirty years.4 
Behind the scenes some Americans experienced in Soviet affairs raised concerns.  
Even before the treaty was agreed upon, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell 
Harriman cabled President Truman saying that the Soviets were justified in expecting 
the return of the southern end of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands from the Japanese.  But 
he questioned the provisions concerning Port Arthur and Dalian. Both were Chinese 
territory, and Harriman feared that the status of Dalian would prove troublesome, as he 
doubted the Soviets had any intention of truly operating the city as a free port.  
Regarding Soviet plans for Port Arthur, the ambassador pointed out that the Soviets had 
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already begun rebuilding facilities at the base constructed and occupied by the Imperial 
Russian Navy between 1897 and the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War. 5    
Within a few days Harriman expanded on his concerns, noting that in peacetime 
Dalian was to be administered by the Chinese, but that in time of war the Soviets would 
exercise full authority. A further understanding of the treaty was that the Chinese 
administrators in Dalian would be favorably disposed towards the Soviet Union, which 
in Harriman’s view meant they would be Communist, granting enormous power and 
influence to the Soviets. 
 The United States and the Soviet Union approved of the treaty for starkly 
different reasons. Eager to have Soviet support for a unified postwar China, the United 
States privately pressured Chiang Kai-shek to accept the treaty.  On August 27th 
Secretary of State James Byrnes released a statement in which he declared the treaty, “an 
important step forward in the relations between China and the Soviet Union.”6 But for 
Stalin the Sino-Soviet Treaty was simply a means to buy time while outwardly 
presenting a friendly posture to all sides. As historian Jay Taylor concludes, “In China as 
in Korea, Stalin’s immediate goal was the departure of the American military.  This 
required an American perception of a benign Soviet posture toward China. 
Consequently, Stalin believed that he had to go some distance in seeming to carry out his 
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repeated commitments that he would support Chiang as the leader of a united China.”7  
Within a few months Harriman concerns would be proven correct.8  The true importance 
of the treaty lay less in what was on paper but in how it was implemented, as the status 
of Dalian and Soviet manipulation of the finer points of the agreement would emerge as 
centerpieces of the emerging Cold War in Asia. 
  The Cardinal Mission9 
Events on the ground in Manchuria would soon arouse deep suspicions of Soviet 
intentions in China.  Among the first stirrings of the Cold War in Asia were a series of 
covert operations undertaken by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in China.  
Although these missions did not involve U.S. Navy and Marine Corps personnel, these 
missions, one in particular, were often cited as reasons the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps 
presence was deemed vital by American supporters of the National Chinese. Despite the 
atomic bombs in September and the lightning Soviet invasion of Manchuria that 
followed, Japan’s surrender within days following the signing of the agreement caught 
many Americans by surprise.10  
Upon receiving word of the surrender, however, the OSS moved quickly to 
execute long-standing plans by sending trained personnel to locate Japanese prisoner of 
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war camps in East China and Manchuria, to make contact with Allied prisoners of war, 
and, if possible, to arrange for transporting the POWs back to Allied-held territory.  
Aircraft, personnel, and fuel were quickly allocated for nine humanitarian POW 
missions, each consisting of a six-man team that would take off from the main OSS base 
near Xian, China, and parachute near known Japanese prisoner of war camps.11        
 The nine missions were assigned avian code names. The most successful were 
undertaken in East China on August 17th, when the Duck and Magpie teams dropped on 
camps near Weixian and Beijing respectively. The Duck team made contact with a large 
camp two miles from Weixian that housed more than 1500 Allied POWs, including 
more than two hundred American and over a thousand British soldiers.12 The Magpie 
team reported similar success, radioing the following message on the 18th: “Excellent 
landing. Contact Japanese Lt. General Takahashi. Party well treated by Japanese who 
claim war not officially over.”13  Further south the Sparrow (Shanghai), Pigeon 
(Hainan), and Raven (Vientiane) missions all established communication with POW’s 
held in smaller camps.  Two operations were failures. Operation Flamingo to the north 
Manchurian city of Harbin was cancelled due to the heavy presence of Soviet forces, and 
its men and resources transferred to the Eagle mission sent into Korea. Due to poor OSS 
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leadership and even worse operational planning the Eagle mission was a fiasco, and was 
forced to leave Korea before making contact with the large POW camp near Seoul.14              
 The last mission was Operation Cardinal, by far the most ambitious and complex. 
Led by OSS Major James Hennessey, the six-man team parachuted from a B-24 near the 
Hoten POW camp, ten miles south of Mukden on August 16th.15  Hennessey’s primary 
goal was to contact the estimated 1,500 POW’s at the camp. A secondary objective was 
to locate U.S. Army General Jonathan Wainwright, who had been forced to surrender the 
Philippines in April 1942, and to provide transportation for him and other senior Allied 
POW’s out of Manchuria. The Cardinal mission was also a cover to establish an 
intelligence gathering operation against the Soviets.  Both OSS head General Bill 
Donovan and Albert Wedemeyer wanted to gather as much information as possible on 
Soviet intentions. Therein lay the critical importance of the Cardinal mission. 
Cancellation of the Haerbin mission left the Mukden operation as the only opportunity to 
penetrate Manchuria and gather valuable intelligence before the door closed.16  The 
Cardinal team soon learned that the Hoten POW camp housed a total of 1,673 POW’s, 
1,321 of them American, but that General Wainwright was not among them.17   Over the 
next few days the OSS team surveyed the camp and a nearby airfield and assessed the 
medical condition of the POW’s, eleven of whom required immediate medical 
evacuation. 
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 On August 19th Soviet paratroopers and fighter aircraft landed at the Mukden 
airfield and made contact with the OSS team. The next night four Russian captains 
boldly walked into the Hoten camp and asked to speak to the senior American present. 
After pleasant introductions, a cheering, raucous crowd of now former POW’s hoisted 
one of the Russian officers onto their shoulders and insisted he give a speech. Through 
an interpreter he proclaimed, “Friends, comrades! As a representative of the 
commanding general of the Russian Red Army in this area, I announce to you that from 
this moment you are free men!” The crowd cheered wildly and the celebrations 
continued.18  An hour later, after stern demands from the Russians to formally surrender 
to them, rather than to the Americans or Chinese, those present at the poorly illuminated 
football field watched as the Japanese officers and NCO’s ceremonially handed their 
swords to Russian officers, while the enlisted men passed their rifles to the former 
captives.19 
 This celebration marked the high point of Soviet-American relations in 
Manchuria. For an ephemeral few days it seemed that the wartime alliance was alive and 
well on the foreign ground of Manchuria.  Several of the American POWs were 
impressed by how the Russians conducted themselves.  U.S. Army Colonel Philip Fry, a 
prisoner of war since his capture in the Philippines, recorded in his August 27th diary 
entry that things had calmed down in Mukden after a few days, writing, “Mukden is 
getting quiet and the Russians are doing everything to assist us. They have a big job to 
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do and are working wonders.” He also wrote that on the day before—ten days after the 
Cardinal team reached Mukden— news of General Wainwright had finally reached the 
camp.20    
The story of how Wainwright was located and rescued from Manchuria is a 
complex tale straight out an adventure novel.  On August 16th elements of the Soviet 
army discovered Wainwright at the Xian POW camp. After the OSS scout team had 
made it to the Xian on August 19th, numerous transportation delays and Japanese 
obstructionism stalled the general’s return. Only with considerable Soviet pressure and 
American determination (including the borrowing of a Japanese locomotive) were 
Wainwright and other high-ranking POW’s finally transported to Mukden the night of 
August 25th. 21  The following morning Wainwright was flown to Wedemeyer’s 
headquarters at Chonqqing and then to Yokohama, Japan on August 31st, where he had 
an emotional reunion with Douglas MacArthur just prior to the Japanese surrender 
ceremony in Tokyo Bay.22 
 Relations between the Russians and Americans soon deteriorated.  Despite 
outward appearances the Soviets were surprised and not pleased to discover the OSS 
team in their new occupation zone. Their reactions ranged from grudging acceptance to a 
creeping hostility, and over the next few days a sharp divide emerged between the 
attitude of the Soviets towards the former POW’s and the OSS.  The OSS Cardinal team 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Diary of Philip Fry, August 25-27th 1945, Philip Fry Papers, AHEC.  21	  Beebe, “Manuscript of Japanese POW Experiences of Brigadier Lewis C. Beebe,” Lewis Beebe Papers, 
AHEC, 110-111.	  22	  “Report on Cardinal Operation,” September 24, 1945, Headquarters, Office of Strategic Services, China 
Theater, Ibid.	  
	   110 
soon witnessed the full ferocity of the Russian occupation of Manchuria when the arrival 
of additional Soviet troops in Mukden led to a three-day whirlwind of theft, destruction, 
and murder. 23  An OSS report recorded that the Russians were “proceeding with a policy 
of scientific looting. Every bit of machinery is being removed and all stocks of 
merchandise from stores and warehouses. Mukden will be an empty city when they get 
through.”24  But Mukden was only the beginning. The Russians would eventually strip 
all of Manchuria of anything valuable, including machinery, raw materials, and even 
entire Japanese factories as spoils of war.  
 Meanwhile, while venting their fury on the Japanese, the Soviets, motivated by 
their desire to get them out of Manchuria, generally treated the American and British 
POW’s well.  For example, General Wainwright’s evacuation from Manchuria could not 
have been achieved without Russian assistance, and for a brief period Soviet officers 
assisted the OSS team in providing food and medical supplies for American and British 
POW’s.  On other occasions Russian hostility to the Americans was demonstrated at the 
point of a gun. After praising the Russians in his diary on August 24th a former 
American POW recorded that while on an authorized sightseeing trip to Mukden a few 
days later, Russian soldiers armed with “tommy guns,” likely Soviet PPsh-41 
submachine guns, attempted to commandeer their vehicle at gunpoint. When the 
Americans refused to give the jeep to them, the Russians simply walked away and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  “Report by Captain Hilsman, Jr. on Mukden,” September 13th, 1945, RG 226, Box 187, NARA.	  24	  “OSS Report on Mukden,” September 13th, 1945, Ibid. 
	   111 
appropriated another vehicle, this one with a sole Chinese occupant who offered no such 
resistance.25 Dozens of similar instances were reported during the week.       
 Over the next few days both the OSS and the former POW’s encountered various 
levels of Soviet hostility. Much of this can be attributed to drunken Russian privates who 
sought to steal American watches, pistols, and other valuable items.  In several cases, the 
Russian culprits were publicly reprimanded by their superiors but were subsequently 
observed to have escaped any substantial punishment.26  As unwelcome as this and other 
encounters were, the Russians generally did not directly interfere with the OSS team and 
its mission. Yet other more serious incidents soon followed.  The first of these occurred 
on the morning of August 21st, when a Russian soldier sabotaged the American B-24 
scheduled to evacuate sick POW’s.  Evidently drunk the Russian stabbed the front tire of 
the bomber with his rifle’s bayonet, delaying the departure by more than 24 hours. As 
with the other incidents his commanding officer apologized and offered to guard all 
American aircraft with Soviet personnel. This of course gave the Soviets added 
opportunity to observe the comings and goings of American military personnel at the 
airfield.27       
 Far more damaging to diplomatic relations was an incident that occurred on 
August 29th.  An American B-29 crew flying airdrop missions over Manchuria was 
attacked by Soviet Yak fighter aircraft, and forced to crash land near Kanko, Korea.  The 
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incident caused no casualties and the Russians immediately apologized for the mistake.28 
To the angry American protests the Soviets countered that that the operation had never 
been authorized by them and that previous air drops in Korea had nearly killed a Russian 
officer. More likely they considered the presence of the B-29s in airspace they 
considered their own yet another provocative act. Some Soviets viewed the airdrops as 
merely a cover for conducting reconnaissance over Manchuria. Dropping supplies was 
the primary mission for the American bombers, but they certainly used the opportunity 
to conduct surveillance about Manchuria.  Replying to an angry cable sent by Douglas 
MacArthur on the subject of the unprovoked attack, General Aleksei Antonov, head of 
the Soviet General Staff, responded that his fliers had “manifested only measures of self-
defense against an unknown plane, and that there were no other intended acts.”29 
 The B-29 incident coincided with a sharp increase in tensions between the 
Americans and Soviets in Mukden. The friendliness of the first Soviets to arrive in the 
city soon gave way to a more hardened stance, and they accelerated their demands that 
the POW’s be moved out of the country quickly. To avoid the possibility of American 
aerial surveillance the Soviets curtailed any further flights to evacuate the POW’s and 
insisted that they be transported by rail to Dalian, where they would be evacuated by 
U.S. Navy transports.  This led to delays which cast yet another shadow on Soviet-
American relations in Asia.30      
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The first week of September witnessed a concerted display of American naval 
power around Dalian.  Two American destroyers anchored in the Soviet-controlled port 
on September 2nd to gather information about the POW’s, but the U.S. Navy officers 
who went ashore received precious little cooperation from the Soviets.  As a way of 
pressuring the Soviets to expedite the return of American POWs, more than one hundred 
aircraft from the carriers Antietam and Cabot overflew Dalian soon afterwards.  
Frustrated by the situation, Admiral Thomas Kinkaid dispatched Rear Admiral Thomas 
Settle, who was fluent in Russian, to Dalian onboard the cruiser USS Louisville.  Along 
with three additional heavy cruisers and five destroyers, the demonstration of naval 
power helped convince the Soviets to transport all American and British [or Allied] 
POW’s to Dalian within a few days.31  After U.S. Navy minesweepers had cleared 
Dalian’s harbor, the POW’s were at long last evacuated from Dalian onboard two U.S. 
destroyers and the hospital ships USS Relief and USS St. Olaf.32  
While it succeeded in evacuating Allied POWs from Manchuria, the Cardinal 
mission did not achieve its secondary goal, the establishment of an espionage network in 
Manchuria.   With the assistance of the French consulate in Mukden, OSS operatives 
produced some important intelligence but they could not organize a permanent 
intelligence network before October 3rd when the Soviets demanded that all remaining 
OSS members in Mukden leave within 48 hours or be arrested as spies.33 Suspecting the 
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French consul of being an American agent, the Soviets forced him and his staff to leave 
as well.34     
 After the last Americans departed, the Soviets completed perhaps the most tragic 
component of the occupation. Beyond the countless rapes and murders committed by 
Soviet forces in Manchuria what followed was the forced move of more than 600,000 
Japanese soldiers and civilians to labor camps in Siberia, an act expressly forbidden by 
the Potsdam Declaration.35  One of these ill-fated thousands, cipher officer Isao 
Yamamoto, describes coping with temperatures of more than forty degrees below zero, 
meals of thin gruel, and endless lice and bedbugs. Yamamoto was one of the fortunate. 
After two years and three months of cutting trees in the Siberian forests he was 
repatriated to Japan in November of 1947.  The grim fate of roughly 60,000 that perished 
in Siberia demands more attention from scholars in the future.36 
 Although Operation Cardinal and the other OSS missions had little direct bearing 
on the Navy and Marine Corps presence in China, other than the Seventh Fleet’s role in 
transporting Allied POW’s homeward, the operations revealed a great deal about Soviet 
operations in Manchuria. The scale of Soviet industrial looting, the human costs of 
deportation, and the enormous disparity between statements of goodwill and realities on 
the ground added enormously to American suspicion. These rising concerns only 
increased the widespread and growing belief that the Soviet Union was actively aiding 
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Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communists and hoping to dominate the region if and when the 
United States removed its military forces from North China. 
The Soviet Union, the CCP, and the “Victory at Yantai” 
For Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party, the fall and early winter of 
1945-46 was a difficult time. Eager to publicly pacify both Chiang and the United States, 
Joseph Stalin had recognized the Nationalist Chinese government as the sole government 
in China in the Sino-Soviet Treaty.  Subsequently the CCP underwent a period of 
tremendous uncertainty, simultaneously making plans for what its members viewed as 
the inevitable struggle with the Nationalists and holding back operations to please the 
Soviets. Matters were not helped when Mao became seriously ill in mid-November 1945 
and was placed under the care of Soviet physicians in Yanan. Operational leadership 
during the chairman’s illness fell to one of Mao’s top deputies, Liu Shaoqi, who pursued 
an agreed upon strategy to hold territory in South China and advance in the North.37 
The level of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the CCP in North China 
and Manchuria, especially in late 1945, has long been a subject of intense controversy 
among historians.  Before 1991 it was generally believed in the West that enormous 
quantities of captured Japanese arms were turned over to Mao’s cadres by the USSR in 
the months after Japan’s surrender.  The lack of Chinese and Russian sources made this 
argument difficult to evaluate, however. Writing in 1981, diplomatic historian Russell 
Buhite concluded that the Soviets had probably begun supplying CCP forces with 
37	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weapons and other assistance as early as 1946, but cautioned that the lack of reliable 
sources made a definitive judgment difficult.38  In 1987, historian Steven Levine stated 
that the lack of information made it impossible to support the conclusion that “the 
Soviets were consciously following a policy designed to promote the country-wide 
victory of the CCP,”  saying that this assessment can be tested only when and if Soviet 
archives are opened to serious scholars.”39  
 The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 made available, albeit briefly, some of 
the Russian archives necessary for sustained research on the subject. A groundbreaking 
paper on the subject appeared in 1995. Utilizing Russian and Chinese archives, Bryan 
Murray argued that while publicly Soviet troops and the CCP expressed solidarity and 
comradeship Soviet leaders in Manchuria often viewed the presence of the CCP in 
Manchuria as unwelcome and thus provided only minimal assistance to Mao’s forces 
during the two months following the end of the war.  For their part the Chinese 
Communists were appalled by the behavior of their Communist allies, especially the 
rape of thousands of Chinese women by Russian soldiers. These were hardly acts of a 
well-behaved proletarian army like the CCP had expected.40     
  Modern China historian Harold Tanner has argued for a more nuanced and 
complex relationship.  Utilizing Russian, Chinese, and American sources, Tanner argues 
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that early postwar Soviet assistance to the CCP waxed and waned according to the 
existing geopolitical situation.  Stalin did not want to antagonize the United States in the 
immediate months after Japan’s surrender, nor to be seen as directly undermining the 
Sino-Soviet Treaty.  Nor did he want to turn his back completely on the CCP. The 
continued presence of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps personnel in North China convinced 
Stalin that he needed to support the CCP more openly. Tanner concludes that, after 
providing little support during August and September, Stalin shifted policy, and, “From 
early October through mid-November, continued American military presence in North 
China and American transport of Nationalist troops headed for Manchuria heightened 
Soviet concern and led them [the Soviets] to encourage the Communists to take a 
stronger stance. Military supplies once again became available.” Assistance would drop 
during the winter, only to rise again following the final Soviet withdrawal from 
Manchuria in March 1946.41    
       None of this was apparent to the American military leadership in China at the 
time. As early as August 1945 General Wedemeyer had warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
that ascertaining the true nature of Soviet-CCP relations was extremely difficult, 
reporting, in part, that, “The attitude of Soviet Russia towards the Chinese Communists 
has never been determined accurately, nor have Soviet intentions in China been 
formalized to a degree that Americans can view with equanimity.”42 Wedemeyer 
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cautioned that the compatible ideologies of the Soviets and Mao’s CCP could come to 
dominate Manchuria in the near future.  
For Daniel Barbey and the Seventh Fleet, their mission was to land the Marines 
safely and repatriate the Japanese.  This led to a curious and memorable encounter 
between U.S. Navy personnel and that of the CCP.43 Barbey’s original orders were to 
land the 29th Marines at Chefoo (now Yantai), a strategic port on the north side of the 
Shandong Peninsula.  Highly sought after by Chiang, Chefoo had the advantage of being 
at the end of key railway line and on the southern edge of the Gulf of Chihli. Yet a small 
problem existed. Unlike all other major port cities in North China, Chefoo had been 
under Communist control since Japan’s surrender. The Japanese garrison had withdrawn 
from Chefoo in mid-September, leaving the strategic port city in Communist hands. In 
most areas of North China the CCP had given instructions to its cadres that if the 
Americans appeared they were to be outwardly accommodating and unthreatening. 
However, at Chefoo orders were given to the local Communist commander, Yu Ku-ying, 
to oppose an American amphibious landing with all available force.44 
 The Seventh Fleet’s leadership had first become aware of the potential for 
problems on October 4th, when Rear Admiral Settle anchored off Chefoo in the USS 
Louisville and delivered a letter to Yu from Admiral Kinkaid. The letter described 
American plans to land the 29th Marines at Chefoo.  Yu responded saying that the 
Marines should not land without official permission from the CCP in Yanan.45  Given 	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the potential for misunderstandings Admiral Barbey sought to settle this matter in 
person. Three days later he anchored off Chefoo in his flagship and, along with III MEF 
commanding General Keller Rockey, met with Yu and his staff. In diplomatic language, 
through an interpreter Yu, informed both Americans that the Japanese had left the city 
and there were no prisoner of war camps in the area. Thus, he stated there was no reason 
for U.S. Marines to enter Chefoo, and that any American landing would be met with 
force. This brazen statement matched official Communist policy from Yanan. That same 
day members of the American delegation still in Yanan were told that any landing at 
Chefoo would be opposed and, “would lead both the people of China and abroad to 
suspect American interference in internal Chinese politics.”46   
 Anxious to avoid being accused of such meddling, not to mention being blamed 
for any bloodshed, Barbey accepted an invitation to meet with Yu at his office ashore. 
The contrast between the conditions in Chefoo and those the Marines had encountered in 
Tianjin and Qingdao, when they were surrounded by huge and cheering crowds, was 
striking. In his memoirs Barbey recalls, “That afternoon, when we arrived at the dock, 
we found the cars awaiting us.  We were driven down a street to the mayor’s office. 
Most of the stores were closed, and the street was lined with armed soldiers standing at 
attention, as we drove between them from the dock to the mayor’s office. On the wall 
behind the mayor’s desk were pictures of Stalin and Mao but none of Chiang.”  
Additional discussions between Barbey, General Rockey, and Yu indicated that nothing 
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had changed: the Americans were friends but any landing would be resisted by the 
Communist forces in the city.  Barbey, with Rockey’s concurrence, then communicated 
to General Wedemeyer that rather than fight their way ashore at Chefoo, the Marines 
should be diverted to join the remainder of the 6th Marine Division at Qingdao.  
Wedemeyer and the Joint Chiefs agreed that he had acted appropriately.47 
It is difficult to say with certainty if the Communist forces in Chefoo would have 
truly resisted landing by the Marines. Yet what is undeniable is that Admiral Barbey’s 
actions likely prevented bloodshed and saved considerable face for the United States. 
But it also laid bare the enormous and all but impossible balancing act the United States 
had taken upon itself. As Ronald Spector concludes, “The Chefoo incident was an early 
illustration of the mutually contradictory aspects of American policy in China: to help 
Chiang while remaining neutral in the civil war, to thwart Communists but not fight 
them, to confront the Soviets militarily in northern China while carrying out worldwide 
demobilization.”48  
The Moscow Conference and the China Marines 
While the Marines of the III MEF were adjusting to life in North China, Soviet 
propaganda relating to their presence began to appear.  Much like Mao Zedong, Joseph 
Stalin was surprised by the American military deployment to China. Although China 
was far from his top priority the Soviet dictator kept a watchful eye on the American 
47	  Dan	  Barbey,	  MacArthur’s	  Amphibious	  Navy,	  336.	  48	  Spector, In the Ruins of Empire, 55.	  
	   121 
military presence, which was an impediment to his long term plans in the region. Likely 
he expected that by the end of 1945 most if not all of the U.S. Marines and naval 
personnel would have been withdrawn. Consternation over their continued presence was 
reflected by a series of December press reports and articles condemning both the 
Marines and the Seventh Fleet.  
 Early in 1946 the Soviet Union began publicizing its own interpretation of who 
was responsible for defeating the Japanese. The Soviet newspapers Pravda and New 
Times downplayed the role of the U.S. Navy or the atomic bombs in Japan’s defeat, but 
instead emphasized that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria forced Japan’s surrender.49  
The new American occupation of Japan under Douglas MacArthur was castigated as 
imperialist attempt to turn Japan into a puppet state against the Soviet Union.  And rather 
than enduring cruel violence and mass rapes from their “liberators,” Soviet newspapers 
announced that Chinese civilians in Manchuria had welcomed them as brothers in their 
struggle against the Japanese.50 
 By October it had become an open secret what the Russians were doing in 
Manchuria. Beyond the reports of the OSS Cardinal team, numerous civilian eyewitness 
reports had documented the rapes and looting that occurred in Haerbin and Mukden.51 
Subdued outrage over Manchuria in American diplomatic circles eventually coincided 
with a hastily conceived diplomatic conference held in Moscow. In late November U.S. 
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  49	  Daily News Summary, October 19th, 1945, Moscow Files, Harriman Papers, LOC.	  50	  “Sixteenth Interpretive Report on Soviet Policy Based upon the Press for September 1945,” Ibid.	  	  	  51	  Report on Soviet Activities in Mukden, 17 October 1945, Ibid.	  
	   122 
meeting of American, British, and Soviet foreign ministers in Moscow.  Despite 
objections by Harriman regarding the exclusion of both France and China, the meeting 
was scheduled and Byrnes arrived in Moscow on December 14th.  For both Stalin and 
Molotov the conference offered a perfect opportunity to confront the Americans over 
their continued military presence in North China.52   
The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers occurred at a delicate time for 
Molotov and his relationship with Stalin. As always, in Stalin’s inner circle no one was 
safe. Arguably the best military leader Stalin possessed, Marshal Georgy Zhukov, was 
expelled from the Communist Party in early 1946 and censured, though Stalin spared his 
life.  Arrests of other senior generals and admirals soon followed. Anyone who had 
become overtly popular during the war with Germany and posed a threat to Stalin was 
potentially a target. 53 In Molotov’s case, some in the Soviet Politburo felt that the 
Foreign Minister had been too accommodating to the West in recent months.  Perceived 
disappointment over Molotov’s performance during the London Council of Foreign 
Minister’s conference in September hung heavily over the impending meeting in the 
Soviet capital. Molotov, to save both his position and possibly his life, thus sought to 
press the Western diplomats forcefully on the issues.54     
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As the Moscow Conference began the Soviet newspaper Pravda published a 
detailed and critical article on the subject.  The highlight of the article asked, “Why 
today, after more than three months have elapsed since [the] conclusion of war in [the] 
Far East and capitulation of Japan, are there numerous U.S. troops in China, including 
infantry, air forces, tanks and naval forces?” The article went on to criticize both the 
Americans and the Nationalist Chinese for their apparent inability to quickly repatriate 
the Japanese and concluded that due to Manchuria’s proximity to its borders the Soviet 
Union had far more right to remain in the occupied province than the United States had 
to retain forces in China.55 
 Along with British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, Byrnes and his delegation 
spent eleven full days in Moscow. After a week of contentious discussions on Eastern 
Europe, atomic energy, and the U.S. occupation of Japan, talk turned to the subject of 
China on the afternoon of December 17th. Secretary Byrnes brought up the recent 
declaration from President Truman that clarified the reasons for a large American 
military presence in China. Molotov replied that he would like time to study both 
Truman’s China declaration and other documents relating to China. The meeting was 
then adjourned.56  
 At a noon meeting two days later Molotov insisted that Byrnes and Harriman 
explain in further detail what exactly the U.S. Marines were doing in China. The 
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secretary responded that the Marines were merely assisting the Nationalist Chinese in 
repatriation operations, primarily to process and disarm the more than 300,000 Japanese 
who still remained in North China and stated that their presence in the region had no 
bearing on Chinese national sovereignty, which both the United States and the Soviet 
Union had agreed to honor. With apparent incredulity Molotov commented that he found 
it unlikely that such a large number of Japanese soldiers could still be in possession of 
their weapons three months after the surrender. Byrnes replied that the repatriation 
process was time consuming and that the majority of Chiang’s forces were in the south. 
Additional time was need to move more of Chiang’s troops to North China so they could 
assist in the repatriation of the Japanese.  Following further explanations on George 
Marshall’s new role as mediator in China, Byrnes attempted to mollify the Russians by 
explaining the complexities of the situation. Near the end of the discussion Molotov 
flippantly remarked that after eight years of war Chiang should have enough experience 
to know how to deal with the Japanese, and that his forces should be sufficient to disarm 
and transport the remaining Japanese to Qingdao or other Chinese ports, to be repatriated 
by the U.S. Navy.  He restated the Soviet position that the U.S. Marines should be 
evacuated as soon as possible. The session ended with an impasse on the issue.57 
 Of course, neither Byrnes nor Molotov discussed some of the more relevant but 
unmentionable facts.  Both sides were well aware that Chinese Communist guerillas had 
been sabotaging strategic north-south railways in an effort to slow the movement of 
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Nationalist forces. The October and November encounters between the U.S. Marines and 
the Communists along the Dagu-Tianjin highway were ample proof of this. Without full 
use of these railways Chiang was limited by American supplied air and naval transport 
to move his forces.  Molotov also omitted the fact that the Soviet Union had maintained 
regular but covert contacts with the CCP in both Yanan and in Manchuria since August.  
As Harold Tanner concludes, “The fact that the Chinese Communists were making a bid 
to establish a significant presence in Manchuria was increasingly obvious to Chiang Kai-
shek, to the Americans, and to the Soviets. For the Soviets, it represented a diplomatic 
conundrum.  The Soviet Union sympathized with and supported the [CCP], but for 
global diplomatic and strategic reasons, it had to act, or at least appear to act, more or 
less within the restraints of the Yalta Agreement and the Sino-Soviet treaty in which 
they had promised to transfer sovereignty over Manchuria to Chiang Kai-shek’s 
government.”58   
For Byrnes’ part he did not mention the fact that since late October the Seventh 
Fleet had been moving some of Chiang’s best troops, including the Nationalist 13th 
Army, from the south to the northern port of Qinhangdo (Chingwantao).59 Nor did he 
discuss the fact that many of the Japanese Army units in Manchuria had been left with 
their rifles and other weapons to assist the Marines in guarding important railways and 
coal depots from potential Communist Chinese attacks. Though this practice had largely 
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ended by December, it was an uncomfortable fact that Japanese soldiers continued to 
serve as armed guards over the same territory they had occupied a few months ago.    
  On December 21st the Soviet Foreign Ministry had released an official 
memorandum which strongly objected to “other foreign troops” beyond those legally 
obligated to be in Manchuria, namely Russian.  The memorandum insisted that the guilty 
party in this case, the United States, agree to withdraw all its forces from North China 
simultaneously with all Soviet forces in Manchuria by mid-January 1946.60  Two days 
later, on December 23rd, the last full day of the conference Molotov pressed Byrnes and 
Harriman to respond to the memorandum.  With visible frustration Byrnes replied that 
he had already discussed the subject multiple times with Molotov and that the new 
Soviet memorandum only deepened misunderstandings. The United States, he asserted, 
was determined to be patient in China and support Chiang in his efforts to repatriate the 
Japanese and stabilize the country.  The United States could not remove its troops 
immediately from China nor could it set a firm date for any future withdrawal.  Molotov 
countered saying that the deployment of U.S. Marines to China had never been 
envisioned by signers of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. Byrnes responded that nothing in the 
treaty prevented deployment of the Marines in China.  Tensions climbed between the 
two men as both sides appeared immovable.61  
 That afternoon Joseph Stalin had the final word on the subject. The American 
delegation met with the Soviet leader and Molotov for more than an hour, opening the 
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discussion with talks on Eastern Europe and the creation of an international atomic 
energy organization.  When the conversation turned to North China, Stalin inquired as to 
why the United States had not removed the Marines from the region, to which Byrnes 
replied that they would be removed as soon as possible. He reiterated that circumstances 
on the ground made that difficult, and that the weaknesses of the Nationalist 
Government in disarming the Japanese made the temporary use of American troops 
necessary. Stalin laughed when he heard Byrnes relay reports that Mao’s CCP had more 
than 600,000 troops available in North China. All Chinese are boastful, he chuckled, but 
went on to describe George Marshall as a leader of exceptional ability. If anyone could 
bring Chiang and Mao to the negotiating table, Stalin declared, it was the former U.S. 
Army Chief of Staff.62           
 A few weeks later Harriman called on Stalin for the last time.  The veteran 
diplomat was preparing to resign his post as ambassador and return to the United States 
after five years abroad. Stalin said his farewells and expressed hope that Harriman could 
remain involved in Soviet-American relations in the future.63   During their final 
discussion the two men spoke at length about East Asia, especially Japan and China. If 
Stalin had any lingering anger over the exclusion of the Soviet Union in the occupation 
of Japan he did not show it. On the subject of China he was outwardly frank, describing 
recent efforts by Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Ching-Kuo, to enlist the Soviets as mediators 
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with the CCP as unfortunately a road to nowhere. Mao and Chiang did not trust each 
other, Stalin concluded, but the Soviet Union had poor contacts with Yanan and Mao’s 
Communist leadership. Thus the Soviet dictator was reluctant to publicly intervene in the 
dispute.64  As he left Moscow Harriman considered the Stalin he had come to know over 
the past four years, an enigmatic master of both great strength and bottomless brutality. 
In words that would guide future historians for decades he concluded that, “It is hard for 
me to reconcile the courtesy and consideration that he showed me personally with the 
ghastly cruelty of his wholesale liquidations.”65 
 From the Soviet perspective publicly working with both the Chiang Kai-shek 
government and the Truman administration on China while covertly supporting Mao 
made perfect sense.  Moscow was ideologically bound to Mao’s CCP but also wanted 
weak neighbors and a diminished American role in the Far East. As historian Russell 
Buhite has concluded, “The Soviets, like their czarists predecessors, saw a need to 
prevent foreign domination of those territories adjacent to their borders (Manchuria, 
Outer Mongolia, and Xinjiang) and they were concerned about defending themselves 
against a resurgent Japan or a potentially hostile China.”66  Despite American hopes, the 
possibility for real cooperation from the Soviets on China had all but disappeared by the 
end of 1945. Instead a proto-Cold War of sorts developed around the Yellow Sea. 
Although the Soviets would finally pull out of Manchuria in March of 1946 their 
presence would be felt long after they left the region. The trappings of the Cold War in 	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Europe, such as burgeoning hostility, vitriolic diplomacy, and espionage would soon 
come to characterize East Asia. 
“Savvy” Cooke and the New Cold War 
Both Ambassador Averell Harriman and the Moscow Charge d’Affaires George 
Kennan had predicted that Soviet designs on the Guangdong Peninsula and the 
Manchurian railways would cause difficulties for American efforts in China.  Harriman 
had warned both Secretary of State Byrnes and President Truman even before the Sino-
Soviet treaty had been signed that Dalian in particular would be problematic. Stalin and 
Molotov had promised to both respect the traditional Open Door policy and the 
agreements that Dalian would be an open port.  In an August 8th memorandum, 
Harriman regretfully concluded that Stalin would not live up to his agreements. “It is 
difficult for me to believe,” he wrote, “in spite of Stalin’s assurances, that there can be a 
truly free port under Soviet management with security patrol by the Soviet secret 
police.”67 Kennan, soon to be remembered as the greatest “Cold Warrior” of them all, 
concurred with Harriman’s view.  The two men would soon be proven right. By the 
spring of 1946 an uneasy, dangerous calm emerged on the Yellow Sea, one that never 
attained the urgency or fame of West Berlin but nevertheless embodied many elements 
of the early Cold War. 
67	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 Some scholars have downplayed the intensity of the early Cold War in Asia. 
Historian John Lewis Gaddis argued in his acclaimed 1997 study, We Know Now: 
Rethinking Cold War History, that, “Prior to 1949, the Cold War had barely touched the 
Asian mainland.”68 In Gaddis’ view, the Cold War in Asia began with start of the 
Korean War in June 1950.  This is a Euro-centric interpretation of the Cold War.   By 
late 1945 signs of the Cold War had begun to appear in Qingdao, Dalian, and even 
Shanghai as American and Soviet officers, intelligence agents, and diplomats sought to 
increase the influence of their respective countries in the region.   
 On January 8th, 1946, newly promoted Admiral Charles Maynard Cooke relieved 
Daniel Barbey as commander of the Seventh Fleet.69 A distinguished graduate of the 
U.S. Naval Academy class of 1910, ranking 2nd in his class, Cooke earned the nickname 
“Savvy” for his first rate intellect and intelligence. One of the few scholarly studies of 
the admiral describes him as possessing a unique and scholarly mind, concluding that 
Cooke “had a peculiar talent for retaining a mass of figures and facts, and a keen, 
incisive logic, which distinguished his scholastic work.”70  Following graduation Cooke 
impressed his superiors, and for the next thirty years excelled as he worked his way up to 
nearly the pinnacle of the Navy’s hierarchy.  
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By 1941 Cooke had achieved the milestone of a major command, as captain of 
the battleship USS Pennsylvania (BB-38).  His ship was in dry dock during the attack on 
Pearl Harbor and suffered two major bomb hits and the loss of twenty-nine officers and 
men killed.71 In the aftermath Cooke caught the eye of Admiral Ernest J. King, who 
handpicked him to serve on his staff in Washington.  Cooke served first as Assistant 
Chief of Staff (Plans) and later in the war as Chief of Staff to Admiral King.72  The 
physically fragile but brilliant Cooke became so invaluable to King that the two men 
often seemed to operate as a single entity. King hoped that his deputy would someday 
succeed him as CNO and at one point strongly suggested that Cooke return to sea duty to 
enhance his career. The ever loyal Cooke demurred, and remained on King’s staff for the 
remainder of the war.73                          
Cooke would become one of the strongest voices for a powerful U.S. Navy and 
Marine Corps presence in China. With the retirement of King in December 1945 and the 
accession of Admiral Chester Nimitz to the Navy’s top post of Chief of Naval 
Operations, Cooke was promoted to full admiral and took command of a materially 
diminished but now legendary fleet whose wartime exploits had amazed the world.  Like 
his mentor, Cooke had a strong interest in China and the Navy’s role in the country.  
Writing to Nimitz in January 1946, Cooke conveyed his impressions and the initial sense 
of optimism he felt about the Seventh Fleet’s role in China. Building the new Republic 
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of China Navy would be a top priority, Cooke wrote, but he was cautiously optimistic 
about such an enormous endeavor. He also spoke warmly of Army/Navy relations in 
China, and informed Nimitz that he would soon be meeting with Chiang Kai-shek in 
Chongqing. The new CNO rarely took an active interest in matters pertaining to the 
Seventh Fleet during his tenure, and this left Cooke great latitude in dealing with both 
the Chinese and the Russians.74 
Meeting Chiang Kai-shek in Chongqing was a memorable experience. Arriving 
in the midst of the Chinese New Year festivities Cooke was impressed by the subdued 
elegance of the wartime capital.  Like most men, Eastern or Western, he fell under the 
spell of Chiang’s famous wife, Soong Meiling, whom he described as “a very handsome 
woman.” Her expert fluency in English also impressed him.75  Soong had returned to 
China after more than a year in the United States, with a renewed sense of purpose 
concerning her marriage and her husband’s embattled position. She quickly became his 
primary translator and aide in dealing with the Americans in the tumultuous years 
ahead.76  Over the next few days Cooke dined and met with the principal U.S. Army and 
Navy leaders in China. He also had lengthy discussions with George Marshall and Dai 
Li, less than a month before the latter’s death in the enigmatic plane crash.  When he left 
the temporary Chinese capital, Cooke was reasonably optimistic about the future of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Letter, Charles M. Cooke to Chester Nimitz, January 28th, 1946, Box 7, Charles M. Cooke Papers, 
CHIS.	  75	  Charles M. Cooke, Log of Trip to Chungking, February 1946, Box 17, Cooke Papers, CHIS. 76	  Taylor, The Generalissimo, 333-334.	  
	   133 
China, the prospects for working with the U.S. Army, and the Navy’s role in the 
region.77 
Cooke’s optimism about Army-Navy relations soon evaporated when he clashed 
with both Marshall and the U.S. State Department in China.  As the Seventh Fleet 
continued the repatriation of the Japanese, sweeping mines, and supporting the Marines 
ashore, a sense that it would remain in China for the foreseeable future began to set in, as 
did an assumption that the fleet would continue to provide support for the Nationalists as 
epitomized by its continuing transport of Chiang’s Kai-shek’s forces from South to 
North China.  The longer the U.S. Navy conducted such operations and stationed ships 
in Qingdao, the more difficult it would become for the Seventh Fleet to withdraw from 
China. 
 As Cooke assumed command of the Seventh Fleet the Cold War had become an 
intractable reality in Asia. Allies of convenience during the war against Germany and 
then Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union were now on opposing sides. During 
the six months after Japan’s surrender, the suspicion and paranoia that would come to 
characterize the Cold War was the new reality. Tense diplomacy between the 
superpowers became an established fact. And caught between them in China were the 
Seventh Fleet and III MEF Marines. Looked upon with enormous suspicion by the 
Soviets, and with firm determination by men like Cooke and Forrestal, the American 
presence had become a controversial counterweight to Soviet expansion.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE U.S. NAVY AND CHINA, 1945-1947 
During the winter of 1945-46 China stood on a precipice. The winter was an 
especially harsh one in North China, and Chiang Kai-shek’s government in Chongqing 
had neither the will nor the resources to combat the human catastrophe that was 
unfolding.  Millions of Chinese were hungry, fuel was in short supply, and rampant 
inflation was making paper currency almost worthless. In crowded Beijing, swollen with 
tens of thousands of starving refugees, shortages of coal and food led to unrest alleviated 
largely by the III MEF Marines.  Their presence ensured that the desperately needed coal 
from the Nationalist controlled mines in North China reached the vast urban centers 
during the long winter.1 Both the GMD and the Communists publicly supported peace 
talks but privately prepared for war. Special Envoy General George Marshall’s peace 
mission calmed both sides for a time, but this was but a temporary illusion. While 
Marshall did work remarkable if short lived wonders, even his immense reputation was 
not enough to bring peace between the two sides.  Yet as his noble but doomed peace 
mission continued, the groundwork was being laid for a bitter intra-service feud over 
American goals in China. 
The tremendous demobilization of American military forces worldwide weighed 
heavily on U.S. planners in East Asia and throughout the world. Perhaps never in history 
had such a huge military force been disarmed so rapidly.  By October 1945 even Harry 
1	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Truman concluded that demobilization had turned into “disintegration,” but he was 
largely powerless to stop it. Public pressure for the rapid return of millions of American 
servicemen was overwhelming. The president was further trapped when Douglas 
MacArthur announced in September that within six months the American occupation 
force in Japan would only require 200,000 servicemen.2  Across the Yellow Sea General 
Albert Wedemeyer reacted to MacArthur’s announcement with dismay. Although he still 
commanded the China Theater on paper Wedemeyer was largely subordinate to Marshall 
after December 1945.3  Although he had officially retired from the Army in November, 
Marshall’s five stars and tremendous prestige made him the senior American official in 
East Asia.  He was expected to work miracles in China, and his strong relationship with 
Truman ensured that he was listened to far more than Wedemeyer or even MacArthur, 
the latter of whom the president was increasingly suspicious. 
Marshall’s year-long peace mission to China has earned the status of a noble 
failure.  Given the ultimate outcome of the Chinese Civil War, this is understandable. 
Yet at the outset many Americans were optimistic about Marshall’s ability to achieve 
peace. The high expectations many Americans had placed on Marshall’s shoulders 
seemed almost achievable.  Wedemeyer, the senior American officer in China, viewed 
Marshall’s arrival as a mixed blessing. Although he never doubted Marshall’s talent and 
abilities, Wedemeyer thought the indefatigable Marshall was tired, irritable, and worn 
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down by the strains of war. Upon meeting each other in Chongqing he conveyed his 
doubts about the possibility of a negotiated settlement to Marshall, asserting that neither 
the Nationalists or Communists were interested in anything less than total victory.  
According to Wedemeyer’s account Marshall snapped back that he was there to achieve 
such a settlement and that Wedemeyer was going to help him. Surprised by Marshall’s 
tone, the younger general vowed to do everything he could to assist.4  
This story may be a bit of self-serving exaggeration.  According to Forrest 
Pogue, General Marshall was comfortable and courteous with his new team of advisers 
in China and listened carefully to their advice and counsel.  The idea that Wedemeyer 
alone had predicted that the peace mission would fail was untrue, as other American 
diplomats in China also warned Marshall of the near impossibility of his task.  
Undoubtedly Wedemeyer was honest with Marshall, but he was not the only one.5  Soon 
after his arrival Marshall met with Chiang, Mao, and Zhou Enlai, and using a deft mix of 
diplomacy and bluster he convinced the Nationalists and Communists to accept a cease 
fire and begin negotiations on a power-sharing agreement and a timeline for discussions 
about a new constitution.  During ensuing discussions both sides agreed to many 
generalities but few specifics, and Marshall had to walk a continuous tightrope in his 
seemingly endless negotiations.6      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, 363.	  5	  Forrest Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-1949, (New York: Viking Press, 1987): 75-76. 6	  Memorandum for the President, “Report on the Marshall Mission,” February 28th, 1946, George C. 
Marshall China Mission Papers, 1945-1947, Correspondence, Box 122, GCMRL.  	  
	   137 
In early February Marshall sent a message to President Truman saying that the 
cease fire was holding and that he was optimistic about future negotiations. A realistic 
coalition government seemed within reach.7  One of Marshall’s biographers 
acknowledged that even at this stage his mission to China “was not an unalloyed 
success, but in little less than three months Marshall had fashioned the basis for 
agreements between the government and the Communists.  They were tenuous pacts, 
shot through with suspicion, but they were more than a succession of negotiators had 
been able to accomplish.”8     
 Wedemeyer was concerned that the end of the war in Europe and Japan’s abrupt 
surrender had created a dangerous illusion among the American public. Deeply 
concerned about the enormous work ahead, Wedemeyer bitterly concluded in his 
memoirs that, “The trouble was that the American people did not realize the conditions 
existing in distant areas after the war. It did not occur to them that a vacuum had been 
created in Europe and Asia by the unconditional surrenders of Germany and Japan. All 
they knew was that the enemy had surrendered and that tumultuous celebrations had 
taken place in every city, town, and village square in America.  Since victory had been 
won, they naturally thought that their boys should at once come home.”9 With the rapid 
demobilization of U.S. forces in Asia, only the understrength Seventh Fleet and the 
50,000 Marines of the III MEF remained in China to truly end the war.  
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As the new commander of the Seventh Fleet, Admiral Charles Cooke faced a 
multitude of problems.  By January 1946 his shrinking fleet consisted of only three 
heavy cruisers, a few dozen destroyers, and approximately one hundred minesweepers 
and amphibious landing craft. Perhaps the fleet’s most urgent yet thankless task was 
clearing China’s coast of Japanese-laid mines. In January more than 50 mines were 
swept or destroyed; one transport struck a mine that had escaped detection and sank 
resulting in the wounding and death of more than twenty Japanese civilians being 
transported back to Honshu.  As significant as the minesweeping work was, it paled in 
political importance when compared to the herculean task of repatriating millions of 
Japanese to their homeland.10 
Upon his relief of Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey, Charles Cooke assumed this 
important and pressing task. The once vast Japanese Empire that had briefly 
encompassed half the Pacific and much of East Asia had encouraged emigration to its 
conquered territories, and at the war’s end nearly seven million Japanese citizens 
required transport back to their home islands. Manchuria contained the largest number 
(1.8 million), but China south of the Great Wall (1.3 million), Korea (625,000), the 
Philippines (142,000), and Formosa (224,000) also had substantial Japanese expatriates.  
The remainder were scattered throughout islands in the Pacific, Indonesia, Hong Kong, 
and Indochina.  Most in East Asia (China/Manchuria/Korea) were transported to Japan 
onboard U.S. Navy amphibious landing craft at rate of 2500-3000 per day (see Table 1).  
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The ships then returned an equivalent number of Chinese or Korean laborers to their 
home countries.11 By the close of 1946 the Japanese repatriation effort had been largely 
completed, with 2.9 million Japanese returned to the home islands from China and 
Manchuria (see Table 2).12  For many Japanese soldiers in Manchuria, however, the wait 
was far longer. During Operation August Storm the Red Army captured more than 
600,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians, most of whom were placed in labor camps in 
Siberia.  Of this number, over 60,000 perished from deprivation and disease before most 
of the remainder were finally repatriated to Japan between 1947-1950.13 
 
Table 2: Estimate of Japanese Repatriated during 1945 
 
Location  Original  Evacuated to Date   Remaining 
 
South Korea  625,000   476,150    148,850 
 
Philippines  142,357   50,950    91,407 
 
Ryuku Islands  67,059   37,265    44,772 
 
Marianas Islands  65,000   61,280    3,720 
 
Australia  211,563   0    211,563 
 
New Zealand  807   0    807 
 
China   1,630,302  42,384    1,587,918 
 
Formosa   224,459   0    224,459 	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Indochina 41,102 0 41,102 
Hong Kong 21,000 21,221 18,779 
Manchuria 1,900,000 0 1,900,000
Russia 936,500 0 936,500 
Southeast Asia 681,724 0 681,724 
Miscellaneous 176,866 37,265 139,601 
United States 16,260 843 15,417 
Canada 10,500 0 10,500 
Hawaii 6,448 0 6,448 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total 6,756,947 693,115 6,063,567 
Source: Report and Study of Japanese Repatriation from China and Assistance to the Chinese 
Nationalist Government, 11 December 1945, Daniel Barbey Papers, Box 29, NHHC. 
Moving the Nationalist Armies by Sea: 1945-1946 
In his memoirs Admiral Dan Barbey recalled that transporting nearly three 
million Japanese men, women and children from China by sea was an easier task than 
moving armies of Nationalist Chinese less than a tenth the size.  In contrast to the 
orderly movement of the Japanese, Barbey confessed that, “The transportation of the 
Chinese armies from the south to the north was not so simple a matter.  With the 
Japanese we knew where they would be embarked and where disembarked. There were 
no disciplinary nor any health problems.  But with the Chinese it was different.”14 From 
late October 1945 through May 1946 the U.S. Navy transported nearly 250,000 men, 
women, and children loyal to Chiang Kai-shek’s regime from southern Chinese ports to 
14	  Barbey, MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy, 338. 
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cities in the north. No other act so yoked the Seventh Fleet and the larger U.S. Navy to 
the direct support of the Nationalists, and none so angered Mao Zedong and his CCP 
cadres. This act of assistance changed the nature of the conflict between the Nationalists 
and Communists and helped exacerbate the tensions between the U.S. Navy and Army 
leadership over China. 
 The transport of Chiang’s armies to the north had been anticipated and requested 
even before Japan’s surrender. On August 13th, 1945 Wedemeyer had written to 
Marshall that approximately sixty days after the surrender it would be necessary to move 
occupation forces to North China and Manchuria.  Acting on Chiang’s behalf, 
Wedemeyer observed that given the lack of available transport aircraft only a handful of 
Nationalist Army divisions could be transported by air. Though not stated directly the 
message implied that U.S. Navy assets would be required to transport GMD armies to 
the north to both ensure the proper Japanese surrender and prevent the Communists from 
dominating Manchuria.15 
 Personally Wedemeyer had grave doubts concerning operations in Manchuria. 
He warned Chiang against overextending his fragile supply lines into the huge province. 
The general recommended that instead of occupying Manchuria Chiang should 
concentrate on building a defensive line along the Great Wall against a Communist 
advance from the north.  Chiang’s pride and his belief that his prestige were at stake 
made acceptance of this strategy unacceptable.  Modern Chinese historian Jonathon 
Fenby concludes that, “if the Generalissimo was to live up to his claims to be the leader 	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of the nation, he had to regain Manchuria, its significance heightened by its fourteen 
years under foreign rule.”16 Much as Douglas MacArthur had vowed to return to the 
Philippines, Chiang saw the retaking of Manchuria as a matter of personal honor and a 
military necessity.  A key difference was that Chiang lacked the overwhelming air and 
naval power MacArthur had at his command in October 1944.  Mao had reached 
precisely the same conclusion on the coming war with the Nationalists. Even while 
meeting with Chiang in Chongqing, he had informed his subordinates that the battle for 
Manchuria would “determine the fate of the revolution.”17   
 At Chiang’s urging Wedemeyer sent another message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
one month later.  Emphasizing the urgency of the situation, he wrote that the GMD 
government requested the earliest possible movement of the 13th Army from Kowloon 
and the 52nd Army from Haiphong to North China.  Each army had roughly 30,000 men 
and would be ready for transport on October 10th.18  The Chinese public was told that the 
selection of those units was based on their readiness and level of training. But Chiang 
had another reason for sending them. They were viewed in the GMD as being especially 
loyal towards Chiang and his regime. For that they received priority, including the best 
weapons and treatment from the Americans.19  The Joint Chiefs soon responded that 
Wedemeyer’s plan had been approved and would be carried out according to the 
schedule already promulgated. The reply message also included this intriguing sentence: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Jonathon Fenby, Chiang Kai Shek: China’s Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost (New York: Carroll 
and Graf, 2004): 452. 
17 Taylor, The Generalissimo, 321. 
18 Memorandum, Wedemeyer to War Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 September 1945, RG 218, Box 
3, NARA. 
19 Dreyer, China at War, 314-315 
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“It is U.S. policy to assist the Chinese Government in the establishment of essential 
Chinese troops in liberated areas, particularly Manchuria, as rapidly as practicable.”20  
With Truman’s approval the United States moved forward with its support of Chiang 
and the GMD. This policy would end up entangling both the Seventh Fleet and the U.S. 
Navy more deeply in Chinese politics than anyone imagined at the time.  Beyond the 
movement by sea, the U.S. Army Air Force would also fly upwards of 80,000 Chinese 
soldiers from bases in southwest China to cities in the east during September- October 
1945.21  
This combined air and sea campaign begs the question: why would the United 
States, which as early as August 1945 had stated on many occasions that it did not desire 
to become embroiled in the Nationalist-Communist conflict, provide such massive 
assistance to Chiang’s government? Part of the reason stemmed from a promise made at 
the Cairo Conference in November 1943.  Soon after the Japanese surrender 
announcement Harry Truman was informed by Nationalist Foreign Minister T.V. Soong 
that during the conference Franklin Roosevelt had promised Chiang to equip 90 
Nationalist Army divisions after the war.22  No written record of such a promise could be 
found, but Roosevelt aide Harry Hopkins informed Truman that privately such an 
agreement was indeed made at Cairo.23 Partly as a result of this discovery, the Truman 
Administration chose to assist Chiang, and the transport mission seemed a compromise 
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between reneging on a promise made to a wartime ally and providing such massive 
assistance promised when the U.S. needed China in the war more than ever.24    
 From October 1945 through May 1946 the U.S. Navy transported ten Nationalist 
Chinese armies totaling 245,900 men (see Table 2).  This total did not include 5,700 
headquarters support staff, their weapons and equipment, and more than 5,000 horses. 
The final army transported, the 93rd, was picked up in Kowloon (Hong Kong) on April 
28th, 1946, and offloaded in the Manchurian port of Hulutao (Huludao) on May 13th.25  
Moving the Nationalist Chinese armies was a cultural experience similar to the Marines’ 
arrival in Qingdao and Tianjin.  American sailors, accustomed to the strict and 
disciplined routine of shipboard life, were suddenly confronted with thousands of 
Chinese soldiers, most of whom had never been onboard a ship in their lives. 
Seasickness and crowded conditions were only the beginning of the many problems 
encountered. This sudden collision of cultures produced many comic and tragic stories 
alike. 
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 The initial movement of the first two armies went rather smoothly.  The 70th 
Army, totaling 16,700 men, was picked up in Fuzhou (Foochow) and transported to the 
north Formosa (Taiwan) port of Keelung.  Apart from the 70th all nine remaining armies 
sailed to ports in North China (see Table 1).26 The 13th Army, considered perhaps 
Chiang’s best ground force, was waiting in Kowloon when twenty-two U.S. Navy 
transports arrived on October 10th.27  After only six hours they completed the loading 
operation and headed out to sea. Captain E.F. Sherman, commanding officer of the 
transport USS Randall (APA-224) reported that in addition to just over 1900 officers and 
enlisted men, his ship stowed 120 tons of ammunition and supplies.   Sherman reported 
that transporting the 13th Army went surprisingly well, concluding that, “The operation 
was conducted, on the whole, far more smoothly and pleasantly than had been 
anticipated. The attitude of the Chinese was most cooperative and friendly, and any 
minor difficulties that arose were steadily surmounted by the exercise of patience and 
tact on both sides.” He also praised the efficiency and leadership of the senior Chinese 
officer onboard, Major General Wan Sai San, for effectively controlling his troops.28    
 During the first few months the overwhelming proportion of the armies 
transported was accomplished by Assault Transports (APA/AKA). The Randall was one 
of the117 Haskell-class transports that first entered service in 1944.  A subtype of a 
Victory ship, they were designed to be fast, long range troop transports, and were 
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heavily used in World War II, carrying the bulk of U.S. Marines and Army units for duty 
against the Japanese. A little over 450 feet long and displacing 14,000 tons fully loaded, 
each could hold up to 1,500 personnel or 2,900 tons of cargo.29  With skeleton Navy 
crews of around 200 men, most ships managed to squeeze up to 2,000 Chinese soldiers 
and hundreds of tons of supplies in their cargo holds. In the annals of maritime 
transportation it was truly one of the most remarkable operations ever conducted. 
 The experience of USS Randall notwithstanding, many of the American 
transports had great difficulties with the Chinese. One of the most obvious problems was 
their poor health. Most of the men taken onboard were in wretched physical condition.  
Cholera and malaria were common, and nearly all had lice and were prone to 
seasickness.30 Yet the U.S. Navy crews often went to extraordinary lengths to make their 
Chinese passengers as comfortable as possible. On each transport the three primary 
cargo holds were washed down, cleaned, and all extraneous gear removed. Special 44-
inch wooden access ladders to allow better mobility and access between decks were 
constructed. On the ship’s fantail a large temporary head was built for soldiers billeted 
aft. Ship’s carpenters also constructed a wooden bulkhead separating junior officers 
from the enlisted men.31  To prevent the men being transported from falling overboard 
embarkation nets were rigged over some bulkheads and the soldiers ordered to stay 
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inside the hull of ship. All ships conducted basic muster drills with all the Chinese 
donning life jackets and being trained in how to find and use them.32 
 Despite these and other efforts this meeting of different cultures was not entirely 
positive. Many of the American sailors were shocked by the Chinese habit of spitting on 
the decks of their ships. Even worse, most of the Chinese had never seen indoor 
plumbing and had no idea how to use a toilet or even a modern sink.  Nearly all had to 
be instructed that urinals were not wash basins and defecating in the corner of the ship’s 
holds was neither good nor necessary.  Despite this some continued to brush their teeth 
in the urinals.33  During the first few days of the voyage most were successfully taught 
the proper use of western plumbing and sanitation.34 As Daniel Barbey remarked in his 
memoirs, “The Chinese are great imitators and they did their best to conform to western 
standards, not only in regards to plumbing, but in other matters.”35 
 Providing food and water to the armies demonstrated some intriguing cultural 
differences. One of the transports reported that more than 700 pounds of rice supplied by 
the Chinese was cooked during the voyage, but after the first day complaints were raised 
as the method of preparation. The Navy mess stewards soon learned the Chinese 
preference for steamed white rice over boiled.  After the appropriate changes were made 
in the galleys and with their steamed rice in hand no further complaints about the food 
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were heard.36 The American sailors also discovered that not all cultures shared their love 
of cold water. The report from the Randall bluntly detailed this issue: “Chinese dislike 
cold water. The cooling system was cut off from certain drinking fountains, and the 
Chinese were instructed which fountains would give them tepid water.” Much to the 
delight of the Chinese further assistance was provided with tea leaves and hot water both 
during and between meals.37  To pass the time most of the Chinese played checkers or 
slept away the voyage. The handful that could read English were provided with comic 
books or magazines.38 
 It was perhaps the health of the average Nationalist Chinese soldier that left the 
deepest impression on the U.S. Navy crews. After eight years of war it was 
understandable that many Chinese soldiers would be in poor health, and most 
succumbed to seasickness during the seven to fourteen-day voyage. Yet the level of 
disease, malnutrition, and abysmal hygiene among many of the Chinese shocked the 
American doctors onboard. Among one advance unit of the 52nd Army, almost 80% had 
chronic malaria, diarrhea, trachoma, or cholera.39  One shipboard report described three 
sick soldiers as “walking skeletons” and they were refused permission to board.40 
 Despite efforts by Navy doctors to screen the Chinese for obvious illnesses many 
boarded the transports who were too weak to make the voyage. Of the more than 
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240,000 Chinese soldiers transported during the six-month operation around twenty-five 
died of disease.41 One such death took place onboard the USS Effingham (APA-165) 
while transporting the 13th Army. The report read simply: “Above named individual 
[Lee] expired on board this ship, 17:35 29 October 1945.”  Malaria was listed as the 
cause of death, and Lee, like many others who died onboard ship, was quickly (less than 
an hour after being pronounced dead) buried at sea.42 Many Chinese had a superstitious 
fear of at sea burial and when some expired onboard their bodies were hidden in the 
cargo holds, and left behind when the Chinese finally disembarked in North China.43 
 The U.S. Navy crews were also dismayed by the brutal discipline meted out by 
the Nationalist Chinese officers. Many of these officers had no compunction whatsoever 
about striking enlisted men.  Even the sick and injured were not spared. In some cases 
when being carried to the beach on a stretcher, a sick soldier would be overturned on the 
sand and then beaten relentlessly with sticks. If he could stand afterwards he rejoined the 
ranks. If not, he was left behind on the sand.44   
The voyages did offer some humorous moments. Daniel Barbey recalled that of 
the Chinese taken onboard, “It was difficult for them to accept the fact that women 
should not accompany the troops, and a few were brought onboard surreptitiously.”45 
Even some small children were smuggled onboard. One of these, a skinny seven-year 
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old boy, was unofficially adopted by his Navy crew. After two weeks of hearty eating he 
disembarked the ship to the cheers of his new American friends, several pounds heavier 
than when he first arrived, equipped with a U.S. knife and bayonet, and weighed down 
with a full pack of rations. Like many of the other disembarking Chinese soldiers he was 
likely killed in the ensuing civil war or deserted the Nationalist side to join the 
Communists.46 
 Only with the transport of the 13th Chinese Army did the Seventh Fleet encounter 
any difficulties at the end of the voyage. Here the tricky status of Dalian raised its head 
once again. Originally after being loaded in Kowloon the 13th Army was expected to 
unload in Dalian, as that port offered the shortest overland transport into central 
Manchuria.  The Sino-Soviet Treaty stated that the port was to be open to all traffic, 
including Nationalist Chinese military forces, but it said nothing concerning the 
movement of Chinese army units through the city to Manchuria. So there was 
considerable surprise and frustration when Soviet officials informed Chiang’s 
government that it could not permit the offloading of the 13th Army into Dalian. The 
Soviets argued that as a free port Dalian could not be used for the movement of troops, 
and despite the peace treaty signed onboard the USS Missouri the Soviet Union still 
considered itself at war with Japan, as no separate treaty had yet been signed. Of course, 
the real motive behind the Soviet obfuscation was to limit the movement of Chiang’s 
armies into Manchuria.47 
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 Though incensed at what he considered Soviet treachery Chiang could do 
nothing but protest, and requested through General Wedemeyer that the 13th Army 
instead be offloaded at the small port of Huludao, just north of Great Wall. The 52nd 
Army, awaiting transport at Haiphong, would be diverted to Yingkou, a port on the north 
edge of Liaodong Bay.  Though denying entry to Dalian the Soviets assured both 
Wedemeyer and Chiang that they could safely unload the Nationalist troops at both 
ports, which were under Soviet control.48  Once again Daniel Barbey was forced to play 
the role of diplomat.  After anchoring his flagship approximately one thousand yards 
from the Huludao beach on October 27th, Barbey’s admiral barge, prominently flying its 
American ensign, came under rifle fire roughly sixty yards from the pier.  After the 
barge returned to the ship a lone Chinese man was seen waving both a Chinese flag and 
a white banner of truce. With great caution Barbey later arranged for the local Chinese 
Communist leader, Lieutenant General Lau Shok Hai to come onboard for discussions. 
The general apologized for the shooting incident, which he blamed on nervous and 
poorly trained soldiers, but also stated that any American landing of Nationalist army 
troops would be opposed by the Communists.49 As at Yantai less than a month earlier 
Barbey chose to avoid bloodshed and ordered the 13th Army offloaded at the small port 
of Qingwangdao. This displeased Chiang, as Qingwangdao was located immediately 
south of the Great Wall, but again he could do nothing.50  
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 Barbey soon discovered that the Soviets had tricked both Chiang and the United 
States yet again. A few days after weighing anchor at Huludao, Barbey’s flagship sailed 
to Yingkou to arrange for the arrival of the 52nd Nationalist Army. Although hundreds of 
Soviet troops effectively controlled the port, several thousand Communist troops were 
busy building beach defenses nearby against an anticipated Nationalist landing.51  Both 
the Seventh Fleet and the Nationalist government had been assured by the Soviets than 
any landing at Yingkou would be unopposed.52 Yet when pressed the Russian officers 
who controlled Yingkou claimed to know nothing about such an agreement and 
requested time to consult with their superiors. Overnight the Soviets mysteriously left 
the port city and were replaced with Communist Chinese, who again made clear that any 
Nationalist landing would be met with force. And again Barbey chose to err on the side 
of caution, and recommended that the 52nd Army be diverted to Qingwandao.53 Despite 
these setbacks, however, the remaining Chinese Nationalist armies were transported 
without major incident. 
 The Seventh Fleet’s assistance to Chiang and his armies can be analyzed in many 
different ways. From a naval perspective, the operation which Dan Barbey called “a 
discouraging business” was largely successful.54 Despite the cultural conflicts and 
logistical difficulties in moving more than 240,000 Chinese soldiers, this seaborne lift 
was done professionally and smartly. Politically, however, it had two unintended 
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consequences. The operation gave Chiang the mobility and confidence he needed to 
push for a protracted invasion of Manchuria. Second, it angered Mao and the CCP, and 
lent credence to the Communist view that the Seventh Fleet was little more than an 
unofficial component of the Nationalist Chinese government. Because of this 
Communist animosity towards U.S. sailors and Marines in China only became worse in 
the years ahead.          
 By January 1946 the fiscal realities of demobilization began to limit the 
resources available to the relocation mission. From August through December 1945 
King, Nimitz, and Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal attempted to develop a 
comprehensive plan to temper the effects of demobilization upon naval operations in 
Asia.  While they planned U.S.Navy ships engaged in “Operation Magic Carpet.”  i.e., 
the return of America’s enormous military forces stationed around the world back to the 
United States.  More than three hundred transports, sixty-three aircraft carriers, seven 
battleships, and twenty-six cruisers were utilized, and by November 1945 more than 
three million men and women arrived home safely.55 
 Of course, this meant that less shipping remained to transport the remaining 
Chinese armies. A December 1945 naval conference held in Tokyo brought together 
Barbey, commander of the 7th Fleet, Admiral Raymond Spruance, commander of the 5th 
Fleet which was assigned to Japan, and members of MacArthur’s Tokyo staff to discuss 
the situation in China and the Western Pacific. As part of an arrangement worked out 
between Barbey and Spruance, a new timetable for completing the transport of 	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Nationalist armies scheduled to move to northern China.  With most attack transports 
needed elsewhere, 75 LST’s (Landing Ship/Tank) were assigned to complete the 
operation, 45 to transport the Chinese armies from Shanghai to the north, the other thirty 
LSTs to move armies north from South China. The LST’s, less comfortable and slower 
than the attack transports, required up to twenty-five days to move troops from South to 
North China, and around ten days to move troops to the north from Shanghai.56 The final 
plan, approved by Truman, also authorized a schedule for turning over twenty-five 
surplus Liberty ships and twenty-five LST’s to the Chinese Navy. This formed the 
nucleus of a new Nationalist Chinese Navy, a complex but little known chapter in U.S. 
Navy history.57 
Table 3: Movement of Nationalist Chinese Armies October 1945-May 1946 
Army Size Departure Port  Destination   Dates 
70th 16,725 Fuzhou Keelung, Taiwan 10/14 – 10/24 
13th 29,000 Kowloon Qingwandao  10/24-11/1 
52nd 26,908 Haiphong Qingwandao  10/30-11/13 
8th 23,745 Kowloon Qingdao 11/8-11/16 
62nd 20,166 Haiphong Dagu  11/5 – 12/6 
HQ Staff 5,700 Haiphong Huludao 12/8 – 12/22 
56	  “Report and Study of Japanese Repatriation from China and Assistance to the Chinese Nationalist 
Government,” 11 December 1945, Barbey Papers, Box 29, NHHC.	  57	  Memorandum, Joint Chiefs of Staff to Pacific Fleet Commanders, 13 December 1945, RG 218, Box 3, 
NARA.	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6th 34,352 Shanghai Qingwandao 11/16-4/16 
1st 35,141 Kowloon Qingwandao 2/11- 4/5 
71st 27,347 Shanghai Qingwandao 3/7 – 4/4 
60th 16,449 Haiphong Huludao 4/1 – 5/1 
93rd 16,443 Kowloon Huludao 4/8 – 5/13 
Source: Unpublished Narrative History of the Seventh Fleet and Western Forces, Pacific, 
8 January 1946 – 24 February 1948, Cooke Papers, Box 17, CHIS. 
    The Republic of China Navy 1946-1947 
With the transportation mission completed in May 1946, the Seventh Fleet turned 
its energies towards gunboat diplomacy and showing the flag, as its predecessor the 
Asiatic Fleet had done in previous decades. The fleet maintained an impressive but 
dwindling presence in Shanghai and Qingdao, but the days of dozens of American 
warships crowding Chinese ports were in the past. One of the newer missions was anti-
smuggling patrols along the Korean coast, to aid in increasingly complex occupation of 
South Korea. A lesser known mission of the Seventh Fleet was the task of building and 
training a new navy for Chiang’s Nationalist government.  This effort had begun long 
before the war ended and reflected Franklin Roosevelt’s desire to build China into a 
great power, as well as Milton Miles’ interest in furthering Sino-American relations 
postwar. Although never heavily publicized due to concerns by the U.S. State 
Department and George Marshall, the training program was larger and more 
comprehensive than has been previously understood. From 1946 onwards Admiral 
Table 3 Continued 
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Cooke and other senior U.S. Navy leaders considered the program a small bright spot in 
the discouraging tempest that was the Chinese Civil War.58 
 At the request of Admiral King, the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) had – 
in February 1943 - begun to plan for training.  Nationalist Chinese officers and enlisted 
men in the United States. An early report recommended that a small group of Chinese 
officers be brought to the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis for advanced English 
courses. The report also recommended that plans be put in place to train Chinese officers 
and enlisted sailors at the Submarine Chaser Training Center at Miami, Florida. In 
addition to English the new students would be taught the basics in engineering, 
seamanship, navigation, and mine warfare.59      
  A school for training Chinese enlisted sailors was established during the spring 
of 1945. Over 1,000 Chinese sailors, most with little or no understanding of English, 
arrived at the Miami Naval Training Center in April 1945.   Discouraged by the all but 
nonexistent English language skills of the Chinese recruits, Captain H. W. Howe, the 
commanding officer of the training center, turned to Dr. I. A. Richards of Harvard 
University. Richards had become well known for his development of Basic English, a 
system of teaching the language by emphasizing fewer than 1,000 key words. His 
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program was implemented in Miami and became a cornerstone of success, both for 
teaching naval skills and the English language.60   
 The rapid conclusion of World War II ended efforts to train Chinese sailors in the 
United States, and the program was gradually incorporated into the creation of a postwar 
military assistance program.  Patrick Hurley wrote to Harry Truman in September 1945, 
citing the “ever growing need for postwar military cooperation,” advocated the creation 
of a postwar military advisory board headed by an American commander, preferably 
Wedemeyer to advise Chiang’s government.61  Truman replied that he was in favor of 
the idea, in principle, and ordered that proposals be prepared by the Joint Chiefs on the 
matter.62  The creation of a permanent American-led training program for the new 
Chinese Navy would eventually coalesce in the closing weeks of 1945. During the busy 
last days of his command of the Seventh Fleet, Barbey convinced Admiral King to set up 
a naval training center in Qingdao to train Chinese sailors.  King quickly agreed, and in 
early December the first class of two hundred recruits began training on three LST 
amphibious transports turned over to the new Chinese Navy. The American effort to 
create a Navy for Chiang had begun.63 
 The same week that the Qingdao naval training center opened, Chiang presented 
Wedemeyer with a list of requests in addition to the 36 landing craft, four destroyers, 
and six patrol craft he sought earlier.  Included were six light cruisers, sixteen destroyers 
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or destroyer escorts, twelve patrol craft, eight minesweepers, and an unspecified number 
of repair ships and other support vessels.  He also strongly requested assistance in the 
construction of port facilities and dry docks. Daniel Barbey forwarded the list to 
Washington with a cover letter that ended with a direct quote from Chiang’s written 
request, “The gradual transfer of the above mentioned ships over an extended period of 
time will be acceptable.”64 Apparently Chiang was under the impression that the creation 
of a new navy was as simple as being handed over surplus American warships, to say 
nothing of the complexities of crewing and operating them.  After assuming command 
from Barbey in early January, Admiral Cooke sought to tamp down Chiang’s delusions 
of grandeur.     
 Cooke’s elevation to command of the Seventh Fleet meant that the responsibility 
of building this new navy fell to him. He approached the huge task enthusiastically but 
cautiously. A personal letter to Nimitz reveals his hopes and fears.  Cooke pointed out to 
CNO Nimitz that at present the Nationalists had only a few small coastal craft, and no 
administrative organization to speak of. Cooke was scheduled to meet with Chiang in 
Chongqing shortly, and would lay out a modest but realistic set of proposals to build a 
limited but capable navy.  He ended the message to Nimitz with a note of cautious 
optimism, writing, “I shall tell the Chinese Government that the way for them to build a 
Navy is to start out on a small scale with the view to building up later, as may seem 
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desirable and practicable. It is my view that if they attempt the grandiose, they will 
defeat their own wishes and objectives.”65      
 Cooke was accompanied on his trip to Chongqing by Rear Admiral Stuart S. 
Murray. The recently arrived Murray was a distinguished submarine officer who, in 
addition to several wartime exploits, was one of the senior submariners who fled the 
Philippines in January 1942 to begin unrestricted submarine warfare against the 
Japanese. He was later promoted to Chief of Staff to Admiral Charles Lockwood, the 
commander of U.S. Submarine-Forces in the Pacific. His last wartime post was an 
especially prestigious one, as commanding officer of the battleship USS Missouri. In 
that capacity he oversaw the endless complexities of hosting the Japanese surrender 
ceremonies on September 2nd, to say nothing of the presence of Douglas MacArthur, 
Nimitz, and countless other high ranking officers.66      
 Murray had originally been slated to take over Naval Group China in December. 
Milton Miles’ chief of staff, Captain I. F. Beyerly, had run the group after Miles’ 
departure, and relations between him and Dan Barbey were problematic. Beyerly and the 
remaining SACO personnel objected to the potential shut down of their organization and 
its unique relationship with Chiang and his government.  Barbey, however, saw SACO 
and NGC as an impediment to future negotiations with the Communists and helped draft 
the SACO termination agreement that was later approved by the JCS and the U.S. 
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Congress.67  Cooke sought to utilize Murray’s outstanding organizational skills in a 
different way.  During a November 1945 meeting in Washington, D.C., Cooke informed 
Murray that Naval Group China would be shut down and he would instead take over the 
Qingdao naval training program and the newly created Naval Assistance Group to 
China. Murray thus had the dual responsibilities of training the new Chinese Navy and 
overseeing the transfer of U.S. Navy ships and resources. Although perhaps not the most 
prestigious posting, it required a deft combination of diplomacy and tact to succeed.68 
 Murray’s official Navy orders authorized him to establish a preliminary 
administrative Survey Board for the purposes of establishing a long term Naval 
Advisory Group and ascertaining the realistic requirements to build and train a Chinese 
Navy. He was also ordered to report to Cooke on his findings.69 Although he had never 
served in China, Murray sought out Milton Miles, Hurley, and several other China 
experts before he departed for Asia.  After touring Qingdao, Shanghai, and Chongqing, 
Murray met with most of the principal American and Chinese commanders, including 
Wedemeyer and Dai Li. To his surprise and gratitude the latter furnished an armored 
limousine for his personal use. Throughout December he continued gathering 
information, and when Cooke arrived in early January he felt prepared to provide his 
new boss and Chiang recommendations on his vision for the new Chinese Navy.70       
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 The February 3rd, 1946 conference with Chiang to discuss his new navy was a 
memorable one.  Most of Chiang’s positions on the size and strength of a future fleet 
remained unchanged. Following a sumptuous multi-course dinner at Chiang’s guest 
cottage, Cooke and Murray laid out the problems with the generalissimo’s vision.  In 
their opinion the Nationalist government did not have enough trained and experienced 
personnel to come close to manning the more than forty warships requested by Chiang. 
Heavy or even light cruisers were out of the question. Cooke pointed out that all such 
warships had advanced high pressure steam propulsion plants, a technology few Chinese 
were familiar with. Only warships fitted with safer and less complex low pressure steam 
plants would be available.  Both Cooke and Murray attempted to soothe the 
generalissimo’s desires to have an instant, modern navy, but were firm that until 
sufficient personnel were trained only simple ships such as amphibious landing craft 
would be made available.  Although he reluctantly accepted their conclusions, Chiang 
pressed for a minimum of twelve submarines to be included. Again Cooke and Murray 
said no, pointing out the profound complexities of modern submarine design.  They did 
promise that within a few years destroyers and possibly even one or two submarines 
would be made available.71 
     As a result of the conference Murray prepared a thorough report for Cooke, 
which was later forwarded to Admiral Nimitz. Murray’s report recommended that a 
larger, congressionally funded naval advisory group be established and emphasized that 
the new Chinese Navy would stress quality over size, and that several years would be 	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needed to develop it to American standards of proficiency.  The report relayed Chiang’s 
desires for a “national” navy for China, something the country had never known in its 
long and ancient history.  Cooke also recommended that two to three light cruisers be 
made available to Chiang’s government within three years, provided that sufficient 
crewmen were available.72  As part of a series of additional reports, Murray also 
recommended that up to 271 surplus Navy ships, primarily amphibious landing craft and 
patrol boats, be turned over to the Chinese.  A tentative accord on the number of ships 
was agreed to by both nations, and ratified by the U.S. Congress as Public Law 512 in 
July 1946.73 
 After returning from a long visit to Washington, Murray set to work expanding 
and improving the naval training center at Qingdao. Despite the funding and support 
available. Murray had to walk a fine line between emphasizing the importance of the 
Qingdao naval center and downplaying it. The training center was a vital part of the 
Seventh Fleet’s mission in China but publicity was kept to a minimum out of concern 
that its establishment would anger the Communists.  In an interview years later Murray 
confided that the ambiguous status of their mission mattered very little to their hosts, 
recalling, “We were operating now as advisors to the Chinese Navy even though we 
were unofficial in that we were not officially established. As far as the Chinese were 
concerned, it made no difference to them. We were just there and whether we were 
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officially established or not had no bearing as far they were concerned.  They wanted 
assistance.”74         
 During the spring of 1946 Murray oversaw the creation of a comprehensive 
curriculum, the organization of classes, and the building of new facilities to house the 
training program. He soon discovered that intra-service rivalry was not unique to the 
United States. As a land power for most of its history, including during the 20th century, 
ground forces received the highest priority.  The Navy ranked a distant third behind the 
Chiang’s Nationalist Army and even the young Chinese Air Force. Many of the recruits 
who arrived for training had even less standing and education than those sent to the 
army.  He thus had to make do with the least educated and poorest peasants, some of 
whom had never even seen the Pacific Ocean.75 
Murray and his subordinates nevertheless made the new training program work. 
Surplus U.S. Navy training equipment was brought to Qingdao throughout the spring of 
1946, along with training manuals and firefighting gear. The center, located adjacent to 
the main Qingdao naval base, was rapidly expanded with the construction of new 
barracks and classrooms. Prefabricated Quonset huts that were used so successfully 
during the war soon outnumbered the permanent concrete structures.76 Most training was 
conducted afloat, utilizing five amphibious landing craft: two LST’s (Landing Ship, 
Tank), one LCT (Landing Craft, Tank), one LCI (Landing Craft, Infantry), and one LSM 
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(Landing Ship, Medium) to familiarize the Chinese crews with their operation.77  
Lessons were conducted in a combination of Chinese and English, and over several 
months many of the training manuals were translated into Chinese.78 In addition to the 
afloat training, forty officers and over three hundred enlisted sailors  took courses ashore 
in damage control, leadership, navigation, and basic seamanship. The specialized officer 
courses also featured broad lectures in Chinese on amphibious warfare, leadership, and 
medical training. Also prominent were classes on popular topics such as the Normandy 
invasion and the 1942 Doolittle Raid.79  By November 1946 nearly two hundred Chinese 
officers and over 1,300 enlisted sailors had completed the afloat training and were 
qualified to operate the growing number of amphibious landing craft being turned over 
to China.80   
James V. Forrestal and the Growing Rift over China 
In his history of the postwar Asian revolt against Western imperialism, 
diplomatic historian Lisle Rose blames Patrick Hurley for the failure of U.S policy in 
China.  With his abrupt and public resignation Hurley gave voice to many nervous 
Americans who saw a worldwide Communist conspiracy directed from Moscow.  Even 
greater, in Rose’s view Hurley shares a considerable burden for helping start the Cold 
77	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War in Asia. He concludes that, “The roots of virulent anti-Communism in America 
were thus firmly laid by Patrick Hurley and his supporters during the first uncertain 
months of the postwar era. And the initial source and focus of this dangerous public 
mood was China and the American foreign service, not the Soviet Union.”81 
This analysis overstates the importance of Hurley, as the Cold War in Asia was 
already well underway before the ambassador’s resignation. As Rose wisely points out, 
however, a growing and influential group of statesmen, diplomats, and politicians agreed 
with Hurley’s views. One of these was James Forrestal, who served as Under Secretary 
of the Navy (1940-1944), Navy Secretary (1944-1947), and the first Secretary of 
Defense (1947-1949).  Well before Japan’s surrender Forrestal had begun to view the 
Soviet Union with deep suspicion. Upon his accession to the post of Secretary of the 
Navy following the death of Frank Knox, opposition to containment of Soviet 
Communism would become a centerpiece of Forrestal’s worldview. 
Born in Matteawan, New York, in 1892, Forrestal enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 
1916 and became one of the first generation of naval aviators.  During most of 1918 he 
served at the office of Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, D.C., time which 
undoubtedly aided him with a future career in politics.  Gifted with an insightful, 
brilliant mind and an acumen for business, in the 1920s he joined the investment firm of 
Dillon, Read, and Company, eventually heading the company and earning a large fortune 
81	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of Wall Street.82  Forrestal was known as much for his restless energy as he was for 
unorthodox and clever ideas. It was a midnight call to Secretary of State James Byrnes 
from Forrestal that suggested the Japanese surrender ceremonies take place onboard the 
battleship USS Missouri, an idea that in Byrnes’ view, “averted a great crisis in Army-
Navy relations.” 83  No matter how grand or illustrious its battle history, Douglas 
MacArthur had long objected to the ceremony taking place onboard a Navy warship, as 
it would create the impression that the Navy had won the war against the Japanese. 
Senior Navy leaders insisted that only an aircraft carrier such as the USS Enterprise 
could be an appropriate venue.  A battleship named after his home state proved to be too 
much for Harry Truman to resist, and the president subsequently cut through any Army 
objections with his choice. Summarizing his best traits, Forrestal’s most recent 
biography describes him as a “meld of great ability, noble ambition, innate patriotism, 
deep dedication, and selfless labor.”  He possessed an exceptionally complex personality 
and was haunted by personal demons.84  
 Compared to many of his contemporaries in government service, such as 
Marshall, Dean Acheson, or even James Byrnes, Forrestal has received little attention 
from academic historians and biographers.85 He remains an enigmatic and tragic figure. 	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Much of this is due to the circumstances of his passing.  The tragedy of his death in May 
of 1949 has long been the subject of considerable controversy, and his hospitalization 
and suicide have led many to point towards insanity in the final months of his life.  
However, a study on his mental state during his final years concludes that no evidence 
exists the former Defense Secretary was psychotic or mentally incapacitated by 
overwork. In the author’s view, the stigma of mental illness has unfairly blemished the 
record, and conclude that, “Forrestal seems to be remembered, not for his prescience and 
courage, but for his suicide and alleged insanity.”86  Given his lasting influence on not 
just the Navy but the Department of Defense this is unfortunate.  Forrestal’s role in the 
postwar U.S. Navy and the peripheral yet vital part that he played in the formation of 
American policy in China, deserve much greater attention than they have received.  
 Forrestal and King had little direct contact before April 1944.  These two brilliant 
men developed a workable but unusually strained relationship.  Forrestal greatly 
respected King for his strategic genius and profound love for the Navy, but viewed the 
Chief of Naval Operations as a sloppy administrator.  For personal reasons King came to 
disagree with his civilian boss more and more as the war neared its end. As King’s 
biographer concludes, “Whereas [Secretary of War] Stimson and Marshall had an open 
door between their offices, the one deck between the offices of King and Forrestal was 
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almost insurmountable barrier.”87  Forrestal’s relations with King’s successor, Chester 
Nimitz, were more cordial but nevertheless challenging. Even the disarming and 
magisterial Nimitz could never quite understand Forrestal’s unique personality.88 
 As World War II neared its end, Forrestal developed entrenched positions on 
both Communism and the future of China. On these matters Forrestal was influenced by 
William Bullitt, the unorthodox but brilliant diplomat and former ambassador to the 
Soviet Union. Bullitt believed that Communism was an atheistic religion and that the 
Soviets sought worldwide domination.  Forrestal would come to share these views.89  
Averell Harriman, whom Forrestal would come to value as a friend and colleague, would 
also help to shape his anti-communist views. In his April 20th, 1945 diary entry Forrestal 
recorded that during a meeting the ambassador informed him that he feared the Soviets 
would stop at nothing to establish “friendly” states on their borders, and that “the 
outward thrust of Communism was not dead and that we might well have to face an 
ideological warfare just as vigorous and dangerous as Fascism or Nazism.”90    
 This view would eventually bring him into conflict with George Marshall. 
Though Marshall demonstrated nothing but determined opposition to communism 
throughout his career, yet, during the war, he largely set this aside. His eyes on ultimate 
victory, the general chose to look past the cruelties of the Soviet regime.  Marshall 
considered Stalin a strong and ruthless leader, and described him as a man “who made 
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his way by murder and everything else and should be talked to that way.”91  To Marshall 
the qualities that made Stalin so abhorrent to later generations of Americans were 
perhaps just the Russian way of doing things, ways that were needed to crush Hitler. 
Marshall appreciated Stalin’s obvious intelligence, command of global strategy, and 
determination, and the Soviet dictator reciprocated this admiration. In contrast, men like 
Forrestal, Charles Cooke, and Averell Harriman were less willing to overlook the Soviet 
Union’s growing trail of death and destruction. 
 The true difference between Forrestal and Marshall was the language each 
thought was appropriate for the nascent Cold War.  According to his best known 
biographer, Forrest Pogue, Marshall was cautious when it came to relations with the 
Soviet Union. The general, “warned constantly against slapping an opponent in the face 
while one was virtually disarmed.  He deplored the use of harsh rhetoric, insisting that 
one must permit one’s enemies room to maneuver.”92 In contrast Forrestal favored a 
blunter and stronger response centered around the new doctrine of containment. In early 
1945 he foresaw that Eastern Europe would come under Soviet domination and the weak 
Soviet Navy would benefit from captured U-boat technology and would eventually 
become a major threat, predictions that came true in the years ahead.  Although he 
shared Marshall’s vision for a Western Europe rebuilt through economic assistance, 
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Forrestal was far more inclined to view Soviet actions as driven by Communist ideology 
rather than practical defensive concerns.93 
 In the case of China, Forrestal agreed with the senior Navy leadership that 
American naval power in the country had been vital in the past and would continue to be 
so in the future. In Forrestal’s view, basing the Seventh Fleet in East Asia, preferably in 
China, would bode well for future conflicts with the Soviet Union. Referring to the 
November 1945 discussions on removing the III MEF from North China, he wrote in his 
diary that, “There is strong pressure to bring Americans out of China, particularly the 
Marines.  If we do, we invite a vacuum of anarchy in Manchuria, and it is obvious that 
into that vacuum ultimately either the Japanese or the Russians will flow.”94 Following 
the arrival of the III MEF, Forrestal became increasingly determined to keep Marines in 
China as long as possible. After one of several meeting with Charles Cooke in 1946, the 
secretary recorded in his diary his that he shared the admiral’s conviction that the 
Chinese had the makings of a great and democratic people, and that, “they [the Chinese] 
were very much like ourselves in the degree to which they prized personal liberty and 
the freedom of the individual.  In Cooke’s mind, the Chinese people only lacked the 
stable order and administration necessary for a modern, free society.”95  
 This was a naïve statement, written by an intelligent man, but one who had little 
direct experience with China and the complexities of its politics.  Most of Forrestal’s 
knowledge on China was anecdotal and incomplete. Yet Cooke, Forrestal, and to a lesser 	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extent Admiral William Leahy became the three U.S. Navy leaders who were most 
determined to keep China “on our side.” All three, like Averell Harriman, strongly 
opposed communism, were determined to keep Nationalist China within the fold, and 
appreciated the Navy’s longstanding role along the coasts and in the rivers of the vast 
country.96  
Unbending in his negative views of communism, Forrestal saw little point in 
continuing negotiations with Mao Zedong or his deputy, Zhou Enlai. He also was 
resolute in his determination to keep U.S. Navy and Marine personnel in China for as 
long as possible, viewing them as indispensable to the security of the region. He wanted 
more Marines in China, not fewer. But by the summer of 1946 Marshall was far more 
pessimistic about America’s future role in China. Due to the corruption of Chiang’s 
regime and the general hopelessness of the situation Marshall saw little that could be 
gained from a prolonged American presence.97 He also confided to Forrestal that if the 
impending negotiations between the Nationalists and Communists broke down he would 
have no choice but to recommend the phased withdrawal of all Marines from China.98 
 During the summer of 1946 Forrestal embarked on a whirlwind tour of the 
Pacific and East Asia.  After witnessing the atomic bomb tests on Bikini Atoll on July 
1st, he flew west and met with George Marshall and Chiang in Nanjing.99 Despite their 
increasing differences over China the meetings with Marshall were cordial, and Forrestal 
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later thanked the general for the use of his private plane and pilot while he was in 
China.100  In addition to Marshall, the Navy Secretary met with several other important 
American officials in China, including Admiral Cooke who warned him of Russian 
subversion and espionage in Shanghai and of the need for a permanent, forward 
deployed Seventh Fleet. Yet perhaps his most illuminating conversation was with Walter 
Robinson, the charge d’affaires of the U.S. embassy in China.  A banker by trade and 
later head of the U.S. Lend-Lease mission to Australia during the war, Robertson was 
the senior American diplomat in China since Hurley’s resignation.101 On a stop in 
Beijing Robertson forcefully argued to the Forrestal that without the Marines China 
would have fallen into chaos the previous winter, and that to withdraw them would mean 
Communist domination of Manchuria and North China. Forrestal readily agreed.102       
The June 1946 trip to Asia was of great importance to Forrestal in the shaping of 
his views on communism and American grand strategy in Asia.  Forrestal’s views began 
to match Patrick Hurley’s, in that Soviet style communism was on the march in Asia and 
only a determined U.S. response could block it. The tour solidified Forrestal’s stance to a 
single axiom: U.S. Marines, supported by the Navy, were essential to a stable China. 
Upon leaving the Asian mainland for Japan and a conference with MacArthur, Forrestal 
wrote in his journal that, “One thing is clear – that the Marines were the balance of order 
in China during the last six months.”  This view, understandable in the summer of 1946, 
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became increasingly untenable as more and more of China fell under Communist 
control.103 
 Forrestal’s trip to Asia also solidified his strong concurrence with Cooke over the 
Navy’s course in China. Throughout 1946 Cooke, partially supported by Forrestal, 
increasingly advocated a more assertive course for the Navy.  By August the admiral had 
become convinced that a stronger American presence in China was needed, and 
recommended that extensive U.S. Navy facilities be built both in Qingdao and Shanghai 
for the Seventh Fleet.  Cooke’s stance was not a popular one, however, as even Nimitz 
declined to act upon his proposals.104  In early 1947, Cooke’s desire to increase the 
Navy’s visibility in the region would lead to conflict with both the U.S. Army and State 
Department.  By this time the American public was increasingly confused about why 
U.S. Marines were still ashore in China. Their presence, coupled with Cooke and 
Forrestal’s continued desire for a more robust American military role in China, would 
soon collide with both the Army and the State Department’s push to pursue an opposite 
course. 
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CHAPTER V 
TWILIGHT OF THE CHINA MARINES, 1946-1947 
Happy crowds greeted the 1st Division Marines when they began landing at Dagu 
on September 30th 1945 followed by the 6th Marine Division at Qingdao on October 15th.  
The latter group included an eighteen-year-old Marine who fifty years later recalled the 
large and enthusiastic throngs of Chinese who welcomed them, remembering that “No 
ticker tape parade in New York City for a victorious returning army could have been 
more grand. The streets were one continuous mass of humanity, a carpet of happy, 
smiling waving people.  Each and everyone [sic] there that day, without exception, 
babies included, held small American flags which they waved frantically.”  It was a sight 
that the arriving 6th Division Marines would not soon forget.1   
Though most of the Marines may have preferred to be returning home to the 
United States, others welcomed the opportunity to visit exotic China. Yet by year’s end 
the spectacle and adventure of China had begun to wear thin. As the cold weather set in 
many of the 40,000 Marines still in the enormous and troubled country had seen enough 
of Beijing, Tianjin, and Qingdao. The crowds that had welcomed the Marines in 
September and October were a memory, replaced by a still grateful but increasingly 
uneasy population struggling to feed and warm itself yet also caught up in a growing and 
remorseless civil war. 
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 American newspaper and magazines had heralded the Marines’ return to China, 
but by early 1946, they had lost interest.  The towering presence of General George 
Marshall dwarfed whatever visibility the Marines had left in China. He deliberately 
deemphasized their role and sought to steadily reduce their numbers during the long and 
tumultuous year.  As Marshall attempted to broker an end to the war between Chiang’s 
Nationalists and Mao’s Communists—an all but impossible task—he paid increasingly 
less attention to Navy leaders’ views of China as a strategic priority.  For Seventh Fleet 
commander Admiral Charles Cooke and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, the 
Marines had become a symbol of the American strategy in the new Cold War in Asia.2  
In their eyes the Marines helped ensure stability and embodied a visible counterweight to 
Soviet expansion and influence.  The two leaders believed that with the Soviets’ 
fortification of Dalian—an act both considered illegal— and covert operations 
elsewhere, a complete withdrawal of the Marines was strategically unsound and 
politically unthinkable. 
 During the late winter and early spring of 1946 Soviet-American relations 
reached to a new nadir. The Cold War, no longer a new theory or pessimistic analysis of 
diplomacy, had become very real. In a February 9th speech to a group of local “voters” in 
Moscow, Joseph Stalin touted the unyielding strength of the Red Army and argued that 
the war had proven the viability of the Soviet state. Candid and bombastic to Western 
observers, the speech seemed to leave little room for compromise with the West.3  A few 
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weeks later George Kennan, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR since Averell Harriman’s 
departure, released an even more influential document, one that would come to 
symbolize the Cold War.  Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” as it came to be known, 
contained the seeds for the U.S. policy of containment and stark warnings for the future. 
Kennan argued that the Soviet Union both feared and envied the West and that Russian 
xenophobia and suspicion were major reasons for the leaders’ hostile worldview.  
Kennan rejected ideology as the base motivation of Soviet leaders, writing that “At 
bottom of Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive sense of 
insecurity.”  He concluded that peaceful coexistence was unlikely, and that, “they 
[Russians] have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total 
destruction of rival power, never in compacts or compromises with it.”4 
Since 1946 both Stalin’s speech and Kennan’s telegram have been criticized in 
various circles. Some Western scholars have argued the Truman Administration’s 
response to Stalin’s speech was excessive and misunderstood. Stalin, in their view, was 
speaking purely to a local audience and did not intend to antagonize the West.  Kennan’s 
telegram, in contrast, has been criticized for its harsh rhetoric and outsized influence on 
U.S. foreign policy.  Kennan himself later likened the telegram to something akin to 
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, less for its immortal language but more for its 
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provocative call to arms. Yet none can deny that both documents, especially Kennan’s, 
played an enormous role in framing the early Cold War.  As Truman biographer Robert 
J. Donovan summarizes, Kennan’s words, “aroused Washington indeed and set a pattern 
then and for years to come for official American thinking about the Soviet problem.” 
One of those most enthralled was James Forrestal, who pounced on Kennan’s telegram 
with enormous satisfaction. The Navy Secretary made the telegram required reading for 
his department and touted its insight into the dangers of Soviet communism.5 
The U.S. Marines and the Marshall Mission: January – June 1946 
Against this grim backdrop General George Marshall continued to bring a 
measure of peace to China. A detailed analysis of the Marshall Mission is beyond the 
scope of this study, as the effort has come under the scrutiny of numerous scholars, 
several of whom have written excellent studies on the complex and nuanced diplomacy 
undertaken to achieve peace.6 One of the best recent analyses of Marshall’s noble failure 
is Harold Tanner’s study of the Chinese Civil War in Manchuria. As he argues that 
Marshall’s efforts, noble and well-meaning as they were, “were most significant not for 
any success in achieving peace, but for establishing the framework within which the war 
5	  Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948 (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1977): 188-189.	  6	  See: John Robinson Beal, Marshall in China. Toronto: Doubleday Press, 1970. Larry I. Bland, Roger B. 
Jeans, and Mark Wilkinson, eds., George C. Marshall’s Meditation Mission to China, December 1945-
January 1947. Lexington, VA:  George C. Marshall Foundation, 1998. 
Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman. Volume 4: 1945-1959. New York: Viking Press, 1987. 
	   178 
would be fought.”7  Both sides used the negotiations to their advantage, playing for time 
at various stages and alternately attempting to win final victory on the battlefield. 
 Despite Marshall’s best efforts full scale war between the Nationalists and 
Communists resumed in the spring of 1946. The Chinese Civil War of 1946-1949, much 
like the painful and disastrous American intervention in Vietnam twenty years later, had 
no precise time or place of origin. In the months after the Japanese surrender fighting 
between the Nationalists and Communists resumed as it had before 1937. But unlike the 
war against Japan or many other civil wars of the past century, the Chinese Civil War 
did not visit death and destruction on the scale of the previous conflict. Although many 
lives were lost, the war involved only a fraction of China’s teeming millions.  Most 
Chinese were not interested in ideology and merely tried to survive. In the words of 
Norwegian historian Odd Arne Westad, “The great majority of the population were 
passive onlookers, doing their best to stay out of harm’s way in the cataclysm that 
engulfed the country.”8 
 For a few short months, however, it seemed that the long feared and predicted 
civil war might not happen. February 1946 marked the high point of optimism for 
American policymakers dealing with China. For a few brief moments Marshall’s peace 
mission seem to have a chance at success.  Shortly after Marshall arrived in China on 
December 20th 1945, officials of the Nationalist government suggested formation of a 
tripartite committee to serve as a forum for peace discussions.  Marshall endorsed the 
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idea and Mao accepted the proposal.  On January 7th, 1946 the Committee of Three met 
for the first time. Composed of Zhou Enlai, and Nationalist General Zhang Qun, the 
governor of Sichuan Province and a close ally of Chiang, and Marshall as its chair, the 
committee agreed to a ceasefire on January 10th and an end to troop movements to take 
effect on January 18th.  On January 11th the Nationalists and Communists jointly issued 
Cease Fire Order No. 1, the text of which was contained in the three hundred thousand 
leaflets dropped over the North China countryside by planes of the 1st Marine Air Wing. 
Despite minor skirmishes the cease fire proved remarkably durable for a few precious 
weeks.9      
Marshall’s other major success was the establishment of Executive Headquarters, 
the formal name for the team of American-led negotiators. With a bureaucracy that grew 
exponentially in a few months, the headquarters was housed in the sprawling Peking 
Union Medical College in Beijing and was designed to facilitate real discussion between 
the Nationalists and Communists.10  Despite the incalculable obstacles remaining these 
were a remarkable series of achievements. As China historian Jay Taylor rightly 
summarizes, “In only a few meetings in early January, the Committee of Three 
astonishingly reached an accord on military integration and a coalition government as 
well as a cease-fire, all with terms that favored the [Nationalist] government.”11 
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But the renewed optimism soon came crashing down. Marshall himself was a 
catalyst for this breakdown. In early March he conducted a 3,000-mile air tour of many 
of the contested areas of North China and Manchuria and met personally with Mao 
Zedong in Yanan. In a dispatch sent to President Truman he described the CCP leader as 
friendly and helpful, and reported that “my reception everywhere was enthusiastic and in 
the cities extreme.”12 Flush with confidence and needing to update Truman personally as 
well as to visit his long separated family, Marshall then returned to the United States on 
March 14th.  At a press conference in Washington he argued that considerable strides 
were being made in China, and that the support of the world community was essential to 
any lasting peace.  Calling the Executive Headquarters, “the most important instrument 
we have in China,” Marshall outlined the progress made since December. In a message 
to the Soviet Union and other Asian nations he proclaimed, “I do not believe any nation 
can find justification for suspicion in our motives in China.  We are asking for no special 
preferences of any kind whatsoever regarding economic or similar matters.  We are 
placing no price on our friendship.”13  
Marshall’s optimism was unfounded.  Agreeing to a ceasefire did not stop 
Chiang from ordering his forces to continue their advance into southern Manchuria, as 
Communist forces withdrew northwards. The Nationalists entered Mukden on January 
15th. Soon afterwards the cease fire effectively collapsed, and at heavy cost Communist 
general Lin Biao resisted the Nationalist advance north of the former territorial capital.14  	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In early April, the Communists shifted to launch a counter offensive and captured the 
lightly defended northern Manchurian city of Changchun, the capital of the Japanese 
puppet state Manchukuo.  After months of alternating combat and diplomacy a true civil 
war had returned to China in unrelenting intensity.15    
 The long awaited Soviet withdrawal was another trigger for the collapse of the 
cease fire.  As had been their practice ever since their forces had set foot in Manchuria, 
when pressed by Chiang or T.V. Soong on their planned February withdrawal the 
Soviets had delayed, and delayed.  Marshall’s frustration on the subject boiled over in a 
detailed letter to Truman on February 9th.  Revealing that the Soviets had “informally” 
demanded half future ownership of Manchurian industry, Marshall argued that the 
longer Red Army troops remained in Manchuria the more the Soviet Union would be 
seen as in violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty.  International pressure was mounting 
against the Soviets’ continued occupation of Manchuria, and Marshall recommended 
that Truman inform Stalin that the United States would substantially decrease the 
number of Marines in China (something Truman had already decided to do, but not yet 
made public), as soon as Russian troops left China.16 
 Chiang’s decision to mount a rapid northern offensive against the Communists 
had cost the generalissimo much goodwill with his American allies.  Of this action Jay 
Taylor concludes that the Nationalist leader was overcome by a form of victory fever, 
writing, “Chiang realized that the support of Truman and Marshall for his takeover of 
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Manchuria, once strong and clear, had evaporated, but military successes had blinded 
him to the reality that he had foreseen the previous July and then again at the end of the 
year.”17 And despite their early victories in Manchuria the Nationalists’ position was 
precarious.  Li Zongren, one of Chiang’s top generals, felt that the early Nationalist 
victories would prove short lived. Morale among the enlisted ranks was generally low, 
and despite the presence of American trained generals, leadership was poor. A unified, 
grand strategy among the Nationalist military leadership was completely absent.  Instead 
of coordinating amongst themselves the army commanders in Manchuria each reported 
directly to Chiang, often filling their reports with recriminations against their fellow 
generals.  As Li and Marshall predicted, Nationalist victories would prove ephemeral.18      
In the Spring of 1946 Soviet occupation of Manchuria had outlived its 
usefulness. With the winter over and their mass scavenging complete Red Army units 
withdrew to the north and west in March and early April, leaving behind a shattered, 
bereft province stripped of nearly all industry but littered with weapons and ammunition. 
The withdrawal had two primary consequences. It opened the door for the Nationalists to 
finally commence their long anticipated conquest of Manchuria, yet the delay had also 
given considerable time to the Communists. An ancient axiom in war is that space can 
be regained if lost, but not time. The Soviet occupation had given the CCP the time it 
needed to consolidate its position in Manchuria. As Ronald Spector has concluded, “For 
the Communists, Manchuria had become the keystone of their power.  They had been 
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forced to yield many areas in central and northern China to the Nationalists, but in 
Manchuria, the Russian occupation, which delayed and obstructed the arrival of the 
Nationalist forces, had given the Communists the opportunity to expand.”19   
Aside from these twin results a secondary consequence was renewed political 
pressure on President Harry Truman to withdraw all Marines from China.  The gradual 
drawdown of the China Marines in 1946 was the result of a compromise among Army 
and Navy leaders. The American public overwhelmingly wanted its fathers, sons, and 
brothers home from overseas, but time and time again both Admiral Cooke and James 
Forrestal emphasized their importance in stabilizing China and providing a buffer 
against Soviet expansion in the Cold War.  Marshall himself recognized the importance 
of the Marines’ presence in China but for political reasons continued to minimize any 
public mention of the Marines, as their presence was viewed negatively by the 
Communists and the subject of increasingly vitriolic propaganda.  He continued 
supporting to order a phased withdrawal throughout the year.  Faced with overwhelming 
public demand and Marshall’s insistence both Cooke and James Forrestal took the 
drawdown in stride but quietly emphasized the symbolic importance of the Marines 
remaining in China whenever an opportunity arose. 
The various agreements negotiated by George Marshall in China have received 
the lion’s share of attention from historians. Far less attention has been focused on just 
what the Marines were doing during the roughly year-long Marshall mission, a time 
during which the Marine Corps was significantly reduced in size.  At its peak of 485,053 	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in August 1945 the Corps was reduced to just over 155,000 officers and men a year 
later.20  By June 1947 the Marines had been further reduced to total of 92,000 
personnel.21    
  As American diplomatic efforts continued throughout the year the Marines 
found themselves in the middle of an expanding civil war.  The 1st and 6th Marines had 
become increasingly vulnerable, not officially part of a war but not quite a peaceful 
occupation force. This was the paradox that confronted Major General Keller Rockey as 
he sought to fulfill his objectives yet keep his men safe. 
As the new year opened, the mission of the China Marines changed. By the end 
of 1945 more than 90,000 Nationalist troops had reached North China, giving Chiang 
sufficient manpower for the repatriation of Japanese military and civilian personnel. On 
January 14 the GMD assumed responsibility for getting the remaining 300,000 Japanese 
prisoners of war and civilians to Qingdao where they would be turned over to the 
Americans for embarkation and transport to Japan.  Thus by February of 1946 the 
objectives General Albert Wedemeyer had identified six months earlier—the movement 
of Nationalist armies by sea, the repatriation of Japanese soldiers and civilians, and the 
stabilization of order—had largely been accomplished.22 What remained for the Marines 
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to do?  And what role did they continue to play in the increasingly difficult American 
effort to bring peace? 
During January the 1st Marine Division remained billeted in Qingdao while the 
6th Division was spread over locations in Beijing, Tianjin, Tangku, and Qingwandao. 
Marines from both divisions continued guarding railways, key roads and bridges.  Small 
scale incidents such as sniper attacks by Chinese Communists continued. On January 5th 
a fire of suspicious origins destroyed a Marine barracks at Nan Yuan airfield near 
Beijing, while a week later a company of Marines guarding a railway station came under 
fire from an unidentified group of men.  Neither incident resulted in any casualties, but 
they served as a reminder of the tenuous nature of the cease-fire agreement established 
in January.23 
 1st Division Marines continued guarding of coal trains running from the Kailan 
mines around Tangshan to Tianjin where the fuel was transported by ship to Shanghai 
and Guanghzhou.  This had been a priority since October when Chiang had written to 
President Truman that the lack of coal in the southern cities would be disastrous during 
the coming winter, warning that, “No coal is available for domestic use. Unless coal can 
be supplied, tragic consequences will result.”24  Since November the Kalian coal mines 
had been producing 5,000 tons of coal per day and four daily trains carrying the coal to 
Qingwandao had been guarded by Marine detachments.  Commercial shipping had been 
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allocated by General Wedemeyer to transport the coal to Shanghai, and this system 
continued throughout the long winter.25 
 Despite their longing for home many of the Marines enjoyed their days and 
nights in China. Some gathered large caches of cheap wares after shopping in Beijing, 
while other brought back more persistent souvenirs.  Numerous prostitutes, especially 
young Chinese girls who had been sold by their families due to their inability to feed 
them, plied their trade in Qingdao, and venereal diseases were rampant.  A February 
1946 health report listed the number of infected Marines in the Tianjin area (1st Marine 
Division), including the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments and the 1st Air Wing, as 308, for 
an annual rate of 225 per 1000. The reduced 6th Division in Qingdao fared somewhat 
better, with a rate of 116 per 1000. The report noted that rates had come down since a 
peak in December, due to a sustained “prophylaxis campaign.”26   
 By the end of 1945, time in China had lost its appeal to many Marines and going 
home was foremost on their minds. The point system, a complex computation of service 
time, combat duty and awards, ensured that most of the III MEF Marines would be sent 
home within a few months. But for many of the veterans of Okinawa the day could not 
come soon enough.  Eugene Sledge, who would finally ship home to Alabama in 
February 1946, recalled a rare moment when even the legendary discipline of the 1st 
Marine Division began to fray. In early January reports circulated in Sledge’s 5th 
Regiment that noncombat personnel were being shipped home before combat veterans. 
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To dispel such rumors, a Marine major briefed the men on the situation in North China 
and when they would be sent home. After explaining that their departure would be 
strictly according to the point system, some of the 5th Marines present asked about the 
rumors regarding non-combat personnel and angrily protested that this was unfair and 
that as combat veterans they should have priority.  The major warned the young enlisted 
Marines that they were coming dangerously close to insubordination, but that they would 
also be sent home as soon as possible. The frustrated Marines left and as Sledge 
described it, “beat their gums elsewhere.”27      
Aside from their operational duties the III MEF Marines spent much of their 
energies during the first half of 1946 reorganizing.  The 6th Marine Division sent most its 
personnel home by January 1946 and was deactivated on March 31.  By early June the 
fewer than 25,000 personnel remaining in China became the newly established Marine 
Forces, China. Headquartered in Qingdao, the new command included the 1st Marine 
Aircraft Wing and the reinforced 1st Marine Division.28  Fresh arrivals from the United 
States also complicated matters.  By early 1946 most of the 1st Division Marines who 
had seen action in Okinawa had accumulated enough points to return home, and, with 
their departure, nearly one-quarter of all Marines in the division were fresh from boot 
camp or commissioning programs.  The 6th Division also received a similar number of 
green recruits. General Keller Rockey and other senior Marines in China recognized the 
need for a thorough training plan for the new Marines. On February 1st a comprehensive, 
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six-month training program was begun that included sessions on Chinese culture and 
customs, hygiene, and the standard drill and rifle practice.29 Many of the veteran 
Marines resented the inexperienced but often arrogant new officers and NCO’s who 
arrived in China, but hid their disgust until finally shipped home.30              
Although ground operations were the mainstay of the China Marines, the 1st 
Marine Air Wing played an important, if secondary role in China. Writing to General 
Alexander Vandegrift, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Rockey listed the 
wing’s accomplishments: over 7,500 sorties and 14,000 hours flown, along with the 
transport of over 2 million pounds of mail and cargo and 17,000 passengers between 
October 1945 and June 1946.31  Most of these flights went by unnoticed by the Chinese 
population, but on other occasions this was not the case. A tragic incident took place in 
the spring of 1946 when a Marine TBF Avenger on patrol suffered engine failure, and 
was forced to crash land on an open field. To the pilot’s horror he saw an elderly 
Chinese woman and her granddaughter directly in his path, and without engine power he 
was helpless to change course. At the last second the grandmother pushed the child out 
of the way, but for some reason she ran directly in front of the aircraft, and was 
decapitated by the aircraft’s wing.  The pilot’s commanding officer paid for the funeral 
expenses out of his own pocket.32 
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 When the Marines arrived in North China in the fall of 1945 they were greeted as 
liberating heroes. Yet less than a year later many Chinese no longer viewed them that 
way. Incidents such as the grandmother’s death fueled a growing divide between the 
Chinese civilian population and the Marines. Patience with the Marines’ drunkenness 
and habitual patronization of prostitutes had grown thin in Beijing and Tianjin, and by 
early 1947 some polls conducted by local newspapers indicated overwhelming support 
for withdrawal.  The behavior of the Americans reminded many older Chinese of the 
days of extraterritoriality when foreigners could do as they pleased. As the United States 
would discover in the decades to come, a fuzzy, amorphous line exists between the 
perception of foreign troops as being an army of liberation and that of occupation.33  
   The growing distrust of the Marines was mirrored by the worsening political and 
military situation. Many outside observers viewed the situation as spiraling downwards. 
One American reporter in China observed that the optimism felt in previous months had 
faded, writing, “Most of the high hopes for China’s unity and peace that people here in 
Beijing felt in January and February have collapsed.  Most of the really extraordinary 
agreements that were reached in the winter months have been undermined.”34  As 
inflation wrecked the Chinese economy, hardships among the Chinese population 
worsened. After weeks of increasingly difficult negotiations General Marshall paused on 
May 30th to pay respects at the small Foreign Cemetery at Nanjing. In an impassioned 
Memorial Day speech he recalled the sacrifice of so many Chinese and American lives 
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in the victory over Japan. He also spoke of his increasingly difficult efforts to bring 
reconciliation to China. He made no mention of the Marines, but focused on America’s 
broader effort with these words: “Here, today, in China we are trying to help, to be of 
genuine unselfish assistance, without price or promise.  We are doing our best to halt the 
development of one of the tragic situations of history, to terminate violent civil strife 
among a people who have already endured eight long years of war, and on whose soil 
the great war started. It seems the irony of fate that the people who have endured the 
longest should see peace restored to the rest of the world while they themselves continue 
to suffer and starve in war-ridden surroundings and who now tremble on the verge of an 
even great calamity.  This must not be.”35 
 June brought many changes to the U.S. diplomatic effort in China. During the 
first week of the month George Marshall had negotiated a new and fragile truce that 
went into effect on June 7th and would expire on the 29th.36  Despite this development, 
however, matters had become worse. Negotiations had become all but impossible, and 
the general confided to Truman that, “at the present moment we have reached an 
impasse.”  The upswing of fighting in Jehol Province and the level of distrust between 
the Nationalists and Communists was higher than ever.37  Still, Marshall hoped that a 
settlement was possible.  The overworked general had long considered adding an 
experienced ambassador to assist in the conduct of negotiations. For several months 
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General Albert Wedemeyer had been considered the top candidate for the position.  
Since December the younger general had overseen the drawdown of U.S. Army 
personnel in China and had assisted Marshall in his mediation efforts, but after Patrick 
Hurley’s resignation back on November 27th, 1945 Wedemeyer’s name was mentioned 
in Washington as a possible replacement.  Despite being an unorthodox choice, Marshall 
trusted Wedemeyer’s experience and judgment on China.  Although he made it clear to 
Marshall that he preferred to stay in the Army, Wedemeyer agreed to the possibility of 
such a post as a matter of duty. As he was due for leave Marshall urged him to return 
home and discuss the matter with his family.38   
Although he publicly supported Marshall at the time, privately Wedemeyer had 
considerable doubts about Marshall’s policies and plans for China.  The general and 
protégé of Marshall would never admit it until later in life, but Wedemeyer had largely 
moved into the camp of Admiral Cooke and James Forrestal, that of fierce opposition to 
world communism and the belief that the CCP received its orders from Moscow.  In his 
memoirs Wedemeyer states that by the middle of 1946 he had largely fallen out with 
George Marshall’s view, recalling that, “Although General Marshall had recommended 
my appointment as Ambassador to China, I felt certain that his concept of what 
American policy should be was not mine.  As with Pat Hurley the year before, I knew 
that there was no possibility of an accommodation between the Nationalists and the 
Chinese Communists controlled by the Kremlin.”39  But for the time being Wedemeyer 
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largely kept his concerns to himself, until he would be later called upon to give a frank 
and honest assessment of the situation in China, an assessment that when received the 
Truman Administration chose to hide from the public.       
Wedemeyer returned to the United States in April, and after a few weeks 
recovering from sinus surgery was approached again about the possibility of resigning 
from the Army to become the new U.S. ambassador to China.40  When the offer of the 
position to Wedemeyer became known, Mao and Zhou Enlai objected to someone so 
close to Chiang Kai-shek becoming the new American ambassador, and as a concession 
Marshall was forced to drop the idea.  Publicly Wedemeyer had been more than happy to 
serve Marshall again, and only regretted that he had already purchased a large selection 
of expensive business suits for his potential new post.41  Privately, however, Wedemeyer 
was less concerned about his clothing expenses than that the CCP could exercise a veto 
over whom the United States chose as its next ambassador.42 
In his biography of Wedemeyer, John McLaughlin argues that whatever his 
disagreements with the younger general, “Marshall’s military training dictated that the 
mission was more important than any individual.  It is unlikely it was based on any 
personal animosity towards Wedemeyer.”43 Yet the political gulf between the two men 
remained. Withdrawal of the offer made clear that Marshall would abandon a man who 
had once worked for him and worn the same uniform, if it helped smooth over relations 
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with the Communists. Marshall would later write to Wedemeyer that he regretted how 
things had turned out and expressed his sincere apologies. His letter closed, “Each day 
out there is a little more difficult than the last one, but we are still in the ring and 
hopeful.”44 In his memoirs Wedemeyer had harsh words for Marshall on the matter. 
Angry at his superior caving into Communist pressure, Wedemeyer argued that in the 
course of his efforts in China Marshall believed too much in his own power, and 
consequently, “thought he could accomplish the impossible.  Thus he became an easy 
prey to crypto-Communists, or Communist-sympathizing sycophants, who played on his 
vanity to accomplish their own ends.”  As Wedemeyer had warned him back in 
December 1945, the Nationalists and Communists were a combination that simply 
would not mix.45   
 In place of Wedemeyer, Marshall sought an individual who he believed would be 
accepted by both sides.  On July 4th, 1946, Dr. John Leighton Stuart was announced as 
the new U.S. ambassador to China.  The son of American missionaries, Stuart had spent 
most of his life in his beloved China and was a well-respected authority on Asia as well 
as a scholar and administrator. In 1919 he became president of Yenching University near 
Beijing, and spent most of the war under Japanese house arrest.46  Due to his age (he was 
70 in 1946) and health concerns Stuart initially expressed reservations about serving as 
ambassador, but on reflection agreed to a year’s service. In his memoirs Stuart explained 
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that “I finally told [Marshall], however, that his task was so difficult and so significant 
that anyone he wanted to help him should be willing to do so and that I would leave it 
with him.” Stuart was unanimously approved by the U.S. Senate shortly thereafter.47 
Like Marshall, Stuart realized the thankless role he would play in an all but 
impossible task. Yet despite his age he took up his new post with powerful energy. 
Throughout the long summer of 1946 he felt reconciliation between the two parties 
might be possible, and that a lasting peace might be within reach.  But then the optimism 
collapsed. In Stuart’s view both sides were to blame, writing that, “But in each the 
suspicions or fears of one side or the other as well as the conflicting aims or ideologies 
were the chief obstructions.  Whatever their motives the evidence seemed to me 
convincing that the Communists wanted the coalition but only on their terms.”48  
Marshall and Stuart worked well together, but by early July they were faced with harsh 
obduracy on both sides, coupled with a vicious Communist propaganda campaign 
directed against the United States. 
Combat, Drawdown, and Dishonor: July–December 1946 
For the Marines in China the month of July became the deadliest of the year. 
Although sniper attacks and harassment from the Communists were commonplace 
throughout the first half of 1946, two major incidents in July were by far the most 
serious.  The first was precipitated by a desire to stay cool in the midst of a long, hot 
47	  John Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years in China (New York: Random House, 1954): 165-166	  48	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summer.  On July 13th, with daily temperatures often as high as 92 degrees Fahrenheit,49 
Sergeant John J. Herndon of the 1st Marine Division requested permission to assemble a 
working party to go to the nearby village of Hsi Ho Nan and purchase blocks of ice. 
Marines had done this is the past so his commanding officer, 2nd Lieutenant Daryl 
McKinney, approved the request, and Herndon gathered a squad of seven Marines for 
the work detail. Also accompanying them was a Chinese boy who acted as an 
interpreter.50  
 The Marines were not especially concerned about encountering any Communists, 
as none had been reported in Hsi Ho Nan the entire summer. As a precaution they were 
armed with rifles and carbines and ordered to return well before sunset. Lieutenant 
McKinney also ordered Herndon to exercise caution and warned him to be wary of any 
Communist soldiers he might encounter. After a two-mile drive in the detachment jeep, 
the party arrived at the ice house without incident, paid for more than a hundred pounds 
of ice, and began loading it into their trailer. Two of the Marines were stationed as 
lookouts while the remainder worked loading the ice. Little to no trouble was expected.51  
The situation quickly changed a few minutes later when four unidentified 
Chinese began walking towards the Marines. Upon being challenged the four were 
immediately joined by more than eighty other Chinese wearing dark blue uniforms and 
carrying Japanese Ariska rifles. The Chinese soon rushed toward the Marines firing 
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several warning shots over their heads. With no other option, Sergeant Herndon ordered 
the detail to surrender. Seven of the Marines were forced by their new captors to march 
four to five miles.  A single Marine, Private First Class John Mahoney, avoided capture 
along with the Chinese boy interpreter by hiding inside the ice house, which the 
Communists failed to search.  After the Communists departed fifteen minutes later 
Mahoney ran back to the Marine encampment at Liu Shiu Leng and informed Lieutenant 
McKinney of the situation.52  A twenty-man patrol immediately set out for the ice house 
where they found only the jeep and trailer.  Further searches that included CNA (Chinese 
Nationalist Army) troops also failed to find any trace of the Marines.53 Extensive ground 
and air patrols conducted over the next few days were also fruitless.54 
For the next ten days the location and condition of the seven Marines remained 
uncertain.  U.S. intelligence reports indicated that the Marines were probably alive and 
well in Communist hands and being held in the vicinity of Tsun Hua, a city northwest of 
Beidaihe.55 Other unconfirmed reports had them being moved south. General Rockey 
and Admiral Cooke concurred that the only way to get the men back was through 
negotiations, and a series of meetings were held during the next week between 
representatives from the Communists, Nationalists, and Marines. At a news conference 
held on July 20th, the CCP representative unleashed a diatribe of grievances against the 
Marines, most notably their support of the Nationalists and their guarding of key 
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railways and bridges. He did reveal that the missing Marines were safe.  After additional 
discussions with the Communists the Marines were finally freed on July 24th.  They 
reported that other than being bombarded with constant Marxist-Leninist propaganda 
they were treated well.56  The negotiations revealed that the capture of the Marines had 
been orchestrated by the local communist commander, and had not been sanctioned by 
senior CCP officials.57   
Far more lethal was the “Anping incident” that occurred on July 29th when a 
convoy of was attacked on the road from Tianjin to Beijing.  Carrying United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) supplies, the convoy consisted of six 
supply trucks, five jeeps, and two Army staff cars manned by 42 enlisted Marines under 
the command of Lieutenant Douglas A. Cowin.58 Near the village of Anping the convoy 
halted at a roadblock where it was attacked by approximately one hundred unidentified 
men wearing dark blue uniforms. Though caught by surprise the Marines responded with 
highly accurate rifle and mortar fire, and for the next four hours defended the convoy at 
the cost of three Marines, including the convoy commander, killed and eleven wounded.  
The unidentified Chinese eventually withdrew, leaving behind fifteen corpses.59  The 
Marines then loaded their dead and wounded into the trucks and drove at top speed to 
Beijing, where another Marine later died of his wounds.60 An air-supported relief 
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column was quickly mustered and moved out from Tianjin to assist and hunt down the 
Communists but they arrived too late to be of any use.61 
In contrast to the capture of the seven Marines and the sporadic sniper attacks the 
previous fall, the “Battle of Anping” was, from the American perspective, a deliberate 
and unprovoked ambush by Communist soldiers on a Marine force engaged in 
noncombatant humanitarian operations.  The incident provoked considerable interest in 
the United States, including an article in Time magazine.  The growing call for all 
Marines to be withdrawn from China intensified after Anping.  Two U.S. Senators, Allen 
Ellender (D-LA) and Hugh Butler (R-NE) had just returned from a trip to Asia and saw 
the situation in darkly pessimistic tones. Ellender described China as “hopeless” and the 
nation a complex patchwork of warring factions unready for any form of stable 
democracy.  Butler agreed, adding that, “we are not at war with China or any faction 
there and I wish someone could explain why our troops are there.”62        
In the controversial aftermath of the attack, Zhou Enlai told Marshall that the 
Marines themselves were largely to blame, as they should not have been on the road to 
Beijing in the first place.  Admiral Cooke took the lead in defending the Marines from 
Zhou and other Communist leaders.  At a press conference in Shanghai on August 5th, 
Cooke laid out his case: the Marines were operating lawfully to transport UNRRA 
supplies and were not provoking the Communists in any way. Instead they were 
deliberately attacked.  Cooke described the incident in detail, providing maps and 
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diagrams of the tactical situation, the roadblock, and the ambush. Responding to the 
concerns from Ellender and Butler he dismissed any suggestions that the Marines be 
withdrawn from China, contending that they were in China at the authorization of both 
Congress and the president, and that their presence remained important for stability.63 
If possible, the Anping incident put Marshall in an even more difficult position 
and strained his relationship with Cooke. The dead Marines were under Seventh Fleet 
command, and though subordinate to Marshall by rank Cooke urged the general to press 
Zhou and the Communists for a formal apology.  Consumed with frustration Marshall 
informed Cooke that he felt he had no choice but to defer any such demand, in light of 
his continuing efforts to negotiate. In an August 12th letter Marshall sympathized with 
Cooke’s position but said that asking Zhou for an apology would lead the Communists 
to break off negotiations.  Marshall wrote that, “Delicacy and embarrassment of situation 
for me is this: [Nationalist] government profits by delay and growing antagonism 
between Americans and Communists.  Rupture would completely defeat my effort to 
secure government agreement for cessation of hostilities and action to terminate present 
suppression of freedom of press and speech and positive steps for reorganization of 
present arbitrary and concentrated authority of Guomindang Party.” He also pointed out 
that, if provoked by a request for an apology, the Communists would likely withdraw 
from the Executive Headquarters.  Demanding an apology could also complicate 
diplomacy with the Soviets. He did, however, authorize Cooke to speak with the press 
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on the Anping incident if he so choose.64  Though not the final straw, the aftermath of 
American deaths at the hands of the Communists served to push Marshall further away 
from belief in the possibility of a negotiated settlement. 
Further problems developed when on August 12th a small band of Communist 
Chinese attacked a key ammunition dump at Hsin Ho.65  No deaths or casualties 
resulted, but, combined with the incident at Anping, nearly pushed Marshall into the 
same camp as Cooke and Forrestal. Writing to Truman on the admiral’s strongly worded 
request for an apology, Marshall said that he was tempted to do so himself, but such an 
act would effectively end his mediation efforts and destroy the Executive 
Headquarters.66  Marshall wrote to Truman again on August 30th that the situation 
continued to worsen, stating that, “The general situation is this: both sides claim the 
other side is leading and pressing the fighting. Both claim the negotiations are being 
utilized by the other side to gain time for favorable military operations.” He continued 
by noting the marked increase in communist anti-Nationalist efforts, both direct and 
indirect: “The communists have practically reached the conclusion that the government 
does not intend to settle matters peaceably and is deliberately pursuing a policy of force. 
Therefore they are striking as heavy military blows as possible to discourage the 
government against a policy of force.  Also they are seeking by intense propaganda and 
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any other means available to terminate all American assistance to the Government which 
they claim is making possible the latter’s military effort.”67 
After the Anping incident reductions in the number of Marines in China 
continued.  What remained of the 4th Marines were ordered to return to the United States 
and Marine forces in Qingdao reduced to a reinforced infantry battalion. Between 
August and September the Nationalists assumed responsibility for guarding the coal 
fields at Tangshan and rail lines between Beijing and Qingwandao.68 Nearly all 1st 
Division Marines were withdrawn from outlying areas until, by the end of September, all 
Marines were concentrated in Beijing, Tianjin, and Qingdao.  General Keller Rockey, 
who had led the III MEF since its landing in September 1945, left China on September 
18th.  Although Forrestal made some protests about the manner of the withdrawals he 
largely acquiesced to Marshall’s directives.  Despite these withdrawals the Marines were 
still exposed to Communists attacks, as on the night of October 3rd when a small force of 
Communist soldiers attacked the Hsin Ho ammunition dump a second time to steal 
munitions. One Marine from the 5th Regiment, 1st Division was wounded, but the attack 
yielded little for the Communists, who lost one soldier killed and got away with very 
little ammunition.69        
The same month Marshall ran out of patience. Like so many others who went to 
China to achieve an objective, the country and its contradictions defeated him.  After a 
series of discussions with Chiang on the current fighting in Manchuria and the failures of 	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the most recent round of negotiations within the Executive Headquarters, Marshall asked 
Truman to  be recalled.70  He remained in China until the end of the year, however, and 
at his final meeting with Chiang in late December the generalissimo praised Marshall’s 
efforts and  said that he hoped that in his future capacity Marshall would direct his 
efforts towards better relations with a China under his leadership. The departing general 
had a very different set of recommendations for Truman, however. Marshall informed 
Truman that he believed any further attempts to mediate an end to the civil war in China 
were doomed to fail and urged the President to withdraw all remaining Marines from 
Beijing and Tianjin.  He also predicted that the Communists had no intention of 
restarting negotiations with the Nationalists and that the ultimate outcome of the civil 
war would be decided on the battlefield.71   
 Attempting to put an annus horribilis of foreign policy disasters in Europe, Asia, 
and at home behind him, Truman forced the overly independent Secretary of State James 
Byrnes to resign and appointed Marshall to replace him. 72 A contemporary assessment 
of Marshall’s mission to China concluded that, “For the year 1946, [Marshall was] the 
central figure of all Chinese politics.  Parties, programs, proposals – all these centered 
around his name and personality.  His fairness, judgment, and experience kept alive the 
illusion of hope long after the practical basis for settlement disappeared.”73 
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Almost a year to the day after he had issued his first statement on American 
policy in China, Harry Truman announced to the world that despite the great 
disappointment of the past year, the United States was not quite finished in China. After 
recounting the great difficulties of Japanese repatriation, the early successes of 
Marshall’s mediation, and the repeated breakdowns of the cease fire in Manchuria, 
Truman spoke in measured but grateful tones about the Marines in China. Though never 
referring to the Marines by name, the president stated that the American military had 
performed vital tasks in China during the past fifteen months, and, their mission 
complete, that they would be withdrawn from China as quickly as logistically possible.  
Almost, but not quite washing his hands of the matter, Truman concluded, “It is a matter 
of deep regret that China has not yet been able to achieve unity by peaceful methods.”  
Reiterating that China was a sovereign nation, Truman urged both Chiang and Mao to 
settle their differences peacefully  
As the winter closed in the Marines received another hammer blow. This one, 
however, was self-inflicted.  On Christmas Eve two U.S. Marines were arrested in 
Beijing for the rape of a Chinese girl.  Nineteen-year old university student Shen Chong 
was walking alone through the diplomatic quarter at night when two Marines, Corporal 
William Pierson and Private Warren Pritchard, assaulted her.  Apparently drunk, the 
Marines dragged the girl to a deserted polo field nearby where Pierson raped her. 
Afterwards Pierson was detained by a Sino-American police patrol and Shen taken in for 
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questioning and medical tests.74 News of the assault spread rapidly through Beijing and 
by the morning of December 26th five local newspapers carried stories about the 
assault.75 
Although sexual assaults by U.S. military personnel in Asia were nothing new, 
this act aroused a fury of protest in North China.  Thousands of students in Beijing 
demonstrated against the presence of the Marines and the Executive Headquarters. On 
January 2nd, 1947 over a thousand students demonstrated at the U.S. embassy. One 
student leader delivered a letter to Ambassador Stuart demanding that the Marines 
involved in the rape be punished immediately, an indemnity be paid to Shen Chong and 
her family, and all U.S. military personnel be withdrawn from China.76 Although a court 
martial soon convicted Corporal Pierson and sentenced him to fifteen years in prison, the 
verdict was overturned by the Navy Judge Advocate General in July and quietly 
approved by James Forrestal in August. No explanation for this was ever provided.  In 
his study of the rape case historian Robert Schaffer argues that, “The scheduling of the 
case before an American military court rather than a Chinese court, as well as U.S. 
efforts to limit the attendance of Chinese reporters at the court martial, revived painful 
memories of the ‘extraterritoriality’ that the imperialist powers had long imposed on 
China and that the United States had only recently renounced.”77 The rape and 
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subsequent court martial undermined any goodwill the Chinese population had for the 
United States, and became a powerful propaganda weapon for the Communists in the 
new year. 
1947: Drawdown and Deadlock 
In the aftermath of the rape in Beijing the remaining Marines in China were 
largely forgotten by the outside world. The major American newspapers that had written 
about their mission since September of 1945 ignored their reduced role. Their growing 
isolation and dwindling numbers made them less of a story. Yet back in Washington the 
divide between U.S. Navy leadership and that of the Army and State Department was 
only growing wider. After Marshall’s departure from China and elevation to Secretary of 
State his new department became the primary opponent to Forrestal and Cooke’s efforts 
to keep the Navy and Marines in China.   
Recognizing the need to improve relations with the Chinese, the 1st Marine 
Division published a “Welcome Aboard” pamphlet designed to introduce newly arriving 
Marines to basic information about Chinese culture and politics.  First distributed in 
December 1946, the thirty-page pamphlet opened with a drily written history of China 
since 1900 that focused on the Boxer Rebellion, the Chinese Revolution, and the rise of 
Chiang Kai-shek. The pamphlet was very sympathetic towards the Nationalists and their 
struggles since the 1920s, but also remarkably frank in its treatment of the Communists. 
The section on the CCP pointed out the strengths of its ideology and warning readers 
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that, “Chinese communism has an attraction for the masses; if democracy is to win in 
China it must be more attractive.”78 
 A typical Marine in Qingdao reading these words in early 1947 had to wonder 
why he and his fellow leathernecks were still in China. The military situation there was 
growing worse and the diplomatic efforts to heal the fractured country had failed. Only 
one year earlier more than 50,000 Marines had labored to complete a series of complex 
and pragmatic tasks made necessary by victory in history’s greatest war. Now reduced to 
about one-third of their previous number, few of the remaining Marines in China likely 
felt that their presence was not apt to have any effect on China. But despite the 
deteriorating situation the Marines were not finished yet. More than two years would 
pass before their eventual departure from China.     
 Perhaps because of the absence of George Marshall, Admiral Cooke became 
bolder in his efforts to emphasize the importance of the Navy and Marines’ role in China 
and save what was left of China from falling into the Soviet camp.  Russian aggression 
in Greece and Turkey made Cooke even more strident in his anti-communist views.  
During a February 1947 visit to the new U.S. Embassy in Nanjing, Cooke informed 
Ambassador Stuart that he desired to increase the number of Marines in Qingdao from 
1,900 to up to 4,800. He also expressed the need to “shine the spotlight” on the naval 
training center at Qingdao, largely as a way to emphasize the Navy’s role in China and 
improve the morale of Chinese recruits. Cooke also indicated that he hoped Chiang 
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would be able to inspect the training center in the near future. Both proposals were met 
with cold apprehension by Stuart.  In a letter to Marshall, Stuart wrote that Cooke’s 
proposals would serve no useful purpose and emphasized that the naval training center 
should be kept in the background, writing, “Embassy regards as undesirable publicity for 
the activities of AAG [Army Advisory Group] and NAG [Navy Advisory Group] which 
operate on a limited, informal, and tenuous basis.”79  He feared that any increase in the 
size of the Marine force in Qingdao would only reinforce the Communist perception that 
the U.S. was building a permanent base on Chinese soil.  Marshall agreed, and wrote to 
Forrestal of his concerns.80 The new Secretary of State reminded Forrestal that the 
American people, in his words, “had been led to believe that, with the exception of a 
small detachment at Tsingtao, we are withdrawing our Marines from China.”81 
 During the first half of 1947 an increasingly overworked James Forrestal focused 
his attention on defense unification.  After extensive discussions, he and Secretary of 
War Robert Patterson issued a joint statement that contained eight basic principles.  
Known as the Forrestal-Patterson Agreement, the document laid the foundation for the 
National Security Act of 1947.  Among other provisions, the act provided for an 
“independent” Air Force and made the service secretaries subordinate to the new 
cabinet-level Secretary of Defense.  After a long debate the Navy retained control of 
Marine Corps as well as naval aviation.82  President Truman appointed Forrestal the first 
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Secretary of Defense by Truman and the former Secretary of the Navy assumed the 
office on September 17th, 1947.83  Despite his increased workload, Forrestal maintained 
a keen interest in China, and continued to support Cooke’s efforts to publicize the Navy 
and Marines’ role. 
In February a series of meetings held in Washington demonstrated that the Navy 
and State Department, though able to come to terms on some aspects of China policy, 
remained far apart on other issues. When unable to reach agreement on policy or how to 
deal with a specific problem, those in attendance often simply delayed making a 
decision.  As the number of issues dealt with in this way piled up, tensions between the 
services and the State Department multiplied.  
 In a February 12th meeting with Forrestal and Patterson, Marshall outlined the 
State Department’s new policy on China: the United States would continue to press for 
reconciliation between the Nationalists and Communists, maintain a “sympathetic” 
relationship with Chiang’s government, and maintain the AAG and NAG [Army and 
Navy Advisory Groups], but withhold outright military aid.84 Both service secretaries 
voiced strong concern over Marshall’s proposals. Patterson concurred with most of what 
Marshall proposed but questioned providing economic aid to the Nationalists while 
withholding military assistance since he believed that the Communists would not 
distinguish between the two.85  Forrestal disagreed even more stridently and requested 
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that Marshall at the very least should confer with Admiral Cooke and Rear Admiral 
Stuart Murray in person, to which the Secretary of State agreed.86   
 A far larger conference on February 20th finally brought all the principal 
American policymakers on China together in one room. Defense Secretary Forrestal and 
State Department Secretary Marshall co-chaired the meeting.  Admirals Cooke and 
Nimitz, and future Chief of Naval Operations Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, and 
Captain Robert Dennison, the future naval aide to President Truman represented the 
Navy. Marshall and John Carter Vincent, the career diplomat and China expert whom 
Patrick Hurley had so excoriated upon his resignation, represented the State Department. 
After a series of heated discussions compromises were agreed to on several issues. 
Supported by Vincent, Marshall agreed to the transfer to the Nationalists of 271 surplus 
ships and to funding for an enlarged Naval Advisory Group to China.  However much to 
Cooke’s chagrin Marshall rejected the Navy’s proposals for a larger Marine presence in 
China and the expansion of naval support services in Qingdao.  The general also limited 
to 3,500 the number of Marines could be stationed in China and argued that any 
expansion of naval port facilities for the fleet would send the wrong message to all sides.  
Disappointed, both Cooke and Forrestal continued to look for other ways to emphasize 
the Navy and Marine Corps’ presence in China.87       
 The situation in China remained relatively calm for the next month. There were 
no major attacks on the Marines while their gradual withdrawal from Beijing and Tianjin 
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continued. But the Nationalist military, though appearing strong on paper, was growing 
more fragile every week. By again trading space for time, including their capital at 
Yanan which was captured in March 1947, Mao’s forces strained Nationalist resources 
to the breaking point.88  Yet before the tide turned in the civil war, the 1st Division 
Marines again found themselves in combat.  During the first week of April the 
Communists launched a third and final brazen attack on the 1st Division Marines, again 
targeting the large ammunition dump at Hsin Ho near Tangku. This attack revealed 
much about the Marine’s vulnerabilities and the improved capabilities of the Chinese 
Communists.   
After the previous two assaults on the Hsin Ho ammunition dump defenses were 
strengthened to include a triangle shaped perimeter and regular patrols. Despite these 
improvements, however the depot was not prepared for the major assault launched 
against it after midnight on April 5th.  Fewer than thirty Marines guarded the depot when 
over three hundred Chinese Communists attacked all three sides of the ammunition 
dump.  Five sentries were killed and sixteen wounded in the attack, the worst loss of life 
in the history of the Marines in China. Unlike the previous attacks this assault was well 
planned and organized, with the Communists planting mines in anticipation of the relief 
column from Tangku and using hand drawn carts to move artillery and mortar rounds.89  
When a column of 5th Marines rushed to the scene,  a fourth group of Communists 
attacked it as well. Although well planned the Communists’ attempt to overrun the entire 
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compound was repelled by highly accurate rifle fire.  Marine casualties totaled five 
killed and sixteen wounded, while the number of casualties sustained by the Communists 
is unknown, as any bodies were carried away before well before dawn.  The brazen 
attack accelerated the effort already underway to transfer ownership of all ammunition 
dumps to the Nationalists.90      
Later that month U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Louis Denfeld 
completed a whirlwind tour of the Western Pacific and Far East.  After visiting 
Kwajalein, Truk (Chuuk) Atoll, the Philippines, and Guam, he met with Cooke and 
Chiang Kai-shek in Nanjing.  While en route from China to Japan, Denfeld wrote 
Admiral Leahy, then President Truman’s chief of staff, that he was impressed by the 
results of the naval training program in Qingdao but deeply concerned about the 
worsening military situation.91  He was pleased to report to Chief of Naval Operations 
Admiral Nimitz that the Qingdao naval center had trained more than 500 officers and 
over 2500 enlisted men, but that he was concerned that most American businessmen had 
chosen to abandon Beijing and Tianjin as soon as the Marines withdrew.92  With the 
final withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division rear echelon on September 1st, all Marines, 
except for the roughly 4,000 who would remain in Qingdao, had left China.93 
 The simmering disagreements between the Navy and State Departments resumed 
in June. During the first half of the year Admiral Cooke had begun to regularly clash 
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with Ambassador Stuart concerning China policy.94 At a meeting on June 19th Chiang 
told Cooke that the military situation in Manchuria was worsening and asked the admiral 
to send a request for additional aid to Marshall.  Cooke wrote to Marshall immediately, 
asking him to reconsider supporting the Nationalists.95 
 The next day Forrestal reported to Marshall that U.S. Embassy officials in 
Nanjing had begun discussions on whether to recommend complete American military 
withdrawal from China. Soon to be Secretary of Defense Forrestal forcefully argued that 
any further withdrawal would embolden the Soviets and accelerate the already 
worsening political and military situation in China. Forrestal also brought up a long 
standing proposal for the Marines in Qingdao to begin training a small group of Chinese 
Nationalist marines. Overall his letter implied that he hoped a semi-permanent U.S. 
Navy presence could somehow be maintained for the foreseeable future.96  In his 
response, Marshall stated that any expansion of the Navy’s role beyond what had already 
been agreed to in China was unacceptable. But he urged patience, as an eagerly awaited 
report on the situation in China was expected in September.97 
 This report, prepared by General Albert Wedemeyer, would become one of the 
most controversial and closely guarded secrets of the American post-World War II effort 
in China.  During May of 1947 Marshall approached Wedemeyer about leading an 
American delegation back to China to prepare a detailed report on the state of affairs in 
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the country.  Wedemeyer agreed to go, and, in July, President Truman dispatched him to 
China “for the purpose of making an appraisal of the political, economic, psychological 
and military situations-current and projected.”98  Marshall hoped that Wedemeyer could 
convince Chiang to make reforms in return for renewed American assistance while 
Wedemeyer believed that it was an opportunity to correct some of the mistakes of the 
past two years. As could be expected the Nationalists were ecstatic upon the 
announcement of the mission, while the Communists were incensed that Chiang’s 
wartime friend and ally was once again being used to spread imperialist propaganda.99  
Upon his arrival in Nanjing on July 16th with a team of eight assistants and aides, 
Wedemeyer wrote to Marshall that the expectations for his task were overwhelming, 
explaining that, “My mission unfortunately is considered among the Chinese at large as 
a panacea of all Chinese ills. We are expected to solve, practically overnight, all the 
major critical and long existing problems of this complex area.” President Chiang and 
the Nationalists were living in a dream world, he argued, and his first impressions were 
of a government mired in apathy and fear. Yet he ended the long letter with a note of 
optimism, concluding, “Though the mission appears depressing at the moment, I am 
determined that this mission will produce some positive and affirmative 
recommendations for your consideration.”100  
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 Wedemeyer and his team spent more than a month in China, visiting most of the 
major urban centers, meeting with Nationalist leaders and visiting the vulnerable cities in 
the North, including Beijing, Tianjin, and Tsinan.101 After several weeks spent reviewing 
his team’s reports he presented his report. It was a summary of the enormous social, 
economic, and military problems confronting China.  He also pointed out the problems 
that resulted directly and indirectly from the Yalta agreements. Yet it was not these 
aspects of the report that raised alarms in the eyes of the Truman administration. 
  In the report the general argued that China could be saved only by a significant 
American intervention through the United Nations. Expanding on some of his earlier 
recommendations, he recommended that Manchuria be placed under a U.N. trusteeship 
accompanied by a five year U.S. aid program and that the Nationalist government must 
implement wide ranging reforms in order to make this possible. Appealing to Truman 
and what he believed was his desire to oppose worldwide communism, Wedemeyer 
concluded that, “The bulk of the Chinese are not disposed to Communism and they are 
not concerned with ideologies. They desire food, shelter, and the opportunity to live in 
peace.”102 
Wedemeyer’s optimism ran directly counter to the prevailing attitudes of both 
Marshall and Truman. After his return to the United States he was informed by Marshall 
that neither he nor anyone on his team should speak about the report. Soon afterwards 
the China report was buried, on orders from Marshall, and not publicly released until the 
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summer of 1949.  Angry and disillusioned, Wedemeyer felt that he had been personally 
repudiated by Marshall for not providing a report the administration wanted to hear. This 
and other disappointments resulted in Wedemeyer retiring from the Army in 1951.103  
Thus by the close of 1947 the U.S. State Department, in profound contrast to most senior 
U.S. Navy leaders, had abandoned any hope that the United States could broker an end 
to the civil war in China. The United States would not intervene any further.  
 For the Marines remaining in China, life went on much as before with the 
exception of a single incident.   On August 27th a Marine Corps fighter ran out of gas 
and was forced to crash land on the beach near Yantai. A naval rescue mission recovered 
one aviator, but the other was captured by the Communists.104 Only after more than a 
week of intensive negotiations undertaken personally by Admiral Cooke was the pilot 
returned.105  Over the next few months the number of Marines in China continued to 
dwindle. On September 1st the rear echelon of the 1st Marine Division left Tianjin, 
leaving only the approximately three thousand Marines of the Fleet Marine Force, 
Western Pacific, in Qingdao as the last element in China.106  For the sailors and Marines 
who remained in Qingdao the fall passed quietly. 
   For the last China Marines, the men of the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions, their 
two years in China after the Japanese surrender was a mixed bag of success, false hopes, 
and confusion.  Some of the terms that would come to be applied to many post-WWII 
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American military deployments, such as mission creep, unclear objectives, and even the 
domino theory, could be used to describe their time in China, as they took on roles not 
quite envisioned when they were first deployed. And though some historians may not 
characterize it as such, after June 1946 the Marines were at war with the Chinese 
Communists. For the United States the toll was twelve Marines killed and thirty-seven 
wounded in this undeclared war (see Table 4). To a generation that followed these deaths 
would be the forgotten precursors of many others that would follow in the United States’ 
efforts to stem the tide of communism in East Asia. 
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Table 4: List of USMC Combat Casualties in China 1945-1947 
 
Date   Location    Dead  Wounded  
 
October 6th, 1945 Tianjin, Hebei Province  0   3 
 
October 19th, 1945 Tangshan, Hebei Province  0   2 
 
October 23rd, 1945 Near Beijing, Hebei Province  0   1 
 
December 4th, 1945 Anshan, Liaoning Province  1   1 
 
December 9th, 1945 Tianjin, Hebei Province  1   0 
 
January 15th, 1946 Near Tangshan, Hebei Province 0   2 
 
April 7th, 1946  Near Lutai, Hebei Province  1   0 
 
May 5th, 1946  Tangshan, Hebei Province  0   1 
 
May 7th, 1946  Lutai, Hebei Province   0   1 
 
May 21st, 1946 Tianjin, Hebei Province  1   1 
 
July 2nd, 1946  Tangku, Hebei Province  0   1 
 
July 29th, 1946 Anping, Hebei Province  4   11 
 
October 3rd, 1946 Hsin Ho, Hebei Province  0   1 
 
April 4-5th, 1947 Hsin Ho, Hebei Province  5   17 
 
December 25th, 1947 near Tianjin, Hebei Province  1   0 
 
         Total 
 
        13   43 
 
 
Source: www.history.navy.mil/research/online-reading-room/title list-alphabetically/c/casualties/.html. 
Retrieved April 13th, 2016; George B. Clark, Treading Softly:  U.S. Marines in China, 1819-1949 (New 
York: Praeger Press, 2001); Shaw, Jr., Henry I. Shaw, Jr., The United States Marines in North China, 
1945-1949, 2nd Revised Edition (Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps Press, 1962).  
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CHAPTER VI 
FINAL STAND IN QINGDAO, 1948-1949 
On Christmas Day 1947, the U.S. Marines suffered their last combat related 
death in China.  Seeking a break from the monotony of life in Qingdao, five Marines 
were thirty-five miles north of the city heading for an area where they could hunt wild 
birds.  Driving through a small village in a jeep the Marines came across a group of 
armed men they assumed were Nationalists loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, given the 
American and British weapons they carried. To their surprise, the unknown men soon 
opened fire.1 With only three shotguns and a carbine, the Marines were unable to defend 
themselves from the heavily armed Communists, and a brief firefight soon left PFC 
Charles Brayton dead. The four remaining Marines had no choice but to accept surrender 
and capture. The incident sparked an intensive series of negotiations to obtain their 
release, and after nearly three months in captivity, the four Marines were handed over to 
U.S. Navy personnel on April 1st, 1948.2  
At a press conference organized by General G. C. Thomas, the commander of 
Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, the four men told their side of the story. The Marines had 
mistakenly driven more than eighteen miles north of the limits set by the U.S. Navy and 
State Department for hunting expeditions. Yet they had no idea they were in Communist 
held territory until the shooting began. After their capture, the men were moved 
repeatedly to different locations, and interrogated endlessly about the American mission 
1	  Report on Captured Marines, 2 January 1948, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1948: The Far East, China, (1948): 8:346.	  2	  “Chinese Reds Used U.S. Weapons in Capture, Say 4 Freed Marines,” New York Times, April 3rd, 1948.	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in China. Their captors demanded that the Marines apologize for American conduct in 
the Chinese Civil War, and forced them to listen to a never-ending diatribe of 
Communist ideology. Perhaps to their surprise, however, other than the endless Marxist 
propaganda they were well fed on beans and steamed bread and provided fresh clothes 
by their captors.3  Upon their return to the Marines, the men were quickly court-
martialed for their errors, restricted to barracks, and docked three months’ pay.4 
 By the spring of 1948, it had become apparent to nearly all observers that the 
Nationalists no longer had a realistic chance of winning the civil war. As the saga of the 
Marines played out, the Nationalists were steadily losing their grip on Manchuria. 
Throughout the spring and summer of 1948 a series of Communist offensives, led by one 
of Mao’s top lieutenants, General Lin Biao, had decimated or routed most of the 
Nationalist armies in the north.  Even when fighting some of Chiang Kai-shek’s best 
troops the Communist armies regularly defeated them through innovative use of 
captured munitions and supplies. Over the summer more and more Manchurian cities 
would fall to the communists, leaving the Nationalist (and American) stronghold of 
Qingdao on the Shandong Peninsula vulnerable.5  On the Liaodong Peninsula, the port of 
Dalian remained a point of enormous contention between the Soviet Union and the 
United States.  After seizing control of the port in August 1945, the Russians placed 
severe restrictions on the movement of commerce and shipping and appointed only pro-
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  North China Marine, 1:36 (1948): Special Archival Collections, USMCA. 
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Soviet Chinese officials to important positions in local government. Subsequently Dalian 
had become a de facto part of the Soviet Union and remained one long after Russian 
armies had withdrawn from Manchuria.6  
Senior U.S. Navy officers and administrators, especially Cooke and Forrestal, 
had long pointed to Dalian as an example of Soviet duplicity.  They viewed keeping U.S. 
military forces in Qingdao to be an important counterweight to Soviet control of Dalian.  
Legally Dalian was under Nationalist Chinese control, but practically the Soviets 
controlled the civic leadership, the port, and the economy. U.S. State Department 
diplomat Paul Paddock, a veteran Foreign Service officer, became the new American 
consul at Dalian in June 1948, the only American diplomatic presence the Soviets 
permitted in the city.  Upon his arrival, Paddock described the impact of Soviet rule, 
writing, “Dairen (Dalian) was as dead as a town could get. The streets were nearly 
devoid of traffic. Automobiles were a rarity, and there were only occasional streetcars, a 
few pedicabs, and horse-drawn droshkies.  It was like looking up the main street of a 
middle-sized American city at high noon and seeing one car and fifty pedestrians.”   
Paddock also pointed out that with little or no trade flowing in or out of the port, Dalian 
had little or no strategic value left to the Soviets, and “had lost its reason for existence.” 
Whatever the economics, however, to many Americans Dalian remained a potent symbol 
of the Cold War in East Asia. 7  
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  Memorandum, Charles Stuart to George Marshall, 7 February 1947, U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 
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 Another change had occurred in early 1948. After two years of energetic support 
for the Nationalists and vigorous opposition to communism in East Asia, Admiral Cooke 
stepped down as commander of Western Forces, Pacific in February 1948.  He had been 
the Navy’s strongest and most vocal advocate for retaining a strong presence in China 
long after George Marshall and others in the Truman administration had advocated 
withdrawal. Like Forrestal, Cooke viewed the presence of both the Marines and U.S. 
Navy as a stabilizing force and a deterrent to the Soviet Union.8  Even in the face of total 
collapse of the Nationalists, he remained unapologetic in his views on communism and 
the importance of East Asia. Angry with Harry Truman and his Cold War policies Cooke 
chose to retire in May of 1948. Calling East Asia the region most threatened by Soviet 
communism, he pointed out that because of decisions made since 1945 their strength had 
grown exponentially in the years since. He made little to no distinction between the 
Soviet and Chinese Communists, saying that, “No one should be fooled by statements 
that Chinese Communists are not in the Communist fold.  Chinese Red leaders have 
repeatedly asserted loyalty to Moscow-guided Lenin-Marxists principles.” He urged the 
Truman administration to rethink its policies towards China, lest the USSR grow even 
stronger in East Asia and the Pacific.9   
After the final victory of Mao Zedong in 1949, the retired Cooke continued to 
argue for greater support and resources directed towards East Asia and China. During 
the Korean War, he advocated expansion of the conflict to decisively defeat the North 
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Koreans, and thus deny the Soviets control of another country in the region. He also 
recommended far greater support for Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan. Under the proper 
circumstances, Cooke argued that the Seventh Fleet could blockade the Chinese coast 
thereby giving time for the Nationalists to gather strength and strike back against the 
“Red China” he detested. The Seventh Fleet would play a decisive role in the Taiwan 
Straits crises a few years later, but Cooke’s recommendations were ignored by an 
administration he considered far too pusillanimous and tepid on China.10 
Cooke’s replacement as commander of Western Forces, Pacific was Vice 
Admiral Oscar Badger. The grandson of a commodore and the son of an admiral, 
Badger, a 1911 Annapolis graduate, had been awarded the Medal of Honor during the 
U.S. Navy’s 1914 occupation of Veracruz, Mexico. Like Cooke, he became one of the 
most strident, if less publicly vocal voices for maintaining a U.S Navy and Marine Corps 
presence in China. A short, wiry man who had served in several important commands 
during the war, most notably as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics Plans, 
Badger had to juggle an increasingly fragile partnership with an ally whose country was 
steadily collapsing around him, while walking a narrow line between war and peace with 
the Communists.11 
 Badger knew full well the difficulty of the situation confronting him in China.  In 
a letter to his friend and newly promoted Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis 
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Denfeld, Badger described his new command as one “loaded with dynamite.” 
Anticipating great challenges in China, he sought the advice of both George Marshall 
and Chester Nimitz before departing for Asia in February 1948.12  In the closing to a 
second letter to Denfeld, Badger expressed gratitude for his appointment to succeed 
Cooke and along with naked determination, writing, “All of this only adds to my 
anticipation for taking over my new assignment, and my appreciation for your having 
given me such a fine opportunity to carry on for the Navy and the National 
Government.”13 
 If Badger had known the full extent of his future difficulties in East Asia he 
might not have been so optimistic.  The next eighteen months would be filled with all 
but insurmountable challenges both for himself and the sailors and Marines under his 
command.  Due to a turning of the tide of the Chinese Civil War and the bitter realities 
of the new Cold War, Badger would oversee what became the final chapter of the nearly 
fifty-year American presence in this part of the world.  He would thus occupy the sad but 
pragmatic role of the U.S. Navy’s last admiral in China.    
 Throughout these difficult months, Qingdao continued to serve as a bastion of 
American naval power in Asia. As the homeport for the Seventh Fleet and later the 
downsized Western Forces, Pacific, the city and its harbor offered excellent port 
facilities that had been largely unscathed during the war.  The departing Cooke and other 
naval officers would also point to the limited, but important work of the Naval Advisory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Letter, Oscar Badger to Louis Denfeld, February 5, 1948, Louis Denfeld Papers, Box 2, NHHC.	  13	   Badger to Denfeld, January 27, 1948, Denfeld Papers, Box 2, NHHC.	  
	   224 
Group (NAG).  In their eyes, the NAG, in very difficult financial and logistical 
conditions, had overseen the transfer of surplus warships, established a naval training 
program, and built the core of what would become the new Republic of China Navy.14 
Over the course of the next few years, the NAG supervised the expenditure of the more 
than $5 million dollars authorized by the U.S Congress to improve naval and shore 
facilities not only in Qingdao but also in Chongqing and Shanghai.  By the spring of 
1948 the Qingdao naval training center had schooled thousands of Chinese officers and 
enlisted recruits and overseen the transfer of more than one hundred vessels and small 
craft to the young Chinese fleet.15 The eventual fate of these vessels and their crews 
would become one of the most contentious aspects of the America’s role in postwar 
China. 
 Yet even to ardent supports of the Nationalists such as James Forrestal, it became 
obvious that Mao Zedong’s communists would probably win the civil war. By the spring 
of 1948, the situation had become increasingly hopeless for the Nationalists. Month by 
month their strength in both numbers and morale decreased, while the Communists, all 
but certain of the final victory, grew more organized and emboldened.  Even before the 
tide had turned many Americans who served as administrators or diplomats in China 
watched with dismay, as the Communists grew steadily stronger.  One of the most senior 
American diplomats in China, Richard M. Service, revealed his misgivings about the 
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situation as early as June of 1946, in a letter to the American embassy in Nanjing. 
Fearful of a Communist encroachment of Qingdao and worried that U.S. naval 
leadership was not taking the threat seriously enough, he questioned the prevailing belief 
that the U.S. military presence in Qingdao would be enough to deter the Communists.  
Fearing that the U.S. forces in China would be drawn into the fighting eventually, he 
worried that it would soon “blow up in the face” of the United States.16 
Admiral Louis Denfeld, who would eventually be compelled to resign as Chief of 
Naval Operations due to his principled stand in the 1949 “Revolt of the Admirals,” was 
understandably preoccupied with events in Washington.  Intense intra-service rivalry 
over such divisive issues as control of nuclear weapons, the role and ownership of 
airpower, and the future of the Marine Corps reverberated throughout Washington 
during these tense months.17  With his attention focused on larger and more strategic 
issues Denfeld allowed Badger considerable autonomy in dealings with China.  The 
correspondence between the two men reveals a casual friendship not often seen at the 
senior ranks of the U.S. Navy. Denfeld had total confidence in his subordinate.  Thus it 
fell to Badger, who unlike his predecessor had limited experience in diplomacy, to deal 
with China debacle.18 
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 By the close of 1947, approximately five thousand American military personnel 
remained in China, primarily in Qingdao.  Among the Americans present in the strategic 
port city the atmosphere was one of tense boredom. Disdain for the lingering mission 
was rampant, as many U.S. Navy sailors no longer saw any point to remaining in China.  
Most junior sailors saw the Chinese as unworthy of their assistance, and for a people 
about to be overrun by Communists the overwhelming majority seemed singularly 
disinterested in their fate. Officers who thought in terms of policy and strategy felt that 
the mission in Qingdao was all but hopeless. One American observer poetically observed 
that, “For this once prosperous German colony in which we have based our naval 
strength in the Far East is a city without soul or spirit.  It is noisily waiting to die, and all 
its skeletons are out of the closet and lying in the streets for all to see.”19    
For the Nationalists the military situation grew worse each month, and, by the 
spring of 1948 the Chinese Communists controlled nearly all of Manchuria and were 
encroaching on the Shandong Peninsula.  On May 4th 1948 Admiral Badger, increasingly 
concerned about the Communist threat, outlined four options to CNO Denfeld 
concerning the future of Qingdao, two of which involved open warfare against Mao’s 
forces.  Option A was for the Seventh Fleet and deployed Marines to remain in the port 
and fight the Communists alongside the Nationalists. Option B was for U.S. forces to 
defend Qingdao without Nationalist support. Option C suggested a phased evacuation of 
the port, while Option D called for an immediate withdrawal. Despite the potential 
casualties, Badger advocated the first option, arguing that American interests in Asia 
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were at stake and that to withdraw would be a disaster. This advice reflected the 
admiral’s rather fanciful belief that the Nationalist position was not hopeless, an 
assessment based in part on the recent election of Li Zongren to become the new vice-
president in Chiang’s government, a move he believed would improve morale among the 
Nationalists. Though ruthless, Li was seen by many Americans as a more competent 
leader than most of his colleagues in the GMD, and his election instilled a strong but 
short-lived sense of optimism among its supporters.20 
Badger’s recommendations on Qingdao received strong support from the Navy’s 
top leadership, but caused grave concern elsewhere.  After considerable discussion the 
Joint Chiefs voted to support Admiral Badger’s conclusions, and were soon joined in 
this view by James Forrestal. The new Secretary of Defense argued that Qingdao offered 
the best port facilities in East China, and that to withdraw would be a tremendous blow 
to American interests in the Cold War. He did, however, recommend that the National 
Security Council study the options for remaining or withdrawing from Qingdao.21  State 
Department officials strongly opposed the option of Americans fighting for Chiang’s 
government.   Marshall spoke plainly in his response to a memo on the subject from 
Forrestal, writing: “If Admiral Badger were to follow course A, I have no confidence, 
given the nature of Chinese military tradition and psychology, that course A would not 
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quickly degenerate into course B, thus placing us in an intolerable military and political 
situation.”22 
 As secretary of state, Marshall continued to work tirelessly to extract the United 
States from what he considered the China trap.  He viewed Chiang’s government as 
hopelessly corrupt, fragile, and incompetent, and held out little or no hope that the 
Nationalists could prevail. He resisted calls from supporters of Chiang such as Forrestal 
to provide more support for the Nationalist cause.  As historian Ernest R. May has 
concluded, “it is not hard to argue that the chief reason why the United States did not 
extend this support was General Marshall’s conclusion that such a course of action 
would be imprudent.  Nor is it hard to argue that the whole course of the subsequent 
Cold War would have proceeded differently, abroad and at home, if Marshall had not 
personally acted to bar involvement in the Chinese Civil War.”23 Marshall instead 
proposed that Badger meet with Chiang directly to determine his plans for Qingdao. If 
Chiang was not willing to devote the military resources necessary to defend the port, 
then Badger should implement an orderly withdrawal.24  Faced with such measured 
opposition from arguably the most influential leader in government, the Joint Chiefs and 
Forrestal reconsidered their options. Forrestal directed the NSC to prepare a report on 
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options for Qingdao, while Badger was ordered not to engage the Communists but 
instead to plan for evacuation if the city was threatened in the near term.25 
The question on many Americans’ minds was, what would Mao do? Would he 
order his soldiers to advance on Qingdao, regardless of the consequences? By early 1948 
the inner circle of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee, including Mao, Zhou, 
and Liu Shaoqi, felt increasingly certain of victory and that the United States had been 
gradually withdrawing its support for the Nationalists.  The Central Committee also 
considered a last minute American intervention to rescue the GMD unlikely, but after 
the departure of the U.S. Marines from Beijing and Tianjin in 1947 Mao kept a wary eye 
on the American forces in Qingdao.  A CCP policy directive drafted by Zhou in March 
1948 stated that, “the essence of our anti-American imperialism is to prevent American 
imperialists from colonizing China and to overthrow American imperialist rule in 
China.”26  Not willing to directly provoke the United States, however, for the remainder 
of 1948 Mao’s armies kept their distance from Qingdao.       
 By the summer of 1948 discussions on whether or not to evacuate Qingdao 
became more pressing.  In June, the Central Intelligence Agency released a highly 
classified report on China, whose key words of “withdrawal” and “prestige” would be 
used time and time again during the coming decades of the Cold War.  The report 
concluded that the Communists could overrun both the city of Qingdao and the 
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American naval base within six months. Concurrently a withdrawal of American forces 
would embolden both Mao and the Soviet Union, and would lead to the conclusion that, 
“the force of communist expansion in Asia was irresistible.” The report laid bare the 
impossible choice for the Truman Administration: stay in place and risk Qingdao being 
overrun, or withdraw and lose considerable prestige while granting the Chinese 
Communists a huge propaganda victory, and abandon the Nationalists to certain defeat 
and death.27 
 By this time two key groups of consensus had emerged. The familiar fault lines 
of the Navy on one side and the Army and State Department on the other remained the 
same.  Forrestal, supported by Badger, advocated for a strong response to the communist 
encroachment on Qingdao. Their argument revolved around the increasingly shaky 
premise that if the United States withdrew from China the move would embolden both 
the Chinese communists and the Soviet Union and damage American credibility abroad, 
a nascent “domino” theory.  Although the basic concept of the domino theory formed 
much of the basis of the 1947 Truman Doctrine, the phrase itself did not enter American 
diplomatic jargon officially until a 1954 speech by President Dwight Eisenhower, in 
which he spoke of “a row of dominoes” being knocked over and the inevitable 
consequences.28 On the other side of the Qingdao debate stood George Marshall, 
Ambassador Charles Stuart, and much of the State Department. In their view, 
withdrawing from Qingdao was the only pragmatic solution. The U.S. Navy had no 
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established legal authority to remain in China, and to do so would mean intervening in a 
war the Truman administration had long sought to avoid.  
 For American servicemen and women in Qingdao, life continued much as it had 
the previous three years.  Liberty was granted liberally and the daily routine of 
maintenance and training went on.  One major recent change in the spring of 1948 was 
the presence of more than a thousand American dependent wives and children. This new 
policy and the steady work being done on the base implied that the U.S. Navy and 
Marine Corps would remain for quite some time, or at the very least that Badger wanted 
it to appear that way.29  On  June 7th Francis Cardinal Spellman, the Military Vicar of 
the Armed Forces, visited Qingdao and conducted mass in St. Michael’s Cathedral.30  
Visits by such senior churchmen were rare, so observers in both China and America 
could only have seen the visit of the vehemently anti-Communist Spellman as a sign of 
the importance U.S. leaders placed on Qingdao. 
 One unusual bright spot was the successful return of four Marine Corps airmen 
who due to mechanical failure had been forced to land in Communist territory on April 
2nd and were subsequently captured.  Unlike the Christmas Day incident, no lives were 
lost this time, and the four Marines were returned unharmed on July 2nd, just in time to 
take part in the baseball games and fireworks planned for the Fourth of July celebrations. 
For the remainder of the summer Qingdao witnessed the usual routine of sports, training, 
and standard discipline in this increasingly isolated base. Although probably discussed in 
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mess rooms and in the officer’s clubs, plans for the evacuation of the one thousand U.S 
Navy and Marine Corps dependents remained only plans.31        
 Meanwhile, the Nationalists’ position on the Shandong Peninsula weakened 
until, at the end of the summer Chiang Kai-shek’s forces suffered a catastrophic defeat. 
On September 23rd the fortified city of Tsinan, fell to the Communists. The Nationalists 
had invested heavily in the defense of the city, only to suffer more than 22,000 
casualties.  Even more serious, during the attack a full Nationalist division had defected 
to the Communist side.32  The fall of Tsinan left the whole of the Shandong Peninsula in 
Communist hands, with only the cities of Linyi and Qingdao remaining under 
Nationalist control.33 Policy makers in Washington now confronted far more than just 
the theoretical possibility of U.S. Marines being forced to defend the base from Chinese 
communists.34 
 Badger grew increasingly gloomy about the operational situation.  Six days after 
the loss of Tsinan, he wrote to Admiral Denfeld that the situation on the peninsula had 
become perilous for the Nationalists and very worrisome for the Americans in Qingdao. 
The more than 180,000 Communist troops who now occupied Tsinan were well supplied 
with captured Nationalist weapons and equipment. The Nationalist garrison at Qingdao 
now numbered fewer than 30,000 men, many of whom were poorly equipped. Morale 
could not get much lower.  Badger told Denfeld that, “It is now my opinion that [if 
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attacked by the Communists the] present garrison would only offer feeble resistance and 
[that] there would not be time for an orderly withdrawal.” He recommended that the 
Marine garrison in Qingdao be doubled in size and that a large transport be made 
available within five days, to help prepare for evacuation.35      
Although the situation in Qingdao went largely unnoticed by most Americans 
back home, one important weekly magazine provided remarkable insight into what was 
happening in the beleaguered city. In an article entitled, “Is Our Navy Trapped in 
China?” Saturday Evening Post correspondent Darrell Berrigan described the bleak 
living conditions in the city—starvation, lack of shelter, bitter cold, the black market, 
and wild inflation.  Desperate residents cut down trees and stole coal to burn to stay 
warm.  Others turned to theft—youth became expert pickpockets, often stealing 
valuables from U.S. sailors and Marines.  As Berrigan made clear, American morale in 
Qingdao was low and the mission to aid the Nationalist Chinese was in danger of failing.  
Many of the Americans in Qingdao felt that the Chinese in the city had little if any 
concern about their fate if the Communist won the war. Berrigan explained that, “It is 
easy to understand why the men of the American Navy feel that way about the people of 
Qingdao and why they feel they have been sent out on a hopeless mission to a hopeless 
county.”36 
After describing Badger as a “lean, neat, energetic officer of fifty-eight, with 
bushy white eyebrows to set him apart from mere mortals,” Berrigan listed several of the 
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difficulties faced by the admiral.  Qingdao’s proximity to the Soviet Union made the city 
especially vulnerable, and by September more than 300,000 Chinese refugees had 
clogged the now crowded streets. An overwhelming sense of apathy and even 
hopelessness rippled through the ranks of both American and Chinese sailors stationed 
in the port. One American bluejacket, angered by the repeated theft of his belongings by 
homeless Chinese children, exclaimed that “They steal us blind and complain that we’re 
not giving them enough!”  Other than provide moral support there was little the U.S. 
Navy could do would alter the situation, and the article predicted that soon Badger 
would be forced to make the choice between staying and fighting or packing up and 
leaving China for good. For now, however, the Navy was “trapped” in China.37 
Observers in the United States were not the only ones who read the Post article 
with interest. An article on the Berrigan piece also appeared in the People’s Herald, one 
of the oldest and most widely read Chinese Communist party newspapers. Focusing on 
the perceived threat to Qingdao, the article highlighted the fact that Badger would not 
comment on the Post article and pointed out the fact that he had recently ordered his 
house painted implied that the U.S. Navy had no intention of pulling out anytime soon.38  
Nevertheless, Badger received criticism from State Department officials in China for his 
comments that implied American citizens had already been evacuated from Qingdao, 
and for not clearing his remarks on the Post article beforehand.39      
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Badger was depicted in the Post article as projecting a sense of frustrated 
determination, his strong personality seemingly held captive by contradictory orders and 
the impossible political and military situation in China.40  Within a few weeks of the 
articles’ publication, however, Badger’s limited optimism had begun to dim. Though he 
projected outward support for the Nationalists, privately he was dismayed by the fall of 
Tsinan and begun to have serious doubts about the Nationalists’ ability to survive.  A 
lengthy letter to Forrestal written on October 9th expressed his concerns, and in a memo 
to Admiral Denfeld that was enclosed in the letter, he confided that, “The situation here 
is not too good. It might have been better if we had used other methods and procedures.” 
Badger listed his extensive litany of concerns regarding China, highlighting the 
deteriorating military situation for the Nationalists, and urged the Defense Secretary to 
provide greater assistance. He described several recent trips to areas in China still under 
Nationalist control, the mood of several Nationalist leaders, and his frustrations over the 
lack of strategic coordination or planning between Chiang’s government and 
Washington. Badger considered the situation to be growing worse by the day, but 
nevertheless held out hope - provided the U.S. acted quickly.41 
Badger’s pessimism was echoed by another American in Qingdao. William 
Turner, the Consul General for the U.S. State Department in the city, was on friendly 
terms with Badger, and the two discussed the military situation often. This friendship did 
not stop Turner from speaking his mind to his superiors. In a series of diplomatic cables 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Berrigan, Saturday Evening Post, 26-27.	  
41 Badger to Forrestal, Badger Papers, Box 1, October 9, 1948, NHHC.  
	   236 
that one can only describe as brutally honest and cold, Turner laid out his concerns or 
fears about the U.S. Navy’s future in China. The U.S. Navy in Qingdao now found itself 
in an impossible situation, he argued, and wrote that, “Now that Tsinan has fallen and 
the shadow of the victorious communists falls across Eastern Shandong, it becomes 
more and more difficult for the Navy to extricate itself without serious loss of prestige 
for itself and for the United States. But the longer we wait the more difficult the problem 
will be – until perhaps the Communists march into the city and decide the answer for 
us.”42 
A week later one of the final issues of North China Marine was published. The 
contrast between this military publication and the Saturday Evening Post could not have 
been more striking. The October 2nd issue of the weekly newspaper differed very little 
from previous issues.  Typical military news such as promotions, award ceremonies, and 
the results of the many sports organizations dominated the pages. Of particular note was 
the victory of the Third Marines football team over that of an opposing Navy squad. The 
Marines won the game 32-6. Boxing matches, opportunities for liberty in beautiful Lao 
Shan, and the arrival of a new Catholic bishop were also noteworthy. There was no 
mention of the ongoing discussions in Washington concerning Qingdao and U.S. China 
policy.  Perhaps only the impending arrival of a task force from San Diego presaged any 
of what was to come.  Two Essex-class aircraft carriers, the USS Tarawa and USS 
Princeton, and their accompanying escorts of cruisers and destroyers were expected to 
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arrive in Qingdao in the coming months. The Navy described the cruise as completely 
routine.43         
 Berrigan’s Saturday Evening Post article on the situation in Qingdao may have 
also reached the desk of the Oval Office. 1948 was a presidential election year, and the 
prevailing wisdom was that Harry Truman would lose to Republican challenger Thomas 
Dewey. The president was down in the polls and had long been preoccupied with 
domestic concerns and events in Europe.  Faced with a struggling economy, the growing 
Cold War in Europe, and a resurgent Republican Party, Truman can be forgiven for not 
devoting much time to the Navy’s concerns over Qingdao. Nevertheless, the Post article 
as well as others from newspapers such as the New York Times often reported the 
deteriorating situation on the Shandong Peninsula, highlighting the dilemma the 
administration faced and creating the impression that the president might pull out at any 
moment.44  
The predominant historical narrative is that domestic politics and economic 
concerns dominated the 1948 presidential election, and that Harry Truman ultimately 
triumphed by retaining the New Deal coalition of his predecessor as well as cleverly 
castigating the Republicans for much of the nation’s ills.  This is a false analysis, 
however. Global events such as the Berlin airlift, the closely watched elections in Italy, 
and the Soviet takeover in Czechoslovakia meant that both Truman and Dewey had to 
take the great challenges of the Cold War into consideration. As historian Robert Divine 
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concludes, “The Cold War cast a long shadow over the election of 1948, influencing the 
campaign strategies of the rival candidates and shaping in subtle but vital way the final 
outcome.”  Though less a priority than Europe, China and the remaining Americans in 
Qingdao would play a small but important role in the political maneuverings of both 
parties.45 
Truman had long grown weary of Chiang and his corrupt regime, and by early 
1948 had begun to consider him a liability.  The president even entertained the 
possibility of engineering his departure. However, Ambassador Stuart and George 
Marshall both scuttled this idea, based on their belief that a change in Chinese leaders 
would be both unworkable and unwise. But what to do about China? According to 
diplomatic historian Odd Arne Westad, by the summer of 1948 the Truman 
Administration faced opposition from three powerful opponents.   The first was posed by 
the “China lobby.” Led by magazine magnate Henry Luce, this influential group of 
politicians and media figures argued fiercely for the unwavering support of Chiang and 
his regime. Second was the reputation both Chiang and his wife, Soong Meiling, enjoyed 
during the war with Japan, unwavering in both their determination and Christian faith. 
Lastly was timing. With the 1948 presidential election fast approaching Truman felt he 
had no choice to but so stick with Chiang and the GMD.46  Faced with Republicans 
angry that he might abandon the most important American base in China to the 
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Communists, Truman, on October 15th, issued a directive to the State Department that no 
withdrawal from Qingdao take place at this time.47  Anticipating what was to come, 
however, Admiral Denfeld soon informed Badger that he should begin making 
preparations for withdrawal, but to do so in a way as to avoid attracting too much 
attention prior to the November 2nd election.48   
 During October Forrestal made his last strong push to hold Qingdao. Despite the 
writing on the wall he refused to let go of the base without a fight.  On October 5th he 
met with Captain (future Admiral) Robert Dennison, the president’s naval aide.  
Dennison repeated to Forrestal many of the arguments laid out in the Post article, 
specifically that the Navy, once departed from Qingdao, would “probably never get back 
in.”49  For the rest of the month of Forrestal became an increasingly lonely voice in the 
Truman Administration as he became one of a handful of senior civilian leaders in 
government who still advocated keeping the Navy and Marines in Qingdao.  Even when 
faced with the inevitable reality of Mao’s victory, Forrestal became more and more 
obsessed about holding on to some solid ground in China.  In their recent study of the 
troubled Defense Secretary, Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley conclude that, 
“Forrestal, tenacious and emotional, continued to resist the idea of an inevitable Chinese 
Communist victory and to seek ways to maintain an American military presence.”  For 
Forrestal the presence of American sailors and Marines in Qingdao was the only thing 
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holding back the Communist tidal wave in Asia. That this force numbered only a few 
thousand against the millions available to Mao Zedong made no difference. Forrestal 
consistently pushed back against Marshall and others in the State Department who 
advocated withdrawal.50 
 Amid this flurry of military and diplomatic communications a tense situation 
emerged at the American embassy in Nanjing.  Sounding the alarm Ambassador Stuart 
wrote to Marshall that despite all the previous discussions that had occurred on the status 
of American forces, Admiral Badger was unilaterally making plans to defend Qingdao. 
Stuart reported that Badger had begun perimeter exercises and had free authority to act 
as he saw fit. Absent any overriding orders Badger was on the verge of declaring war on 
the CCP. Fearful of provoking the Communists Stuart exaggerated Badger’s plans to 
defend the city and asked that a higher authority issue orders to ensure that the admiral 
would not act independently and possibly bring the United States into war with the 
Chinese Communists.51  Badger’s exact intentions are difficult to determine with 
certainty. It seems doubtful that if Qingdao fell under attack he would have actually 
ordered the Marines to fight back against the Communists. But Stuart’s message to the 
State Department had the desired effect. Marshall strongly cautioned Forrestal that 
Badger was not adhering to official U.S. State Department policy.  He recommended the 
immediate evacuation of all remaining dependents and that withdrawal plans be sped up, 
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but under no circumstances was he to engage in a perimeter defense of Qingdao.52 There 
the matter stood for the few days remaining until the November 2nd election. On his own 
authority Forrestal granted Badger the right to defend the perimeter of the city, but this 
window did not last long.53  
  To the astonishment of many political observers on November 2nd Truman won 
an upset victory over Republican candidate Thomas Dewey. On China, the re-elected 
Truman acted quickly. The president wanted to avoid the impression that he was 
abandoning Chiang and suggested a compromise be found to the delicate political and 
military situation. At a National Security Council meeting, held the same day as the 
election, opinions coalesced once again into two camps, with the State Department and 
Army on one side, and the Navy and Defense Department on the other. As usual, 
Forrestal argued the most strenuously for holding on to Qingdao. After difficult 
discussions the council recommended that civilians and military dependents be 
evacuated but also that the Marine garrison be reinforced. These steps limited the threat 
to American civilians but also provided a sliver of hope to bolster collapsing Nationalist 
morale.54 Six weeks later, on December 20th the NSC voted to accept the State 
Department proposal that Qingdao be completely evacuated, and on Christmas Eve 
Truman approved the recommendation. The Navy’s long struggle to keep a foothold in 
China was finally over.55 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Memorandum, Marshall to Forrestal, 28 October 1948, RG 218, Box 2, NARA.	  
53 Cox, “U.S. Naval Strategy and Policy in China,” 95. 
54 Memorandum, Sidney Souers to Harry Truman, 3 November 1948, RG 218, Box 2, NARA. 
55 Wang, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff and United States Policy on China, 1945-1949,” 176. 
	   242 
 For Chiang and the GMD, Truman’s reelection was a grave disappointment. The 
beleaguered Nationalist leader viewed a Republican victory as perhaps his last, best 
chance to secure continued American aid and money for his regime.56  Yet the 
generalissimo made one last attempt to salvage support from his American ally. Despite 
Marshall’s muted objection and Chiang’s own lukewarm support, Chiang’s wife flew to 
Washington on a Navy aircraft for the purposes of consulting with both Marshall and 
President Truman.57  Meeting with Marshall over the course of several hours on 
December 3rd, she pleaded for a public statement of support by the U.S. government and 
the appointment of a U.S. Army envoy, a “spark plug” in her words, to energize the 
Nationalist military effort. Marshall politely declined her requests. With diplomatic but 
firm language, he made it clear that any statement from the United States would do more 
harm than good, and that any envoy sent would likely become directly involved in the 
civil war.58  Unlike his previous hospitality to Madame Chiang, the president was also 
courteous but wasted little time on his foreign visitor. By this point Truman felt that he 
had little choice. A CIA report he had received a week earlier conservatively estimated 
that nearly all of North China would fall to Mao’s armies within thirty days.  Despite 
pleas from the China Lobby the president had no intention of expending any more time 
and effort on what he considered a lost cause.59 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Westad, Decisive Encounters, 198. 
57 Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, 533. 
58 Memorandum of Conversation with Madame Chiang, December 3, 1948, Papers of Harry S. Truman, 
President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 151, TPL.  
59 Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for the President, November 24, 1948, Papers of Harry S. 
Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 151, TPL.  
	   243 
Within a week of the election, Badger had at last accepted the inevitable: 
regardless of what happened in Washington, Nationalist China was doomed. In a private 
letter to a friend at the State Department, he conceded that Chiang’s armies had lost the 
will to fight.  He speculated that the Nationalist government would not last long, and 
bitterly concluded that China would be Communist in the near term, writing, “With the 
emergence of a Communist dominated national government, we will have, in a very real 
sense, lost the cold war in this part of the world.”  For him the only positive aspect in the 
situation was that a newly Communist China would face nearly insurmountable 
economic and political difficulties, problems that would take years or even decades to 
overcome.60           
By early December the evacuation of civilians and dependents from Qingdao was 
all but complete, and two days after Christmas an unusual and rather strained meeting 
took place onboard Admiral Badger’s flagship, the amphibious command ship USS 
Estes (AGC-12). There the admiral met with a group of Qingdao city leaders, led by Li 
Tai-Fang, Chairman of the Qingdao Municipal Council. Though at all times courteous, 
the Chinese businessmen repeatedly attempted to get a clear answer to one simple 
question: was the United States going to completely withdraw from Qingdao?  
Unwilling to convey the president’s decision, Badger deflected the question with 
considerable skill and informed the group that the redeployment of forces was a common 
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military practice, and did not automatically imply withdrawal. He then reminded Mr. Li 
that the Navy would prefer to stay in Qingdao as long as they were welcome.61    
 Despite Badger’s obfuscation nearly everyone could see that the decision for 
withdrawal had been made. Even before the first day of 1949 most Navy and Marine 
Corps personnel had boarded the warships and transports anchored in the harbor.  The 
American consul in Nanjing wrote to the soon retiring Marshall that little secrecy 
remained on American intentions, writing, “As a result almost open discussion of 
withdrawal by some Naval and Marine officers, withdrawal is now open secret Qingdao, 
only the date a matter of speculation.”62  On January 10th the last remaining military 
personnel were withdrawn to the warships and transports at anchor in Qingdao harbor.63    
The Americans were not the only ones pulling out. In early December, Chiang 
had ordered all Nationalist personnel to withdraw from the Shandong Peninsula.64  The 
Chinese Naval Training Center at Qingdao had been relocated almost a year earlier. 
Long the pride of Admiral Cooke’s efforts to build a new navy for the Nationalists, the 
decision to move the center to Taiwan had been made back in October 1947. Rear 
Admiral Stuart Murray oversaw the transfer of equipment and personnel, and by 
September 1948 more than three-quarters of the training center facilities’ and equipment 
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had been moved to Amoy and Taiwan.65  Amoy, another Nationalist stronghold located 
across the straits from Taiwan, would also fall to the Communists during their takeover 
of southeastern China. Yet despite the departure of his own forces, Chiang somehow 
held out hope that the U.S. Navy’s presence in Qingdao would continue.  During a brief 
meeting with Badger on January 17th, 1949 Chiang asked the admiral if the Navy was 
about to fully withdraw from Qingdao. With the utmost caution, Badger remained 
noncommittal, declaring that the movement of American aircraft and supplies from land 
bases to ships was primarily for weather related reasons. A haggard and frustrated 
Chiang did not press the issue. Yet it was apparent to nearly everyone that once Truman 
had triumphed in the 1948 election American days in Qingdao were numbered.66 
 Afterwards the pace of withdrawal grew even more rapid as the Communists 
continued their advance. A last minute plea from Nationalist General Yen His Shen to 
remain in the city was brushed off.67   On January 31st the last American military flight 
landed in Qingdao, and within a few days all aircraft were transferred to the remaining 
aircraft carriers. One week later 1,600 Marines were redeployed from the city, departing 
onboard the troop transports USS Henrico and Renfield as a Marine Corps band played 
“California, Here I Come.” With their departure only seventy Americans remained in the 
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city, organizing the remaining logistical supplies and preparing for the inevitable 
complete evacuation.68   
In the midst of the withdrawal, in February, American politics again intervened. 
A month earlier Mao Zedong and the CCP had begun entertaining the notion of a 
negotiated settlement to the war, and had listed a series of conditions for such talks to 
proceed. As Chiang’s biographer succinctly puts it, Mao’s conditions, which included 
the surrender of Chiang and his family for war crimes, amounted to “unconditional 
surrender.”69 Mindful of the potential for such talks, however, Truman and the State 
Department ordered that any further evacuations from Qingdao be delayed for a few 
weeks, as it was believed that such action would strengthen the Nationalist position 
during negotiations. Both Truman and Ambassador Stuart felt that a “more deliberate 
withdrawal” would encourage the peace talks.70 Such hopes proved futile, however, as 
the preliminary negotiations failed and the loading of men and material in Qingdao 
resumed.  On February 23rd Admiral Badger transferred his flag to USS El Dorado 
(AGC-11), a replacement for the USS Estes that had been sent to San Francisco for 
decommissioning and took his new flagship underway for a month long cruise, visiting 
the Nationalist strongholds of Amoy, Takao, and Shanghai.71 After returning to Qingdao 
in late March, Badger began to accelerate the phased withdrawal.  On May 7th the 
admiral telegraphed Ambassador Stuart that he recommended the American naval 
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presence in Qingdao be reduced to one cruiser, two destroyers, and four naval 
auxiliaries, a far cry from the dozens of warships that crowded the beautiful harbor just 
three years earlier.72     
During the months of April and May Badger’s small fleet also assisted with the 
evacuation of American and British personnel from South China. The hospital ship USS 
Repose (AH-16), long stationed at Qingdao, became a temporary home to hundreds of 
Americans fleeing Shanghai.73 The finale for North China came on May 25th, when all 
remaining U.S. Navy ships and personnel were withdrawn from Qingdao. The final 
diplomatic cable from the State Department in the city concludes as follows: “The 
Commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Western Pacific, has reported that all remaining U.S. 
Naval units were withdrawn from Qingdao on May 25th, 1949.  With this action the 
phased withdrawal of naval forces from Qingdao has been completed.”74  The U.S. Navy 
had closed its last chapter on China. As Cooke, Dennison and Forrestal had feared, the 
grey hulls of the U.S. Navy would no longer have a place in the teeming ports of 
mainland China. 
A few weeks later another departure occurred. Mentally and physically 
exhausted, James Forrestal resigned as Secretary of Defense in March 1949.  Forrestal 
had long been a trusted member of Truman’s administration, but his refusal to campaign 
for the president in the 1948 election coupled with disagreements over defense 
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unification, the new state of Israel, and several other issues soured their relationship. 
Truman had also been receiving disquieting reports about Forrestal’s mental health for 
some time but had delayed acting on them out of respect for his longtime aide.75  
Responding to his letter of resignation the president praised the first Secretary of 
Defense, declaring that, “Your service to your country covering a period of almost nine 
years during this administration and that of my predecessor has been as varied as it has 
been distinguished.” Forrestal was to officially leave office on March 31st, though 
Truman expected him to be available for consultations and advice.76 Before his departure 
Truman awarded the first Secretary of Defense the Distinguished Service Medal, 
America’s highest civilian honor.77      
The remaining ships that made up Western Forces, Pacific were now without a 
homeport.   Not wanting to place them under the command of General MacArthur in 
Japan, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Denfeld chose to base them temporarily at 
newly rebuilt facilities at Subic Bay, in the Philippines. Those Marines not sent to the 
States found a new home in Okinawa. And as a fitting postscript the ship most identified 
with the American naval presence in Qingdao was soon retired. USS Estes, the much 
beloved flagship to both Admiral Cooke and Badger, was decommissioned at the 
Hunter’s Point San Francisco Naval Shipyard on June 30th, 1949.78  Her 
decommissioning seemed both ironic and appropriate. As the final flagship for the last 
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American admirals in China, her role, like the fabled China Marines and gunboats of the 
Yangtze, all belonged to the past now. More than a half century of American military 
presence in China had come to an end.79      
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CONCLUSION 
On May 22nd, 1949 James Forrestal fell to his death from the 16th floor of the 
Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland. His death was labeled a suicide, but 
decades later doubts and conspiracies still lingered about his end. Further calamities 
soon followed. Just three days later Shanghai would fall to Mao Zedong’s armies.  
Beijing and the rest of North China had long since been overrun.  Chiang Kai-shek, 
having spent the summer in desperate attempts to stave off the collapse of his regime, 
made preparations to depart Chongqing for Taiwan.1 On October 1st, having demolished 
all opposition Mao Zedong proclaimed the new People’s Republic of China in Beijing. 
The following day the Soviet Union recognized the new nation. The worst fears of 
Forrestal and Charles Cooke seemed to have been realized. The Nationalists had been 
destroyed and Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party, in lockstep with Moscow, was 
now in control in Beijing. 
Meanwhile the administration of Harry Truman attempted to absolve itself of 
responsibility for the outcome of the Chinese Civil War. In January of 1949, as the 
Nationalist collapse seemed imminent Truman ordered the newly elevated Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson to prepare an official report on the matter. Released to the public in 
August and entitled United States Relations with China, With Special Reference to the 
Period 1944-1949, the report provided a lengthy and overstuffed defense of both 
Roosevelt and Truman’s policies in China. Over a thousand pages in length, the China 
1	  Chongqing fell to the Communists on December 1st 1949, and Chiang flew to Taiwan on the 10th. 
Jonathan Fenby, China’s Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 
2003): 496-497.	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White Paper, as it was informally known, was a detailed narrative of U.S. military, 
economic, and diplomatic relations with China and Chiang’s GMD.  Acheson, who had 
succeeded George Marshall as Secretary of State in January 1949, offered this mea culpa 
early in the paper, writing, “The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous 
result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United 
States.  Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of 
its capabilities could have changed that result.”2 
Months before the release of the China White Paper Congressional Republicans 
had held hearings on Truman’s China policy. Claire Chennault, who testified before 
Congress on May 3rd, 1949 predicted that China’s collapse would lead to the fall of 
Indochina, Indonesia, and much of the rest of Asia to communism.3 The release of the 
White Paper had been intended to offer a reasonable account of American policy in 
China and quiet the growing controversy about America’s perceived failure. Yet it had 
the opposite effect. Truman’s critics assailed the report. Congressional Republicans, 
supported by the influential China Lobby, called it a whitewash of the facts. Energized 
by a presidential administration on the defensive, they demanded action long before the 
final collapse of the Nationalists. Pro-Nationalist congressmen repeated the long 
standing belief that Mao Zedong and the CCP took their orders from Moscow.  
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In his scathing attack on the presidency of Harry Truman, historian Arnold 
Offner admits that Truman inherited a frustrating and confusing policy on China, but 
places blame on both Truman and Marshall for their inability to work with Mao and the 
CCP, and continually showing preference for the Nationalists and starting the mediation 
effort with closed minds, writing, “In fact, from the start Truman and his chief aides 
viewed the CCP as agents of Soviet power, not as Chinese or Marxists bent on pursuing 
their own political and national interests that historically were often at odds with 
Russian/Soviet interests.”4 The Truman administration made many miscalculations in 
China, perhaps the most prominent being the naïve belief that throwing George Marshall 
at the problem would provide a quick solution. Yet as this study shows, Stalin 
continually pressed his hard won Yalta concessions on China and offered more 
assistance to the CCP than acknowledged by Offner.       
As for the U.S. Navy, its hopes for a permanent place in China’s future vanished 
with the final departure from Qingdao. Time and time again the Navy’s leaders in both 
Washington and China, most notably Chief of Staff Admiral William Leahy, Forrestal, 
and Charles Cooke, pushed back against Marshall and both the U.S. Army and State 
Department on China policy.  To make sense of this one must first look backwards a few 
years. Much of the Navy’s determination to stay in China can be traced back to the 
wartime decisions of Franklin Roosevelt. The decision to bring the Soviet Union into the 
war against Japan, the agreements made regarding China at Yalta, and the lofty place the 
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president envisioned for China in the postwar world directly and indirectly influenced 
the Navy leadership’s posture. Sizing up the comparative postwar predictions of 
Winston Churchill and Roosevelt, historian Max Hastings offers this revealing analysis, 
writing, “The president’s world vision was more enlightened, yet even less realistic. He 
pinned his faith for the future upon the new United Nations organization, the rise of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s China, and a working partnership between America and the Soviet 
Union.”5 
Of course, Roosevelt’s vision for the future was not only wrong, it was 
hopelessly idealistic and naïve. Stalin was not the partner he had hoped for, nor was 
Chiang Kai-shek. Yet Roosevelt’s predictions, in the Navy’s eyes, became intertwined 
with the Cold War. Nationalist China, whatever its battlefield record, had been a staunch 
ally of the United States, and was a nation that had endured eight years of brutal war and 
millions of casualties at the hands of the Japanese. Preventing this huge population from 
falling to communism became a priority.  The Navy’s senior leaders were unwilling to 
abandon this ally and country so easily.  
For the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, long a goal of Roosevelt, the United States 
and China both paid a heavy price. Although it almost certainly ended the war more 
rapidly, Soviet control of the huge province permitted the Russians to gain a semi-
permanent stronghold in Dalian and fed into the narrative of the Cold War. Although the 
precise level of support remains unclear, the Soviet Union provided aid and comfort, and 
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its greatest vulnerability. Without Soviet control of Manchuria and even the minimal 
support that went along with it, the CCP may not have survived the fall of 1945 to 
emerge capable of winning the civil war three years later. 
Another aspect of this attitude was the Navy’s experience in China during the 
war. In stark contrast to U.S. Army the Navy had a productive and largely positive 
relationship with the GMD, especially the controversial Dai Li. The centerpiece of this 
was the also much debated Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO). Milton 
Miles and SACO were able to forge a remarkably effective organization in China, a fact 
that incensed both General Albert Wedmeyer and the China-Burma-India Army staff.  
Wedemeyer’s relationship with Chiang was an improvement over the disaster that was 
Joseph Stilwell, but considerable friction existed between the two as Wedemeyer 
consistently argued that the Nationalists’ corrupt and inflexible nature would lead to 
their downfall.  Furthermore, many Navy leaders, most notably Admiral Ernest J. King, 
were eager to move in and reclaim China from the Army’s control at the war’s end. A 
force of nature in his own way, King’s longstanding desire to return the Navy to China 
ensured that his protégé, Charles Cooke, pushed continuously for the Navy to remain in 
Qingdao.       
The second reason for the Navy and Marine’s attitudes on China can be found in 
the realities of the postwar U.S. military establishment. For the U.S. Navy and Marine 
Corps, the years following Japan’s surrender in 1945 were uncertain times mired in 
defensiveness.  The very existence of both the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps hung in the 
balance, as the power of the atomic bomb and new ideas about warfare seemed to 
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presage their demise. Air Force leaders, strongly supported by the Army, argued that 
strategic bombing should become first line of defense for the United States, not the grey 
fleets of the past. The Marines faced an even more existential test in the postwar years, 
as senior Army leaders such as General Omar Bradley expressed a prophetic certainty 
that amphibious landings could never be a part of any future war.6 As historian Allan R. 
Millet concludes, “the Marine Corps found itself pitted against a strong War 
Department-executive branch-Congressional coalition that wanted to strip the Corps of 
its wartime amphibious assault mission, transfer Marine aviation to the newly 
independent Air Force, and so constrain Marine combat functions that the Corps could 
have been a force in readiness only if its opponents had been Pacific islanders.”7  
Both services suffered overwhelming postwar reductions. The Marine Corps was 
shrunk from a high of more than 450,000 on V-J Day to 155,00 a year later.8 The vast 
grey fleets that had triumphed in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were steadily 
being mothballed or sold for scrap, as the Navy went from over 1,200 major warships to 
less than 240 five years later.9  The usefulness of a modern fleet was being called into 
question by both air and land strategists who argued that the atomic bomb made all but a 
coastal naval force obsolete. Future wars, they said, would be won by land armies 
supported by heavy bombers capable of delivering nuclear payloads deep into enemy 
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  Merrill Bartlett, ed., Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare (Annapolis, 
MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1983): ix.	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  Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: MacMillan 
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territory. Navies would no longer be needed.  As the military establishment embarked 
upon the complex and difficult process of both demobilization and unification, Navy and 
Marine Corps leaders feared their unique capabilities and prestige were in danger of 
being lost forever. In the postwar world the U.S. Army was in control of the occupation 
of Germany and Japan. The new Air Force positioned itself at the guardian of nuclear 
warfare. And U.S Navy leaders argued safeguarding China was its role. The top 
leadership of the USMC agreed. 
The views of the Army and Air Force ignored thousands of years of military 
history and relied on unproven and ephemeral opinions regarding airpower and nuclear 
weapons. Yet as ridiculous as these arguments seem today many civilian and military 
leaders of the time believed them. To combat these prevailing views advocated by their 
rival services the Navy’s leadership struggled to find a role to justify its existence. A 
strong defense of China and the prevention of a Communist takeover became one of 
those missions the Navy leadership considered essential.  Men like Forrestal, Leahy, and 
Cooke seized upon the growing Cold War as evidence that the Navy and Marines were 
urgently needed in China. Even after the military necessity or even logic of keeping the 
Seventh Fleet/Western Forces, Pacific in Qingdao had passed they felt the symbolic 
presence of U.S. warships and fighting men was an important part of resisting Soviet 
expansion.   
The rivalry between the Army and Navy leadership in China ebbed and flowed 
over the five years covered in this study, but the tension was very real.  For the Army 
leadership, especially George Marshall, China was a task to be overcome. But once his 
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mediation mission failed he turned his back on the GMD. The Navy’s relationship with 
China was far more complex. The Navy’s arguments for retaining a presence and a 
working base in China were based both on strategy and nostalgia.  Keeping China from 
falling into communism was certainly part of its strategic logic, as was providing a 
buffer against the Soviet Union. The Navy, and to a lesser extent the Marine Corps, had 
a longstanding proprietary relationship with China. For over a quarter century Navy 
gunboats patrolled Chinese rivers to enforce the Open Door. Duty in the vast country 
was considered the highlight of one’s career. Nostalgia for the China from decades past 
crept into the Navy’s arguments, long after it made strategic or political sense.  
A discerning reader might conclude from this study that the Army/Navy 
differences over China were more a clash of personalities than sound disagreements over 
strategy and policy. And there is some truth to this. The idiosyncratic and brilliant minds 
of Forrestal, Cooke, Marshall, and Wedemeyer are a large part of this study.  But what 
was World War II but often a clash of larger than life personalities?  Men like George 
Patton and Douglas MacArthur have become legends for their unique bombast and ego 
on the battlefield. In China, the personality clashes between Joseph Stilwell and Chiang 
Kai-shek are an ineluctable aspect of history. And this only includes the top military 
leaders.  An understanding of personality in conflict, but especially World War II, is 
essential. 
Forrestal, Leahy, and Cooke agreed on the need to safeguard China from 
Communist expansion. Although all three recognized the endemic corruption and 
disorganized nature of the GMD, they also agreed that the alternative was much worse. 
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Of the two Forrestal and Cooke were the most staunchly anti-communist. For them the 
admonitions of George Kennan on the dangers of worldwide Soviet expansion were very 
real. Neither felt that Harry Truman was doing enough to repel the communist threat in 
Asia, and so they did what they could with what they had. Admiral Oscar Badger, 
though in lockstep with much of his predecessors’ views, had little more than a year as 
head of Western Forces, Pacific, and by the time he assumed command the communists 
were almost at his doorstep on the Shandong Peninsula. 
Qingdao, that former German colony that became synonymous with the U.S. 
Seventh Fleet and the China Marines, was retained by the Navy as a forward base for 
three major reasons. The complex political situation in the Philippines made the use of 
former naval bases in that country uncertain. In Japan the dominance of Douglas 
MacArthur, the “American Caesar” made unattractive the locating of bases. Perhaps the 
most important reason for maintaining an American military presence in Qingdao was to 
provide an important counterweight to Soviet control of nearby Dalian.    
After 1946, the Navy played a more important role in China than did the 
Marines. In truth, after the spring of 1946 the Marines’ presence in China proved an 
impediment to any hope of settlement between the GMD and the CCP. The 1st and 6th 
Marines were extremely useful in keeping trains running and moving coal to cold and 
hungry people in China’s teeming cities in the fall and winter of 1945, but the sight of 
Marine chevrons in the country fueled the perception among the CCP that the United 
States was supporting its enemy as an imperialist power. The movement of the 
Nationalist armies by the Seventh Fleet seemed to confirm this. Perhaps if the Marines 
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had been withdrawn at the same time as the Soviet departure from Manchuria or by June 
of 1946, this image could have been avoided. However, the steady drawdown had the 
unfortunate effect of still angering the communists and making the Marines vulnerable, 
as was proved with lethality at Anping and Hsin Ho.   
 Despite the final outcome of the Chinese Civil War, which saw Nationalist China 
all but extinguished and the banner of communism spread from Shanghai to Urumqi, the 
1944-1949 U.S. Navy and Marine operations were not a failure. Nor were they a thinly 
disguised attempt to reintroduce imperialism or colonialism to East Asia. Historians who 
argue this ignore a basic fact of many military operations: they were very pragmatic.10  
Setting aside concerns over the Soviet Union, the U.S. Navy and Marines were sent to 
China in an attempt to stabilize a catastrophic situation, prevent greater bloodshed, and 
get the Japanese out of the country they had brutalized for more than eight years. And 
thanks to the American sailors and Marines these goals were largely met. The 
repatriation effort stands out as the best example of this campaign. Now all but 
forgotten, this was a massive logistical operation moving millions of former enemies, 
and undoubtedly contributed to healing of relations between the United States and Japan.    
 Were Cooke, Leahy, and Forrestal wrong to advocate so strongly for a continued 
U.S. military presence in China? Certainly they exaggerated even the symbolic 
importance of the Seventh Fleet and China Marines. After 1946 their presence was 
almost superfluous, and for the Marines especially dangerous. And they were wrong 
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   260 
about Chiang Kai-shek, his corrupt government, and the staying power of the 
Nationalists.  Yet if they were wrong about China, they were in many ways correct about 
Asia, as the great continent would become the primary battleground in the Cold War, 
instead of Europe.  For all the failures often attributed to their mission, the military tasks 
performed by the Seventh Fleet and III Marine Expeditionary Force proved far more 
successful than the diplomatic effort undertaken by Marshall.  As the guns fell silent in 
Asia, American sailors and Marines brought a measure of security and confidence to a 
nation that had known only war for decades. They ended up staying too long, but for a 
short period their presence made a difference to many and saved countless lives. That, 
not the Marshall Mission, was perhaps the greatest gift the United States gave to China.   
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